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Abstract 
 
This dissertation aims to contextualise the history of the Cap Arcona, providing not 
only the first detailed reconstruction of the events which led to the incarceration of 
concentration camp prisoners on the ship, but also exploring British motives for its 
bombing. It argues, firstly, that the imprisonment of the former camp inmates on the 
Cap Arcona was not undertaken with a particular plan in mind, but in desperate reaction 
to a chain of circumstances: the rapid advance of the Allies, the hurried evacuation of 
Neuengamme as well as conflicts between Party, civilian and military offices created a 
problematic situation to which the ships at harbour in Lübeck Bay appeared to offer an 
interim solution. Secondly, it argues that the bombing of the ship by the British also 
resulted from a chain of circumstances, albeit a very different one. Concerned lest the 
Russians advance too far, the British pushed their forces north rapidly in the early part 
of 1945, hoping to get to the North Sea as fast as possible. In their rush, the British 
became increasingly careless and, in the case of the Cap Arcona, over-hastiness, poor 
communications and neglect of proper reconnaissance led to a disastrous error of 
judgement. By interweaving and chronologically juxtaposing the German and British 
sides of the story, the dissertation seeks to show how the war’s approaching end 
impacted on policies, thinking and practices which, while of course very different in the 
German and British cases, made possible the catastrophe in Lübeck Bay. 
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Chapter One 
 
The Cap Arcona: Historical Myth and Theory 
 
On the afternoon of 3 May 1945, a squadron of RAF Typhoons began a descent to 
attack Axis shipping in Neustadt Bay. Anchored in the Bay was the Cap Arcona, laden 
with over five thousand concentration camp prisoners who had been evacuated to the 
coast as no suitable alternative could be found. At around 3pm, Typhoons from Second 
Tactical Air Force attacked the Cap Arcona. The result left the Cap Arcona’s crew and 
prisoners struggling for survival in the icy Baltic waters. Yet some seventy years after 
the tragic sinking there still remain key and crucial questions that have yet to be 
explored. 
 
Overview 
The sinking of the Cap Arcona is often portrayed in terms of culpability.
1
 Any 
discussion focusing on the attack has largely been concerned with the need to assign 
responsibility to either German Commanders or British military HQ. As a consequence, 
historians have thus far under- appreciated the topic of the sinking in terms of its wider 
context.  Some fundamental questions, therefore, remain unanswered. What was the 
purpose of using the Cap Arcona? Did British forces have information regarding the 
                                                          
1 For an overview, see Wilhelm Lange, Dokumentation: Cap Arcona, Das Tragische Ende der 
KZ-Häftlings-Flotte am 3. Mai 1945 (Struve's Buchdruckerei und Verlag: Eutin Germany, 
2005); Roy C. Nesbit, Failed to Return: Mysteries of the Air 1939-1945 (Patrick Stephens 
Limited: Wellingborough, 1988). 
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placement of prisoners on board the Cap Arcona prior to an aerial attack? Why did 
British forces press hard to Lübeck in April 1945? What were the driving factors behind 
such a move? Why did the British attack shipping in May 1945? Why did the British 
push hard to the Baltic coast in April 1945? 
 
This thesis will open out the perspective beyond merely the sinking of the Cap Arcona 
and examine more closely this broader contextualisation, moving away from the 
moralising discussions, and focus instead on longer-term factors which help to explain 
the Cap Arcona tragedy within a wider framework.  For the British side the Cap Arcona 
tragedy will be used to expand our knowledge and understanding of British military 
strategy in the final months of the war, including aerial strategies. In terms of the 
German narrative, by analysing the Cap Arcona in the wider context, our understanding 
of the evacuation processes from German camps yields new results. One useful aspect 
to consider is the method used to evacuate the camp. At a time when almost every 
aspect of German society was impacted by chaos, the transportation method of 
evacuating Neuengamme is largely unique when compared to other camps in this final 
period. The use of rail trucks, at a time when most camps either evacuated by foot, or 
were liberated, allows for further exploration as to the motives of the SS, as well as 
other local state functionaries and civilian administrators. 
 
 
By 3 May German forces were staging a last-ditched attempt at resisting the Allied 
advance. Sensing the end, British forces became more hastened in their approach to 
warfare. There were elements within Second Tactical Air Force that felt that Nazi forces 
11 
 
were staging a last-ditched attempt to flee to Norway. In direct response to this 
perceived threat, the number and focus of air assaults against shipping rose in the final 
days of the war. Throughout April and into May 1945, aerial attacks by British forces 
increased ten-fold as resistance in the air was often absent. The German Luftwaffe was 
unable to stage any substantial resistance particularly due to a lack of fuel supplies.  
 
 
With the war nearing an end, both British and German forces were impeded by the 
overriding military situation. For Britain, there developed an overwhelming feeling 
amongst military personnel that Nazi Germany would be forced in full capitulation. 
However the belief within Germany was that a partial surrender could still be negotiated 
on the Western Front. This led to an overall situation that was often marked by chaos. 
By chaos, this thesis refers to a situation that embodied confusion and disorder in all 
realms of society. The term ‘chaos’ often relates to a series of conditions that form 
together to create total imbalance and disintegration.
2
 Whereby the social stability of 
normal society breaks down, this often leads to a situation that created a rift within 
everyday society. As Blatman notes, the lack of a guarantee of social continuity by the 
political rulers developed a situation where the wider populace has a total loss of 
confidence in the existing regime.
3
 But as German and British forces entered the final 
weeks of the war, much of their judgment was further influenced by the term “fog of 
                                                          
2
 See Daniel Blatman, The Death Marches: The Final Phase of Nazi Genocide (Harvard 
University Press: London, 2011), p. 408. 
3
 Blatman, The Death Marches, pp. 408 – 411. 
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war”.4 During the final months of conflict armed forces were confronted with 
difficulties in determining situational awareness. Therefore the term “fog of war” is 
used to define a lack of uncertainty in both British and German military operations. This 
uncertainty was a culmination of communication breakdown, twined with a series of 
operational orders that were often out-dated, and led to further military confusion. This 
led to a potential situation of ‘operational blindness’ whereby military actions, by either 
British of German forces, were conducted in a scenario that they were ill-prepared and 
uncertain for. Intelligence is often used to prevent a so-called fog of war incident 
occurring during combat; however judgement can become impaired if there is a 
breakdown in communication.  
 
 
Unfortunately, the lack of scrutiny in the immediate postwar investigations has given 
rise to significant media attention. This attention, by and large, criticised the British 
pilots who had been engaged in the attack.
5
 Furthermore, because there was limited 
information available regarding the attack, this left considerable scope for media 
researchers to interpret the available information as best they could. As a direct 
                                                          
4
 For a discussion on the term “fog of war” please see Simon Godfrey, British Army 
Communications in the Second World War: Lifting the Fog of Battle (Bloomsbury Academic: 
London, 2014), pp. 181 – 212; Monica Duffy Toft and Talbot Imlay, “Strategic and Military 
Planning under the Fog of Peace” in Talbot C. Imlay & Monic Duffy Toft (eds) The Fog of 
Peace and War Planning: Military and Strategic Planning under Uncertainty (Routledge: 
Oxon, 2006), pp. 1 – 10; Hew Strachan, “Strategy and the limitation of war” in Patrick Cronin 
(ed.), The Impenenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern Warfare and Strategic Surprise 
(Praeger: Westport, 2008), pp. 67 – 84. 
5 See “The Sinking of the Cap Arcona”, https://www.feldgrau.com/WW2-Germany-Cap-
Arcona-Cruise-Liner-Sinking [Accessed 17 May 2017, 15:36pm]. 
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consequence of this interpretation, much of our current understanding of the sinking, as 
a singular event, has been distorted. 
 
Secondary Literature 
 
The press continues, around the anniversary of 3 May, to re-ignite the tragic story of the 
sinking of the Cap Arcona, often in sensationalist headlines. The tragedy of this event 
has often attracted numerous media articles that have been widely publicised. The rise 
of media attention began in the 1980s. Prior to this there had been very few accounts 
published outlining or even acknowledging the attack.
6
 During the 1980s the West 
German magazine Stern published a series of articles condemning the role the British 
played in the attack. It had claimed that some of the pilots were aware of secret 
intelligence days prior to an aerial assault regarding the prison fleet fleeing to Norway.
7
 
Stern further claimed that British intelligence did not seek clarity on the issue.
8
  In a 
direct response, a number of former airmen used the UK print media in an attempt to 
rebuff the allegations. Within the newspaper article it stated that “the ship bore no 
markings to show that it carried civilians, and he [Lawrence Stark] had been briefed that 
it was being used by Nazi leaders and troops seeking to continue the war from 
                                                          
6 See various early works, Joachim Wölfer, Cap Arcona: Biographie eines Schiffes: Geschichte 
einer Reederei (Koehlers: Hamburg, 1977); Otto von Mielke, Fahrt ins Verderben: 
Schnelldampfer Cap Arcona (Moewig: Munich, 1953). 
7 See Günther Schwarberg, Angriffsziel Cap Arcona, (Steidl: Göttingen, 1998). See also “Stern 
Magazine ‚Cap Arcona”, 3 March – 7 April 1983 (Vol. 10-15). The article proves unreliable on 
a number of key instances. One example is on the details of which RAF squadrons attacked the 
Cap Arcona. 
8
 See Schwarberg, Angriffsziel Cap Arcona, pp. 39-51. 
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Norway”.9 But this readily accessible form of media only further fuelled the confusion 
surrounding the subsequent attack on the Cap Arcona. In dividing opinion over the role 
of British airmen, media articles enable us to critically evaluate the different viewpoints 
of other significant nationalities. For instance there have been a variety of headlines 
which have headlined the sinking as a “British error” or “pilots tricked”. 10  Both 
headlines arguably only sought to attract a wider audience in a blatant attempt to shock 
their readership by over-estimating the number of deaths. The difficulty is that 
controversial events are often mis-represented in the print media, who by their very 
nature, seek to shock their readership. One case in point is an article published in the 
British newspaper, The Independent. The article suggested that over 10,000 prisoners 
perished at the hands of the Allies.
11
 This greatly exaggerates the number who died and 
over-embellishes the British attack. Reliance on this type of readily accessible medium 
has led many amateurs to form a historical narrative that is simply inaccurate. A quick 
survey of the internet will produce headlines such as “the friendly fires of hell”, 12 “the 
                                                          
9 Daily Telegraph, “British pilot saw Prison Ship survivors shot”, 13 March 1983, p.2. The 
Daily Telegraph’s defence correspondent Richard Greenfield interviewed former pilot 
Lawrence Stark who provided the above quotation. See also David Stafford, Endgame 1945: 
Victory, Retribution, Liberation (Thistle Publishing: London, 2015), p. 245. 
10 See various media publications, e.g.  The Independent, Max Arthur, “RAF Pilots tricked into 
killing 10,000 camp survivors at the end of the war”, 16 October 2000; Daily Telegraph, 06 
March 1983, Daily Telegraph 10 March 1983; Daily Telegraph 13 March 1983. 
 
11 The Independent, Max Arthur, “RAF Pilots tricked into killing 10,000 camp survivors at the 
end of the war”, 16 October 2000. See also, Vintage News, 20 January 2016, “WWII: For nearly 
39 years, parts of skeletons were being washed ashore”, Accessed 18 February 2016, 
https://www.thevintagenews.com/2016/01/20/wwii-nearly-39-years-parts-skeletons-washed-
ashore-ss-cap-Arcona-carrying-around-5500-concentration-camp-inmates/; Die Spiegel, 
“Versenkung der Cap Arcona: Schwimmendes Konzentrationslager”, 30 April 2015. 
 
12 Jerusalem Post, 18 April 2007. 
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strange sinking of the Nazi Titanic”13  or “British error killed WW2 camp inmates”.14 
This type of readily accessible medium has been accepted by the wider public as 
historical fact, rather than a true reflection of the historical narrative. 
 
 
The focus on the sinking is, generally then, a focus on the topic of responsibility. In 
attempting to apportion blame, previous narratives often attribute this blame on the 
British who attacked the ships.
15
  Investigative research by German author’s continued 
throughout the 1980s. The British attack has been the subject of numerous general 
histories and journalistic interpretations, which largely examine the attack based on 
survivor and eye-witness accounts. The focus continued to be on the British attack, and 
their actions in the immediate aftermath.
16
 Schön’s reconstructive work on the Cap 
Arcona asserted that the British could not be acquitted for their actions.
17
 Schön 
suggested that “the attack on the Cap Arcona was a senseless bombing raid resulting in 
the death of 8,000 inmates”.18 One possible argument for his stance was how he viewed 
the wider military situation. On 3 May partial surrender negotiations between Allied 
Commanders and Admiral Dönitz had begun. Under this potential agreement, the Cap 
                                                          
13 Daily Telegraph, 5 March 2012. 
 
14 Shanghai Star (China), 7 March 2000. 
 
15 See various secondary accounts, Schwarberg, Angriffsziel Cap Arcona; Lange, 
Dokumentation: Cap Arcona; Nesbit, Failed to Return; Bogdan Suchowiak, Mai 1945: Die 
Tragödie der Häftlinge von Neuengamme (Rowohlt: Hamburg, 1985). 
16 See Heinz Schön, Die Cap Arcona Katastrophe: Eine Dokumentation nach Augenzeugen-
Berichten (MotorBuch Verlag: Munich, 1989). 
 
17 Schön, Die Cap Arcona Katastrophe, pp. 320-322. 
 
18 Schön, Die Cap Arcona Katastrophe, pp. 320-322. 
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Arcona, military and civilian personnel, as well as the prisoners would have surrendered 
without a fight in Neustadt bay.
19
 But his stance is based on the assumption that German 
forces were willing to sign surrender, and that all forces would surrender without a 
fight.  Within the climate of war, Second Tactical Air Force (TAF) continued to attack 
Axis shipping in a belief that these ships were heading to Norway. 
 
 
Nevertheless neither Schön nor Schwarberg have written comprehensively about the 
wider circumstances that culminated in the sinking of the Cap Arcona. Besides, when 
they refer to British aerial actions in their research, this is largely from a German 
perspective.
20
 Therefore their assessment of the role of the British must be handled with 
care. It is a lack of scrutiny of available source material, as well as other wider social 
factors that limit the importance of their work. British aerial actions cannot simply be 
judged in the final weeks of the war. Aerial strategy was part of a broader purpose that 
encompassed the Western Allies’ overall military and strategic goal. 
 
More recent publications have added very little to our understanding the tragic event. 
Watson, whose account was published in 2016, continued to acknowledge the lack of 
scholarly attention, but offered nothing new.
21
 He concluded that “ultimate 
                                                          
19 Schön, Die Cap Arcona Katastrophe, pp. 320-322. 
20 Schön, Die Cap Arcona Katastrophe, pp. 308-322. 
 
21 See Robert P.Watson, Nazi Titanic (Da Capo Press: Massachusetts, 2016). See also, Stefan 
Ineichen, Cap Arcona 1927-1945: Märchenschiff und Massengrab (Limmat Verlag: Zurich, 
2015); Pierre Vallaud and Mathilde Aycard, Le Dernier Camp de la Mort: La tragedie du Cap 
Arcona: 3 Mai 1945 (Editions Tallandier: Paris, 2017); S.P. Geertsema,De ramp in de Lübecker 
Bocht: Nederlanders bij het einde van Neuengamme (Uitgeverij Boom: Meppel, 2011). 
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responsibility is with the Nazis”.22 In response to attributing blame Watson suggests that 
the final acts of barbarism by German forces on those who survived the sinking shows 
clearly that the Nazi guards and SS troops were determined, until the very end, to kill 
the prisoners. In discussing his findings, Watson felt that “many of the Nazis at the 
Baltic coast devoted the last actions of their lives not to repentance and humanity […] 
but to killing those who survived the sinking of the ships”.23 Based largely on 
documents gathered by the late Günther Schwarberg, Watson’s research is hindered by 
an over-reliance on the earlier work of Schwarberg, whom by his profession was a 
journalist and prone to eccentric claims. Thereafter Watson limits his research focus by 
excluding valuable AIR records available in the National Archives (TNA). 
 
The topic of responsibility continues to demonstrate that there remains clear divisions 
among those few works that have attempted to research the sinking of the Cap Arcona. 
By April 1945, the area in and around Schleswig-Holstein was a mass of people, ships, 
armed forces and refugees from the East attempting to flee Soviet forces.
24
  This made 
the area incredibly difficult to survey. In discussing his theory of a trap, Lange 
establishes that ultimately the German forces hid the prisoners on board the Cap Arcona 
in an attempt to hide the atrocities of the camp.
25
 He further argues that the driving force 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
22 Watson, Nazi Titanic, p. 252. 
 
23 Watson, Nazi Titanic, p. 252. 
 
24 See Lange, Dokumentation: Cap Arcona, p. 236. 
25 Lange, Dokumentation: Cap Arcona, pp.  227-236. In summarising his trap theory, Lange 
suggests that Nazi elite simply used the Cap Arcona to hide the prisoners from Neuengamme 
and other such camps.  
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behind such a move was the need to surrender the city of Hamburg. British forces had 
issued an ultimatum that unless the city was surrendered, it would be attacked using the 
full force of Bomber Command.
26
 So in attempting to place the sinking within the 
broader context, Lange was able to present an important argument. Namely those 
German commanders were intent on hiding the atrocities of the camp system in the final 
weeks of the war. While Lange is able to show some important merits to utilising this 
wider perspective, the narrow focus of his time frame, as well as his lack of focus on the 
camp structure and political relationship with the city of Hamburg, limit strongly his 
conclusions. To develop our existing knowledge, a much broader overview of the final 
months of the Second World War are needed, if we can fully appreciate the impact of 
the longer-term factors that played a pivotal role. For instance, the relationship between 
the local civilian administration in Hamburg and the Neuengamme camp is key if we 
are to better understanding why the prisoners were evacuated and placed on the Cap 
Arcona. 
 
At this stage of the war any long term planning simply did not exist. Local civilian 
administrators and party members planned, or at least attempted to, for the immediate 
future. Once the prisoners were loaded aboard the vessels no further action was taken.
27
 
However, the placement of prisoners on the Cap Arcona was not as final as Lange 
                                                          
26 See Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (Phoenix: London, 1995), p. 555. 
27 See various secondary accounts, Detlef Garbe, “Wiederentdeckte Geschichte: Gedenken an 
Todesmärsche, Auffanglager, Cap Arcona und andere Stätten der Erinnerung an das Ende des 
KZ Neuengamme im Westen Deutschlands”,  in Detlef Garbe and Carmen Lange (eds.), 
Häftlinge zwischen Vernichtung und Befreiung: Die Auflösung des KZ Neuengamme und seiner 
Außenlager durch die SS im Frühjahr 1945 (Edition Temmen: Bremen, 2005); Detlef Garbe, 
Neuengamme im System der Konzentrationslager: Studien zur Ereignis-und 
Rezeptionsgeschichte (Metropol Verlag, Berlin, 2015). 
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suggests. The decision-process, as well as the transfer process, highlights that in actual 
fact the ship can be seen as an extension of the physical camp structure. Even to the end, 
the SS continued to retain control and influence over the prisoners once on the ship. 
Therefore Lange misinterprets this transfer process as simply a way to hide the 
prisoners. 
 
The role of the British 
 
Where we have existing representations and discussions surrounding the sinking of the 
Cap Arcona they often focus on the topic of responsibility. This largely fails to take into 
account important research areas that broaden our understanding of the intricate 
processes that led to the sinking. This singular tragic event allows us to draw more 
widely on a number of key areas in the final months of the Second World War. One 
such example is the direction of British military strategy.  In attempting to address why 
British forces attacked shipping, including the Cap Arcona, we need to better 
understand what British military priorities were and therefore what their strategic aims 
were. In focusing on how aerial strategy evolved in the closing stages of the war, we can 
determine whether or not the normal protocols and procedures were followed correctly. 
Moreover, a closer analysis of squadron operational records can give us a better 
understanding of the precise aerial brief.  
 
A common theme in Cap Arcona literature is on the topic of whether or not British 
forces – RAF or Army – had prior knowledge of the prisoners being placed on board the 
vessel. Nesbit suggested that “it is quite apparent that RAF intelligence had no 
20 
 
knowledge of the presence of prisoners in ships in Lübeck”.28 However Nesbit did note 
that,  
 
The men of the RAF, intelligence officers, aircrews as well as those in higher 
command, believed that some of the surviving German forces and their political 
masters intended to escape to Norway and to continue the fight from the 
mountains.
29
 
 
The justification, therefore for the British to attack Neustadt, appears to be founded in 
this notion that the prison fleet was attempting to flee to Norway. One drawback to 
Nesbit’s research is the mis-interpretation of archive sources. For instance he suggested 
that “there are no records of how the victims in the two barges met their fate”.30 Yet a 
closer search of the archives shows that these victims were from the barges that had 
previously attempted to transfer their prisoners onto the Cap Arcona. Once the barges 
drifted ashore, the local police descended on the beach and killed those too sick or weak 
to move.
31
 The relevance of this provides a further dimension to the final days of the 
war being seen as overly chaotic and indeed, highlights the problems of central and 
local communication issues. While one administrative body remained in charge of the 
loading and prisoner transfer, it seemed quite apparent that this information was not 
made readily available to other military units in Neustadt. But, if this information was 
readily available to senior military staff, then this poses a fundamental issue. Should the 
                                                          
28 Nesbit, Failed to Return, p. 172. 
29 Roy Nesbit, “Cap Arcona: Atrocity or Accident”, Aeroplane Monthly, June 1984, p. 289. 
30 Nesbit, Failed to Return, p. 178. See also Watson, Nazi Titanic, p. 245. Watson notes that it 
was all elements within Britain’s military services that had no existing knowledge of the 
prisoners being placed on the vessels in Neustadt Bay. Although he describes in some detail the 
problems associated with air reconnaissance, the bulk of his argument centres on the “fog of 
war” discussion. 
31 See for instance Watson, The Nazi Titanic, pp. 214-215. 
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evacuation period continue to be categorised as an extension of Nazi genocidal policy, 
or should it be deemed a separate act of barbarism? 
32
 
 
Intelligence and prior information remain an important focal area for any wider 
discussion on the sinking of the Cap Arcona. Existing research often notes that the 
Swedish Red Cross representative, Dr. Hans Arnoldsson, had provided the British with 
information regarding the situation in Neustadt Bay.
33
 The basis of this information was 
that a significant number of camp prisoners had been placed onto passenger liners 
docked in Neustadt. This information was passed to British forces on the morning of 3 
May. Later that same day British officers returned to Arnoldsson and after speaking 
with him further promised to act at once on the information.
34
 In terms of their actions, 
on this particular occasion British forces acted in an expedient manner. But there were 
other opportunities for the British to halt an attack on Neustadt.  
 
The most relevant piece of evidence was handed to the liberating British forces at 
Lübeck on 2 May 1945. The ICRC delegate, Paul de Blonay, informed the liberating 
commander that there were concentration camp prisoners housed on ships in Neustadt 
bay.
35
 This information was passed to the relevant department. Yet by some oversight 
                                                          
32 For a discussion see Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary 
Germans and the Holocaust (Abacus: London, 1997). 
33 See Hans Arnoldsson, Natt och Dimma (Bonnier: Stockholm, 1945). 
34 See Wilhelm Lange, Cap Arcona: A Summary of the Cap Arcona disaster in the bay of 
Neustadt on 3 May 1945, http://media.offenes-archiv.de/caparcona_summary.pdf  
35 See Wilhelm Lange, Dokumentation: Cap Arcona; C. Lotz, “Der Untergang des 
Häftlingsschiffes Cap Arcona am 3. Mai 1945: Ein Überblick über Ereignis, 
Erinnerungskulturen und Forschungskontroversen”,  in Bill Niven (ed.),  Die Wilhelm Gustloff: 
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was never processed. Therefore certain areas of Britain’s intelligence department had 
prior knowledge of the situation that faced British forces in Neustadt Bay. Yet as this 
wider social breakdown took hold of all aspects of Britain’s military campaign, the 
broader policy took sole priority.  
 
 
One area of concern was what the British thought that they actually knew. Many 
surveys of the tragic sinking propose that British intelligence suggested that the ships 
docked in Neustadt were preparing to take SS and high-ranking German officials to 
Norway, in a last-ditched attempt to continue the fight. Lange states that “late in the 
afternoon of 2 May 1945, British air reconnaissance spotted two military convoys with 
at least six destroyers, some U-boats, escorts and large transport ships. They had just 
left Neustadt in Holstein”.36 Based on aerial reconnaissance results, Second TAF 
delayed proposed aerial flights until the following day. As for what German 
departments knew of the transfer process in Neustadt Bay, this was primarily held at a 
local level. Extensive discussions and negotiations existed between Gauleiter 
Kaufmann, the Reikosee, and the Merchant Navy in relation to the release of the Cap 
Arcona from the German Navy. These discussions continued until the end of April 
1945.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Geschichte und Erinnerung eines Untergangs (Mitteldeutscher Verlag: Halle, 2011), pp. 120-
142. 
36 Lange, Cap Arcona, p. 5. http://media.offenes-archiv.de/caparcona_summary.pdf 
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While existing research has pointed to the need to look at the sinking in terms of a wider 
context, often these surveys misjudge its relevance. In his study on the Cap Arcona, 
Lange notes that the main problem for researchers lay in the lack of crucial source 
critique.
37
 In acknowledging a potential issue with archival material Lange attempted to 
reconstruct key elements of the tragic sinking on the 3 May. By looking more closely at 
the relationship between the camp at Neuengamme and aid agencies, his research 
developed a clearer understanding of the involvement of the SRC and the prisoners in 
the camp.
38
 Although Bernadotte did not directly assist those placed on the Cap Arcona, 
he did assist a small party of prisoners on a subsequent death march. Moreover his role 
and work with the camp commandant, as well as his discussions with Himmler 
demonstrate clearly that delicate state of central command in the closing stages of the 
campaign. Himmler appeared willing to surrender Scandinavian nationals, but only if 
Bernadotte would act as an intermediary to the West.
39
 But while Lange draws on the 
broader context, he misjudges the relevance to the Cap Arcona tragedy. The 
fundamental importance of this negotiation allows us to understand the wider military 
strategy and its impact on British aerial policy. Furthermore, in analysing the rescue 
operation by the SRC, we can better understand the way in which Second TAF were 
operating in the closing stages of the war. 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 Lange, Dokumentation: Cap Arcona, pp. 13-14. 
38
 Lange, Dokumentation: Cap Arcona, pp. 24-27. 
39 See Peter Longerich, Heinrich Himmler (OUP: Oxford, 2011). 
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Nazi State and Structure 
In attempting to develop our understanding of the intricate details that led to the tragedy 
on 3 May, it is important to draw on the situation that had evolved in the concluding 
weeks of the war. During these final months, historians largely suggest that “German 
society was unravelling as people across the country madly scrambled to save what they 
could and cling to life”.40 On the home front German society was struggling as promises 
of a people’s community had long since faded.  As everyday society unravelled the 
remaining Reich administration stepped up its terror apparatus in a mis-guided attempt 
to re-gain control.
41
 But overall control of Hitler’s Third Reich was fading. Central 
communication began to falter, and those orders that were issued by the Reich centre 
were often outdated or muddled.  But the collapse was much more than a breakdown of 
communication from central office. As Blatman notes,  
the collapse of the apparatus of the state, because of the defeats on the front, the 
advances of the enemy armies, and the chaos that was spreading everywhere that 
made it possible for radical elements in the party, SS, and Gestapo to seize 
control of the disintegrating apparatus of government and exploit it to mobilize 
the masses for this struggle. 
42
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42 Daniel Blatman, “On the Traces of the Death Marches: The Historiographical Challenge”, in 
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Blatman suggests that the situation within the Third Reich was being seized by extreme 
party elements. But in the case of the final evacuation transports Himmler’s often 
confused and indecisive orders demonstrate clearly that the SS commander was more 
willing to use the prisoners as political pawns rather than continue with their 
extermination.
43
 So much so, that the British and Canadian armies liberated the camp at 
Bergen-Belsen with some 50,000 inmates still within the compound.  
 
 
Generally historian’s assessment of the final months of the war often point vividly to a 
State apparatus that was in turmoil. From January 1945 through to capitulation in May 
1945 communication, along with central leadership became disjointed and fragmented. 
Kershaw notes that 
As Nazi rule disintegrated ever more rapidly and fragmentation took the place of 
any semblance of centralised governance, the regime increasingly ran amok.
44
 
 
Centralised command became increasingly difficult as Soviet forces began their assault 
on Berlin. But fundamentally, Nazi state apparatus did not totally disintegrate. In a vain 
attempt to grasp control of the impending situation “police, SS and regional and local 
party officials took matters into their own hands”.45 Therefore it would be unwise to 
suggest that state apparatus descended into total chaos. In fact, the state, even in this 
final period, remained highly resilient to an impending defeat. In defining the Nazi state 
in the final months of the war, it evolved into an intricate, complex system whose 
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44 Kershaw, The End (Allen Lane: London, 2011), pp. 295-96. See also Stephen G. Fritz, 
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behaviour was often unpredictable. At times, therefore, its actions appeared random and 
uncoordinated. 
 
During the latter stages of the war, “Germany became a crumbling state of shortages, its 
urban landscapes dominated by piles of rubble, a country that continued to shed its 
blood in a hopeless quest for survival, under the direction of a frantic leadership that 
was totally cut off from reality”.46 But in defining chaos, this thesis will challenge 
existing beliefs that Nazi society, as well as state apparatus, was in turmoil. It will argue 
that as local state agencies evolved, their ability to function independently of central 
government demonstrated the extreme resilience of parts of a system which, overall, 
was in decline. Paradoxically, however, this ability to function at the same time 
exacerbated the chaotic conditions. Operating in an environment where central 
command was almost non-existent led to a situation where the ability to communicate 
widely with other local departments failed. This blinkered relationship remains 
important as each department, although able to operate independently, was unable to 
function within an integrated system. Therefore, the political and social structure of 
Nazi Germany in the final months of the war functioned in an ad hoc manner. This 
means that those territories that were cut off from the Reich centre were not necessarily 
without structure or guidance. The example of Hamburg will show that while 
communication with Berlin was almost non-existent, local civilian administrators were 
able to provide a certain degree of stability in the closing stages of the war. What 
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emerged was a series of local civilian administrators who guided political policy in the 
closing months of the war. 
 
Camp evacuations 1944 – 45 
The placement of prisoners on the Cap Arcona has largely been seen by some as a 
continuation of the death march policy.
47
 As camps were evacuated in line with 
Himmler’s final order on 14 April 1945, the German countryside became amass with 
camp prisoners. These marching convoys were seen endlessly marching towards a 
destination further behind Axis lines. Through using the Cap Arcona sinking, we can 
better understand how and why the prisoners were placed on the ship. In doing so this 
further develops our existing knowledge of the death march practices in the closing 
stages of the war.  
 
Through autumn 1944 it was increasingly common for state functioning to be developed 
more locally. In turn, this localised structure and policy-making further fuelled the 
uncertainty amongst soldiers, civilians and refugees. But by February 1945 the 
emergence of one localised power house suggests that chaos was not total. Amidst this 
situation, whereby many state departments struggled to function coherently, the 
example of Hamburg highlights that this was not the case. The relationship between 
state agencies and the Party, as well as SS officials, was important in guiding Hamburg 
                                                          
47 For instance, see Blatman, The Death Marches, pp. 155-165; Joachim Neander, “Vernichtung 
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in the final weeks of the war.
48
 One useful example was the relationship between 
Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann and other political Reich institutions. Gauleiter Kaufmann, a 
long-standing party member, and a ruthless businessman, ensured that local businesses, 
as well as administrative functions continued operating. In operating away from the 
reach of central office, the process to ready Neuengamme camp for evacuation shows 
that communication lines functioned locally. Previously, Kershaw has suggested that 
“where communications still functioned, they brought an unceasing flood of new 
decrees and directives from Bormann”.49 But locally, regional representatives ensured 
that their responsibilities were undiminished. It is precisely these aspects of chaos – 
communication, personal motives and agendas – that allow a more thorough overview 
of the Cap Arcona tragedy.  
 
Militarily, German commanders “ultimately, by April 1945 […] just did not know what 
to do with the hundreds of thousands of prisoners still in its domain. In the gathering 
chaos of the last weeks, the death marches reflected the futile flailing of a regime on the 
verge of its own destruction but retaining its murderous capacity to the very end”.50 The 
decision process to evacuate the camp system often caused administrative chaos. From 
the Reich Centre communication was not forthcoming. As Kershaw argues, “only 
unclear or confused guidelines, though leaving much scope for initiative, came from 
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Himmler and the now faltering concentration camp central administration”.51 In reality 
“the collapsing communication network also contributed to the undermining of central 
control”.52 Central government no longer functioned effectively. What emerged was a 
series of localised central functionaries who governed the remaining territories. 
Hamburg is a significant example of how this decentralised command structure 
continued to function amidst total chaos. 
 
The evacuation of Neuengamme in April 1945 is an area which the tragedy of the Cap 
Arcona can broaden our understanding of the intricate policy-making in the final weeks 
of the war. This thesis will explore why it became necessary to evacuate the camp at 
Neuengamme during a time when the area under German control diminished. Why, 
unlike other similar sized camps, had Neuengamme successfully evacuated all inmates? 
What was special about the situation in Neuengamme? Neuengamme had long been 
seen as a business enterprise by the local Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann, and the SS elite in 
Hamburg. This unique relationship between Gauleiter Kaufmann and his business 
association within Hamburg that provides the primary motive to evacuate the camp.  
 
The sinking of the Cap Arcona has been seen as simply part of a final act of the final 
solution because of the suggestion that the evacuation from Neuengamme camp was 
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part of the death marches.
53
 A leading scholar on the death marches has argued that this 
final phase witnessed these marches as the sole extermination technique.
54
 In attempting 
to broaden our understanding of the death march process as a whole, Blatman has to 
pick through a numerous examples of evacuation marches. Therefore, his approach and 
discussion, which views the death marches as not merely continuing the process of 
antisemitism, but rather a continuation of impulsive genocide on the masses, does not 
work entirely on a camp by camp basis.
55
 The drawback on attempting to provide a 
generalised method for viewing the death march process is that his conclusions are too 
broad. For instance, out of some forty transports that departed Neuengamme camp, only 
three ended in a massacre.
56
  Blatman’s approach breaks down when applied locally to 
case-specific examples. Generalising the approach of the Nazi hierarchy at a time when 
many elements of the regime functioned in an ad hoc nature weakens his central 
argument. In response to Blatman’s model, Goldhagen notes that “authority was 
fracturing increasingly within Germany, and central control of the marches was 
conspicuously lacking; thus, it is no surprise that the Germans guarding the marches 
conducted them in varying manners”.57 He largely noted that while central authority 
                                                          
53 See for instance, Buggeln, Slave Labor, pp. 266-275; Watson, The Nazi Titanic, pp. 87-98.  
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was unreliable, those guarding the marches and undertaking the responsibility of the 
prisoners during these marches had significant scope to interpret their orders. In many 
cases once these columns departed the camp, communication with higher officials was 
not always possible. This scope and interpretation of orders is largely where confusion 
arose. By March 1945, the area under direct German command continued to diminish. 
This meant that any short-term planning for a potential evacuation destination was 
difficult. In terms of this final evacuation phase any potential evacuation site was often 
impractical as Allied forces were continually over-running German held territory. 
 
There remains a stark divide in historiography over the extent to which the camp system 
continued to function. Greiser argues that the concentration camp system, by and large, 
continued to function in the last months of the war.
58
 The camp system, although 
deadly, did concede to some categories of prisoners. Scandinavian nationals were 
released through special measures with the SRC, while small parties of Jewish prisoners 
were released in last-minute humanitarian efforts. But for Wachsmann his study on the 
camp system notes that “there was nothing stable about the KL system in the spring 
1945”.59 Transports that departed the main camp often used the marches to continue the 
killing phase of the camp. The majority of evacuations in the final phase were 
undertaken on foot. At Neuengamme the method was different. A clear and decisive 
destination, coupled with a determination by local administrators meant that this 
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evacuation from the Neuengamme shows that there was still some coherence within the 
camp system. Moreover this example shows clearly that the camp system at 
Neuengamme was able to continue to function amidst this chaos; communication within 
a local framework still functioned. This begs the question as to why the Hamburg 
administration continued to function in the face of overwhelming defeat. 
  
There remains much debate in existing historiography regarding this the final months of 
the war and whether this period transcends into chaos. One example from Neuengamme 
camp highlights this point. Buggeln suggests that that out of some forty transports that 
left the camp, only three ended in a massacre.
60
 As British forces entered the camp 
compound on 4 May, the camp was found empty, and important documents had been 
destroyed.
61
 This thesis will argue that previous attempts to create a general model to 
explain the death march period wrongly identifies this final phase as essentially a killing 
stage amidst chaos and confusion. The current periodisation model of the death marches 
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does remain useful; however the evacuation of Neuengamme does not fit this model. 
One of the key focus areas remains the method used for the evacuations. Generally 
Blatman focuses on marches by foot, but Neuengamme was largely evacuated through 
the use of rail trucks. At a time when many elements of the Third Reich were 
crumbling, the Hamburg administration was able to ensure the camp was evacuated in a 
timely manner.
62
  
 
Primary Source Material 
 
A small collection of primary sources provide information about the sinking of the Cap 
Arcona and the role of the Hamburg administration in the final weeks of the war. There 
is much less surviving evidence from senior SS and Party figures than there is survivor 
testimony. There are a number of survivor testimonies, trial transcripts and official 
publications that help to guide an interpretation of the British attack on 3 May. The 
most valuable collection of papers is from the War Office files in the National 
Archives.
63
 This is a series of files collated by Number Two War Crimes investigation 
team (WCIT). They had been charged with the task of gathering evidence to trial the 
perpetrators at Neuengamme camp. Within this collection of files, there are 
interrogation reports as well as statements of evidence from key figures in the sinking of 
the Cap Arcona. Unfortunately, there are no surviving narrative sources written by the 
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pilots who attacked the Cap Arcona. This collection of evidence within the official files 
has since been destroyed. 
64
 
 
In the late 1980s Lange noted that many previous publications were mono-causal and 
focused disappointingly on guilt.
65
 The problem for many was a lack of source material 
and source criticism. Basing his work largely on survivor testimony, Lange was able to 
begin an analysis that looked at some longer term factors. The bulk of his source 
material was collated from official documentation and interview transcripts which are 
now held in the town archives in Neustadt in Holstein. In his account, Lange asserts that 
the gaps in his research were “filled in by those who had been still living or had been 
there”.66 In dealing with the event some forty years after the attack, and with many 
survivors living through the Cold War, thoughts and opinions on the British attack were 
often found dealing with the topic of responsibility. This thesis will carefully utilise 
survivor testimony that was written shortly after the sinking. Although it will consider 
opinions of survivors in the late 1980s,
67
 the material will need to be further 
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corroborated with other primary material. By utilising the method of source criticism, 
this thesis will corroborate and interrogate primary material. It will be necessary to 
establish its providence and set this in the broader context of when the source was 
produced, and attempt to establish any bias. Through the use of valuable AIR records, 
including operations records, squadron reports and depositions, we can carefully 
reconstruct why Second TAF attacked shipping in May 1945. As original pilot 
testimony remains elusive within the archive surroundings, the use of alternative 
methods and material to reconstruct the build-up to the sinking is important. One 
alternative source of material is the use of AIR records which provide summary 
overviews of each day’s event. Further, this type of “official British” record also allows 
for the longer term factors to be considered in the build-up to the attack. There are some 
drawbacks in this approach. Pilot testimonies and personal narratives do exist. However 
they exist for squadrons that did not attack the Cap Arcona but other ships located in 
Neustadt Bay. In terms of their viability, these records will be cross-examined with 
official narratives to validate their accounts. Acknowledging that the attacks on 3 May 
were part of a wider transport strategy, no specific squadron was assigned to a specific 
ship. This means that the available pilot testimony is a valuable resource and is readily 
transferable for any discussion on the sinking of the Cap Arcona. A further hindrance is 
the lack of official documentation complied by British military forces in the post-war 
period. The British narrative must be reconstructed using piecemeal evidence. This is 
achievable, however, through the use of a wider survey of archives, diver reports as well 
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as sound interviews and personal correspondence with surviving pilots will all be 
utilised.  
 
The only British investigative report was finalised in March 1946. Known as the Till 
Report it remains instrumental in any discussion on the sinking of the Cap Arcona. 
Although the report examined the circumstances that led to the sinking, Till’s 
conclusions demonstrate a lack of appetite from British commanders to fully investigate 
this attack.
68
 Throughout his report, Major Till acknowledges a number of issues which 
centre on adequate resources. In fact there are a number of incidents to which Till 
highlights where investigative staff are removed for other duties. These duties largely 
focused on crimes committed on British POW’s. What we can infer from this is that the 
focus of British investigations was primarily on those crimes committed by Nazi 
Germany. This report further highlights a link that exists between the wider issues and 
the British attack. Throughout the report there is a common theme that Till was forced 
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to rush his report. There were a number of instances where his investigations were 
suspended while members of his team were allocated elsewhere. In general British 
investigators prioritised crimes against British nationals, and those in favour of 
processing Nazi war criminals. This unfortunately led to a swift and indecisive report. 
This thesis will utilise this report in the reconstruction of political discussions between 
the different German leaders. 
 
The important discovery of diving reports provides a clear insight into why attention 
was paid to survey sunken vessels in 1946.
69
  The reports further add a crucial 
dimension to the reconstruction of the British motives for the attack. Although the 
reports are incomplete, nevertheless they prove a useful tool to analyse how and why 
the British attacked these vessels in the final days of the war.  All these sources have 
been collated and analysed to broaden our understanding of the particular circumstances 
that led to the sinking of the Cap Arcona on 3 May. While there are gaps with the 
primary material, it is important to employ the methods of critical source analysis in 
dealing with existing material. One important area has been the branching out and 
attempting to source material from a much wider archive base. This will enable this 
thesis to corroborate existing sources with new findings, as well as drawing on new 
historical theories.  
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Structure 
 
This thesis concentrates on the broader theme of chaos and its impact on crucial aspects 
of the Cap Arcona tragedy. In expanding the historical survey, this study will examine 
the period of January to May 1945. By examining the sinking in this wider context it 
will examine the principle impact of chaos on key elements of the Cap Arcona tragedy. 
This will be explored in five thematic chapters. Such an approach provides a clear 
analysis of the key features of British military policy as well as the core motives of 
German SS and Party officials. The effect of the central theme of chaos on the build-up 
to the sinking had a massive impact on the decision making process as well as the 
requirement to utilise shipping. This thesis offers a new broader perspective on the 
tragic sinking of the Cap Arcona on 3 May 1945. 
 
This study begins with a closer examination of the evacuation planning process 
surrounding Neuengamme camp. It will argue that until now our understanding of this 
process has often been categorised as chaotic and ad hoc. Using Neuengamme camp it 
will demonstrate that amidst this chaos, the planning process was developed and 
strategically executed prior to the Allied capture of the camp. By analysing this broader 
circumstance, it can demonstrate how the Cap Arcona was ordered to Neustadt to serve 
as a prison ship.  
 
Chapter Three will build on the previous research and look at the actual evacuations to 
Lübeck Bay. But the process that took place eventually evolved into chaos and disorder 
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once the transports arrived at Lübeck Vorwerk harbour. The method of evacuation is 
analysed in more detail. In providing this analysis, it provides a useful context for the 
reasons why the camp was evacuated at Neuengamme. Moreover it will show that 
communication between local institutions, the merchant navy, Hamburg-Süd and other 
state departments reinforced this chaotic state. This chapter will look more closely at the 
transfer of prisoners to the ships at anchor in Neustadt and further analyse resistance to 
this planned transfer.  
 
Chapter Four will analyse more closely Britain’s wider military and strategic policy in 
1945. It will argue that as a result of the wider military situation, British aerial policy 
became rushed in an attempt to push northwards. In doing so, this Thesis will provide 
an analysis of Foreign policy as a result of Yalta in February 1945. The question of 
what happened to aerial operations as a result of this strategic change will also be 
explored. During the final months Second TAF were continually stretched in their area 
of operations, and although there was limited aerial resistance, communication between 
Second TAF HQ and squadron groups remained problematic. The chapter then 
examines more closely the activities of individual squadron groups to determine what 
squadrons were actually attacking.   
 
Intelligence and information played a pivotal role in the history of the Cap Arcona, and 
therefore Chapter Five will examine numerous sources by external agencies. In doing so 
it will demonstrate that a number of opportunities were handed to the British prior to the 
aerial bombardment on 3 May. While acknowledging that information did exist, it is 
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necessary to evaluate exactly what these external agencies knew and analyse its 
relevance for the prisoners on the Cap Arcona. But the dissemination of this 
information will also play an important role. As military policy had drastically altered in 
response to a Soviet threat, air operations in the remaining territories became ever 
fiercer. This led to a number of friendly-fire incidents against Red Cross convoys. 
Assessing these incidents, Chapter Five will argue that the normal protocols and 
procedures that had featured in the processing of information fell to the wayside. In turn 
this will show the impact of these chaotic and frantic situations on British policy. 
 
Chapter Six will draw on existing scholarship and carefully piece together the events 
that culminated in the sinking on 3 May 1945. This chapter will argue that the sinking 
of the Cap Arcona was the result of a unique series of circumstances that culminated in 
the final days of the war. While previous chapters focus on the long-term factors, this 
chapter will draw on the short-term issues. This thesis explores the reasons behind the 
German surrender of Hamburg and its impact on the prisoners held on the Cap Arcona. 
It then examines the changes to Second TAF aerial policy in the first days of May, with 
a specific focus on targets. A reconstruction of the British attack will follow, and seek to 
analyse what the pilots knew prior to take-off. This thesis argues that the sinking of the 
Cap Arcona was not the responsibility of either British or German forces; rather the 
attack on the 3 May was the result of a series of errors of communication on both sides 
severely impacted by chaotic circumstances in the final weeks. In many respects, the 
broader context demonstrates that as the military situation culminated over the bay of 
Lübeck, this series of circumstances led to the tragic sinking of the Cap Arcona. 
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Chapter Two 
 
April 1945: Camp Evacuation Structure and Process 
 
By January 1945, according to Nazi records, some 714,000 prisoners were languishing 
in the concentration camp network.
70
 This number included prisoners from nearly all 
European nations who had been persecuted for reasons ranging from political affiliation 
to religion, and sexuality to race. As the regime collapsed and German forces retreated 
on all fronts, the question of evacuating the concentration camp system presented an 
increasing problem. This chapter will discuss in greater detail the evacuation planning 
process from Neuengamme camp. At a time when other camps had been unable to 
evacuate their prison labour force, Neuengamme camp was able to implement an 
orderly evacuation. This is surprising since many elements of the Third Reich were 
crumbling under intense military pressure from Allied forces, as well as having no 
centralised command.
71
 This chapter will argue that Neuengamme camp was 
remarkably different to other camps because of its close links between civilian 
administrators, SS and local business leaders. In order to understand why this was so 
important there are a number of factors to consider.  
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A closer analysis of Neuengamme camp and its position within the SS camp system are 
vital to understanding how and why the local civilian administration was heavily 
engaged within the camp. While the camp commandant was responsible for delegating 
the selection of each prisoner transport on behalf of the SS Main Economic and 
Administration Office (WVHA), many of the business contracts were put forward on 
behalf of local business leaders through the Hamburg administration. From late 1944 
onwards there was a tussle over who had responsibility for arranging the evacuation 
process, and therefore it is important to establish exactly who was ultimately, 
responsible for guiding this process. In terms of the Cap Arcona, this issue of purpose 
has yet to be explored fully. In defining who was responsible for the process and 
planning of the evacuation, we can further explore the purpose of utilising the Cap 
Arcona as well as defining personal motives. 
 
Finally this chapter will examine more closely the impact of the evacuation order Fall-
A, and discuss how, ultimately the Cap Arcona was chosen as a viable solution for the 
evacuation of Neuengamme camp. Why was Gauleiter Kaufmann seeking a solution to 
the evacuation issue? What were the driving factors behind this? Did the local SS have 
any short term or long term aims for the evacuees? How did the relationship between 
Gauleiter and HSSPF (Höheren SS-und Polizeiführer) function in terms of the 
evacuation process? 
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Neuengamme camp and the City of Hamburg 
In attempting to understand the unique situation that existed between Hamburg and the 
camp constructed at Neuengamme, it is necessary to examine why the camp was built. 
In addition, it will be important to discuss why the camp operated differently to other 
SS- camps. To grasp why the camp needed to be evacuated to the Baltic coast, we must 
first examine the unique relationship between the party administration, SS and business 
leaders. In focusing on the development and importance of this close co-operation this 
chapter will show that in the chaotic final months of the war, these relationships drove 
the evacuation process from Neuengamme camp.  
 
Nazi camps were often designed to exploit a much-needed labour resource as the war 
intensified. The camp at Neuengamme became an integral part of the expansive camp 
system. One area which requires particular examination is the involvement of the local 
party administration in the early months of the camp’s operation. In an account 
published shortly after the war, Möller described the Hamburg Gauleiter as “the good 
Gauleiter”.72 The frequent misreading of the role of the Gauleiter in Hamburg has meant 
that very little has been researched regarding his authority and role within Hamburg. In 
his study on Gauleiter Kaufmann, Bajohr argued that his anti-Jewish policies during the 
rise of Nazism show the Gauleiter as a ruthless businessman.
73
 His role and close 
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business interests within Hamburg further prove his extensive involvement in the 
development and evolution of the camp at Neuengamme. In addition the speed at which 
Neuengamme expanded further highlights how prosperous this business link between 
civil administration and business leaders was. It is precisely this close working 
relationship that led to the subsequent placement of prisoners on the Cap Arcona.  
 
Neuengamme concentration camp was situated 20km south of Hamburg. While it 
started life as a satellite camp to the larger establishment of Sachsenhausen in 1938, on 
the outbreak of war it was expanded to a full independent camp.
74
 The camp boundaries 
were drastically changed and expanded beyond its pre-1939 area. From 4 June 1940, the 
camp was accommodating some 2,000 prisoners.
75
 The SS were keen to branch into 
businesses in the city of Hamburg and surrounding areas. As the war continued, the 
demand for slave labour rose dramatically. In particular, the armaments and war 
production businesses expanded exponentially. This led to extensive negotiations 
between the city of Hamburg and the WVHA. In turn, it was agreed mutually that the 
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civilian administration would offer building and development contracts and projects to 
the camp, in turn for cheap and freely available labour for local businesses.  
 
At its peak, Neuengamme was responsible for around eighty-six subsidiary camps, most 
of which were engaged in armaments production or construction works.
76
 Furthermore a 
decree from the Ministry of Armaments in 1942 led to an increase in the demand for 
slave labour to be supplied by concentration camps. The expansion of Neuengamme 
during the war demonstrates that the relationship between the city and SS 
administration functioned well. In comparison, the SS run camp at Sachsenhausen 
showed that the SS had more flexibility over a number of key factors.
77
 Firstly, the 
choice in industry, as well as prisoner tasks, was down to the camp administration. This 
led to a number of SS-run workshops as well as small companies situated close to the 
site utilising prison labour. In the case of Neuengamme, the SS were largely handed 
appropriate contracts from the city administration, rather than being able to seek direct 
business links with business owners. Secondly, the SS administration in Sachsenhausen 
was able to benefit financially from the exploitation of slave labour.
78
 In continuing to 
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hire out prisoners, the SS administration attempted to meet a growing demand. The 
camp at Neuengamme, however, functioned differently. In most camps, the SS received 
significant financial reward and benefit from developing extensive business contracts. 
But with the development of the camp at Neuengamme, there was significantly less 
scope to seek business opportunities independently. The Hamburg civilian 
administration decided which contracts and which businesses would utilise slave labour. 
For example, owing to a lack of production at the shipyards, sub-camps were built and 
prisoners were employed to drive up the U-boat production after numerous bombing 
raids.
79
 But what remained unique was the relationship between the SS body and the 
civilian administration in Hamburg.  
 
The construction of the camp at Neuengamme was an important asset, not only for the 
SS, but for the local civilian administration. Buggeln notes that “Gauleiter Karl 
Kaufmann was presumably behind the initiative to establish the camp”.80 Having finally 
secured the development of an independent concentration camp, Gauleiter Kaufmann 
had met longstanding demands from the Hamburg police authorities for a concentration 
camp.
81
 But Kaufmann was also an ambitious man. After extensive negotiations with 
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Speer, Kaufmann wished to make Hamburg the leading port of Nazi Germany.
82
 
Arguably, this demonstrates above all else that Kaufmann was determined that the city 
of Hamburg would thrive both during and after the war. In all other matters, his concern 
was for the business community and his personal gains.  
 
Neuengamme’s position within the wider camp system and its relationship with the 
state apparatus allowed both parties to benefit from the association. In terms of its 
function, the camp became an important labour reserve for key industrial war 
productions. Largely the SS-run camps were designed to turn camps into a well-
organised and functional reservoir of labour for the armaments industry.
83
 Although 
historians suggest that this did in fact fail, the construction and expansion of 
Neuengamme would suggest otherwise.
84
 Prisoners were engaged in sub-camps 
associated with Neuengamme camp which extended from the Channel Islands to North-
Sea fortifications and shipbuilding yards. This therefore suggests that the link between 
camp and business had been extremely successful at Neuengamme. The growth and 
breadth of tasks, as well as business interests clearly point to the effectiveness of close 
links with the city administration. The crucial location of the camp in North Germany 
meant that it became an important source of labour supply for the German Navy, who 
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engaged prisoners in the building of submarine pens Valentin and Hornisse.
85
 Moreover 
slave labour supply for the armaments industry in and around Hamburg remained 
important. Labour supply for Hermann Goering Reichswerke, Draht- und 
Metallwarenfabrik Salzwedel GmbH, and other large manufacturers continued 
throughout the war. 
 
While large extermination camps such as Auschwitz-Birkenau, Chelmno and Treblinka 
began to systematically exterminate European Jewry, camps such as Neuengamme were 
designed to provide slave labour for German industry. Orth notes that “the twin 
demands of genocide and forced labour […] brought functional changes to the 
concentration camp system in the second half of the war”.86 Although wholesale change 
did affect the wider camp system, Neuengamme remained relatively unchanged. As the 
demand for slave labour intensified Neuengamme did not expand as rapidly as other 
camps. Business communities and other large entrepreneurs were often unwilling to use 
or be associated with slave labour. Change was only forthcoming when a chronic labour 
shortage in key industries could no longer be filled by civilian labour. With this change 
in labour requirements the satellite camp system expanded exponentially. At the start of 
1944 there were approximately four satellite camps. By the end of the year that number 
had risen to approximately seventy satellite camps.
87
 The close connection between the 
camp and the sub-camp system and its association with local businesses remain an 
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influential factor for the history of the Cap Arcona. One useful measure was prisoner 
survival rates. This was used to rank prisoners in terms of their potential productivity 
and usefulness within the SS camp model. During the evacuation period in April 1945, 
the transfer of this hierarchical model to the Cap Arcona demonstrated that the SS still 
hoped to retain some viable use for the evacuees.  
 
Survival rates and the prisoner hierarchy remains a useful tool in examining labour 
requirements and a potential use of the Cap Arcona. Orth argues that “the chances of 
survival were closely linked to the type of forced labour and the individual’s status in 
the racist prisoner hierarchy”.88 The SS prisoner hierarchy, as noted by Orth, has been 
identified in terms of its racist structure in how it categorised its total prisoner 
population. The SS based the model on themselves being seen as top of the hierarchy. 
The further away an individual was categorised, the lower they ranked within the camp 
society. Sofsky notes that “the further a category was from the SS… the greater was the 
pressure for annihilation to which it was subjected”.89 Based on this model of camp 
social structure, the type of work which was almost certain to result in death was given 
to those prisoners who were socially considered at the bottom of the SS model. For 
example, figure one highlights an overview of this model. Prisoners of Russian 
nationality, or Jewish faith often found themselves tasked with the hard, gruelling 
manual labour tasks, rather than skilled factory work. Moreover, even if they were 
skilled in a specific trade the SS ignored this because of their social status within the 
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hierarchy model. In terms of productivity within the camp surroundings, productivity 
was measured either in business output, or death. For certain business contracts, output 
was measured by supply and demand. Where the SS set tasks, such as digging anti-tank 
ditches, the type of work was well-known to result in death and therefore often assigned 
to Russian prisoners. 
 
Figure One: Model of SS camp racial model. 
90
 
 
From a closer inspection of prisoners’ skills and nationality, it remains clear that these 
two factors played an important role in terms of a prisoner’s ability to survive the work 
camps. Orth therefore identifies two pre-requisites for determining a prisoner’s chance 
of survival. While this was applicable during the war, its application during the 
evacuation of the camp seemed pointless. During the evacuation process the type of 
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work was relatively unimportant, and therefore it was a prisoner’s status within the SS 
hierarchy that became the defining feature. The two pre-requisites outlined by Orth are 
not applicable throughout. We can therefore infer that the SS prisoner hierarchy was the 
preferred method of categorisation for prisoners rather than by skill or labour abilities. 
Moreover this system was readily and easily transferable aboard the Cap Arcona. The 
continued segregation based on this model suggests that the SS still hoped that the 
prisoners could be utilised further. 
 
Sofsky notes that “the society of the concentration camp was a system of glaring 
differences and extreme inequality”.91 His representation of camp structure and the 
social injustices that faced the prison inmates demonstrates clearly that the SS regime 
encouraged inequality amongst its prison workforce. In fact this development of a social 
hierarchy within the camp compounds is a useful framework within which to discuss the 
aims and behaviours of the governance of the camp. Neuengamme camp was never 
designated to hold one category of prisoner. The diverse collection of different 
nationalities, as well as religion, show that the camp was often more diverse than other 
sized camps. Sofsky further argues that the prison structure within the camp was largely 
geared towards those criminal and political prisoners from within the Reich as well as 
outer territories.
92
 Furthermore based on his model it was clear that both the type of 
work a prisoner was expected to undertake and their alleged crime could then determine 
the length of time a prisoner would be expected to survive.
93
 Nowhere is this more 
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evident than in the construction of the Dove-Elbe canal. Those prisoners deemed 
essential to the brick-works production were left in their current role, while prisoners 
deemed expendable to the SS- business interests were forced to work in horrific 
conditions.
94
 
 
Once on board the Cap Arcona the SS continued to privilege one set of prisoners over 
another through the continued implementation of the camp hierarchy. This continued 
use of the SS hierarchy raises a number of issues. Firstly, the extension of the physical 
properties of the camp to the Cap Arcona suggests a force of habit which was often 
typical Nazi elitism. This extension also shows a level of detailed planning in 
application. It certainly was not simply a case of loading prisoners anywhere on the Cap 
Arcona, but in clearly defined levels on the vessel. Secondly, the transfer to the Cap 
Arcona clearly shows that there was now no long-term planning. The continued barbaric 
treatment and dwindling conditions further highlight that the SS system was in turmoil. 
A lack of basic provisions, as well as water, show clearly that the Cap Arcona was 
destined to be a grave for the majority of prisoners. The structure and hierarchy that 
existed supported those of Western nationality; where as those of Russian or even 
Jewish religion had limited chances below the decks of the Cap Arcona. This suggested 
that the Cap Arcona served as a mere extension of the physical camp structure. As with 
some sub-camps, the placement of prisoners in certain areas of the ship could only 
achieve one thing: namely the extinction of life. One useful example was the sub-camp 
at Husum. The purpose of this sub-camp was designed to force prisoners to dig anti-
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tank ditches. Because of the location the prisoners had to march around 10 to 15 
kilometres before starting work. The nature of work involved in digging anti-tank 
ditches was heavily labour intensive. Therefore those prisoners who were assigned to 
this type of work were not readily expected to survive any length of time. In fact, they 
were marched some significant distance to the site prior to undertaking any work.  As a 
result, many were exhausted which ultimately resulted in high mortality rates. Marching 
the prisoners the considerable distance each and every day only served to weaken them 
so that they would be less likely to survive the slave labour. Moreover, much of the 
work required was done during late autumn and early winter. Buggeln notes that on 
November 25, 1944 “there were 734 sick prisoners in the camp, which amounted to 
more than 50 percent of the detainees who were still alive”.95 Therefore in similar 
comparison to life on board the Cap Arcona, SS methods of detention and killing 
remain the same as the life in the sub-camp at Husum. Those prisoners within the SS 
hierarchy who were seen as the lowest in the structure were considered expendable. 
Consequently the type of work was therefore often labour intensive, and resulted often 
in death. Furthermore this group of prisoners were placed into the hold of the Cap 
Arcona, often without sufficient light, air and water supplies. We can therefore infer that 
this was done with the sole purpose of extinguish life. 
 
Although the camp at Husum only functioned for a short period of time, we can draw 
important conclusions from this. Firstly, the type of work combined with the conditions 
would arguably suggest that the prisoners were deliberately worked to death. That being 
the case, the type of work expected of this labour force and the harsh conditions, had no 
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other purpose than ending life. The structure and organisation from the main camp at 
Neuengamme to the location of work demonstrated the administration’s determination 
to develop and sacrifice working parties. It also demonstrates that even before the 
evacuation order was given, there was a unique structure organising and implementing 
certain marches. In the case of the sub-camp at Husum brutal working conditions and 
corrupt practices became the norm.
 96
 However in practical terms the organisation and 
negotiations between the administration and the German Navy highlights the close 
connections the camp fostered with external agencies. The subsequent expansion of the 
sub-camp network within Neuengamme shows a distinctive situation. Those prisoners, 
who were deemed useful to the Reich, were seen in terms of business exploitation, 
while those prisoners without any useful skill were expendable. This meant that in the 
case of Husum, high mortality rates were largely amongst unskilled labourers, while 
such figures were not seen in key armaments industries. This example shows that the SS 
prisoner hierarchy was readily transferable to not only the Cap Arcona, but also to 
different satellite camps. Furthermore, the SS continued to hold some control over the 
day-to-day running of the camp. The example of Husum shows clearly that the camp 
was designed to extinguish life in a short period of time. But in terms of this SS 
hierarchy being transferred to the Cap Arcona, the prisoner hierarchy clearly highlights 
that the Nazi regime was attempting to find some normal function amidst a difficult 
situation. There was no real purpose to continued segregation based on the SS racial 
model other than a twisted form of ideological disillusionment whereby the SS elements 
attempted to maintain a power structure despite collapse elsewhere.  
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Conditions within the camp structure demonstrate and provide key insights into the 
treatment of prisoners by the localised command structure. By focusing on these 
conditions, historians can ascertain crucial information that provides an insight into the 
overall intentions of the local command structure. This localised chain of command is 
key to understanding the processes that led to the use and implementation of the Cap 
Arcona as a temporary camp. Within this broader framework, the general situation was 
often ad hoc and frantic. But this example highlights that local rationality and local 
policy making was still effective. Within this local rationality the approach of Gauleiter 
Kaufmann still shows that policy was blinkered. For instance, prisoners’ treatment 
within the sub-camp system demonstrates a number of important factors. Firstly, while 
certain types of industrial output deemed that there was a constant and regular flow of 
prisoners, there were those types of work which were short-lived and potentially deadly. 
In the case of Husum, the camp was largely designed as a knee-jerk reaction to the 
threat of an Allied invasion. In comparison, the sub-camps associated with the shipyard 
at Blohm & Voss were an important industrial output and therefore while prisoner 
conditions were still below an acceptable standard, the need to continue a vital war 
production meant that mortality rates remained comparatively low. 
97
 Therefore while 
German industry had a potential output for slave labour vital to the war effort, these 
categories of prisoners had a greater chance of survival. But once this hierarchy reverted 
back to the SS ethnic segregation, it became more dependent on ethnicity than skill. 
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In terms of Neuengamme’s labour output Buggeln notes that “an evaluation of prisoner 
file cards […] revealed that of the 27,735 prisoners who have a Neuengamme prisoner 
number, 22,823 (82.3%) are listed as unskilled labourers (no useful skill) and 2,355 
(8.5%) have no profession, meaning that only 2,557 prisoners (9.2%) are recorded as 
having a specific occupation”.98 This relatively small number of skilled workers meant 
that any death of a skilled worker would have a direct impact on a company’s output. 
The expansion of sub-camps attached to Neuengamme highlight the successful 
relationship between the city and key businesses. This relationship between the camp 
and business industrialists remains important for any discussion on the sinking of the 
Cap Arcona. In other similar-sized camp evacuations the majority of prisoners were 
forcibly marched to a destination unknown. This resulted in incalculable deaths. But 
Neuengamme was markedly different because of the close connection between 
Hamburg and the camp. The extensive use of slave labour from Neuengamme within a 
variety of industrial outputs placed increasing pressure to find a permanent solution to 
the evacuation question. Once business leaders no longer required slave labour in April 
1945, the former SS camp hierarchy was implemented. The transfer and continuation of 
this social structure on board the Cap Arcona shows that the SS still retained some 
control over the evacuation process. While the SS supported the evacuation from 
Neuengamme, the drive behind ensuring it was undertaken smoothly was a result of the 
pressure from the civilian administration in Hamburg. Thereafter the drive to plan the 
evacuation was largely driven by Gauleiter Kaufmann; the transfer of an internal camp 
hierarchy demonstrates clearly that the SS still played an important role in the transfer 
of prisoners to the Cap Arcona. However it is difficult to explain why it remained 
                                                          
98
 Buggeln, Slave Labor, p. 92-93. 
57 
 
important to continue this segregation. One possible motive is that the SS wished, at 
some point, to continue the use of slave labour for future tasks. But once the prisoners 
are placed on the Cap Arcona it was difficult to see any other viable use other than their 
continued detention. The evacuation to the Cap Arcona shows that Nazi policy, in this 
instance, had regressed back into a form of ghettoisation through the use of prison ships.  
 
Neuengamme’s position within the wider camp system and its relationship with the 
state apparatus allowed both parties to benefit from the association. In terms of its 
function, the camp became an important labour reserve for key industrial war 
productions. Largely the SS-run camps were designed to turn camps into a well-
organised and functional reservoir of labour for the armaments industry.
99
 Although 
historians suggest that this did in fact fail, the construction and expansion of 
Neuengamme would suggest otherwise.
100
 Prisoners were engaged in sub-camps 
associated with Neuengamme camp which extended from the Channel Islands to North-
Sea fortifications and shipbuilding yards. This therefore suggests that the link between 
camp and business had been extremely successful at Neuengamme. The growth and 
breadth of tasks, as well as business interests clearly point to the effectiveness of close 
links with the city administration. The crucial location of the camp in North Germany 
meant that it became an important source of labour supply for the German Navy, who 
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engaged prisoners in the building of submarine pens Valentin and Hornisse.
101
 
Moreover slave labour supply for the armaments industry in and around Hamburg 
remained important. Labour supply for Hermann Goering Reichswerke, Draht- und 
Metallwarenfabrik Salzwedel GmbH, and other large manufacturers continued 
throughout the war. 
 
Political Interest 
This section will analyse more closely the impact of a breakdown of central 
communications. In relation to the Cap Arcona, this breakdown of communication 
ultimately gave rise to a strong local command administration in Hamburg. This section 
will seek to argue that during these final months, orders from the Reich centre were 
often indecisive and unclear. This meant that local state organizations had increasing 
scope to interpret orders as they saw fit. In the case of Neuengamme and the city of 
Hamburg, the local Gauleiter and Police Chief were, for both personal and professional 
reasons, determined to evacuate the camp. What was unique about this situation? How 
did the Cap Arcona come to be utilised as a floating concentration camp? 
 
In the midst of the final months of the war, Blatman suggests that within all elements of 
German society that “the orderly continuity that enabled social stability and a 
reasonable prospect for the future was breaking down. Its collapse led to disrupted 
communications and even disconnection between those who gave the orders and those 
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who executed them”.102 Confidence in the regime’s ability to lead and stave off defeat 
was very low; the civilian population felt that the regime was to blame for all the 
catastrophes that had now befallen the country.
103
 Throughout the final weeks and 
months of the war the German state continued in a vain attempt to reverse military 
fortunes on both fronts. In doing so, central government and guidance became 
increasingly confused and unclear. This often meant that orders received in areas such 
as Hamburg were often out-dated or impossible to follow. The ability of the Reich 
Centre to coherently filter information to the remaining German-held territories was 
increasingly difficult. Baranowski suggests that “the bureaucratic structures and 
procedures of the Nazi concentration camp system functioned to the bitter end. 
Although the lines of authority and the issuance of orders did become confused before 
and during the evacuations, Himmler continued to exercise his authority from the top”. 
104
 But in the case of Hamburg we witness a growth in localised pockets of governance, 
almost devoid of contact with the Reich centre. For the prisoners held at Neuengamme, 
this meant that by 1945 their fate was in the hands of the local SS and civilian 
bureaucracy.  
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Developments on both fronts continued to push the German army back. On 17 June 
1944 the Nazi High Command began to discuss potential problems associated with the 
concentration camp network. Himmler, as a result of an impending threat concerning 
camp security, issued a directive which was considered unique of its kind. This order 
provides the initial driving force behind the planning process to evacuate the camp at 
Neuengamme, and other camps, and subsequently to utilise the Cap Arcona. Formally 
issued by Richard Glücks, head of Amtsgruppe D, the directive “was addressed mainly 
to the supreme SS and Police commanders, the HSSPF in various districts of the Reich 
and the occupied territories”.105 This group of senior SS leaders were an elite group of 
men who had been entrusted by Himmler to implement tasks of a sensitive and difficult 
nature. The problem is that there was considerable confusion surrounding the directive. 
Known as “security of concentration camps in case A” (also known in German as 
Sicherung der Konzentrationslager Fall-A), it stated that: 
Camp commandants continue [to be] responsible to the WVHA for all general 
administrative matters except during alert periods (Fall-A), when the HSSPF 
assumes complete control of Concentration camps in his military district 
(Wehrkreis) and the camp commandants become members of his staff. The 
HSSPF is, henceforth, responsible for the military security of all concentration 
camps and work camps in his districts with the exception of special purpose 
camps and political sections.
106
 
 
 
In general there was a clear structure within the various SS departments which 
determined who took charge in the event of a security issue. The problem is, what could 
actually be defined as an alert period? The result of this confused order meant that many 
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HSSPF were instructed to use their initiative to interpret the orders as they saw fit. For 
the camp at Neuengamme this in turn meant that Bassewitz-Behr should have taken 
charge of the evacuation planning process. In reality the process was heavily guided by 
the local Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann. The problem is how best we might understand this 
order in light of a perceived threat by German commanders. During the trial at the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) of Oswald Pohl, Gerhard Maurer argued in 
defence of Pohl regarding the directive from Himmler: 
 
I remember that in the middle of 1944 Himmler issued an order to the Higher SS 
and Police leaders according to which, in the case of “A” the concentration 
camps and work camps located in the district of command, were automatically 
subordinated to them. Upon receipt of this order the Higher SS and Police 
Leaders had to get in touch immediately with camp commanders to prepare for 
taking charge of the camps in the Fall-A case.
107
 
 
While the basis of both versions of Himmler’s directive remains the same, Maurer 
placed a greater emphasis of the camp commandant’s automatically becoming 
subordinate to the HSSPF. What still existed was the lack of a clear and specific set of 
guidelines on what exactly Fall-A was defined as. The guidance provided no real 
definition as to what an exceptional case was. In fact, when the decision was left for 
local commanders to interpret, an exceptional case could easily be defined as an 
uprising or large-scale revolt within a town or city, or more seriously could be described 
as an attack on the state itself. Attempts on Hitler’s life is one plausible example of what 
could have been deemed an exceptional case and warranted the implementation of order 
Fall-A. One clear and concise example for the implementation of this order was the 
Allied landings on the Normandy beaches in June 1944. This knee-jerk reaction to a 
                                                          
107
 IMT Pohl Trial, Deposition of Gerhard Mauser, Exhibit no. 15,  3 July 1947. 
 
62 
 
significant threat demonstrates the severity with which this order was subsequently 
implemented. However, amidst the fighting, communications as well as Germany’s 
ability to hold the Allied advance at bay meant that orders from the Reich centre 
became tangled in the maelstrom that had begun to grip German forces. The impact of 
order Fall-A further shows the impact of chaos within central authority in the final 
months of the war. Furthermore, this left significant scope and interpretation of central 
orders which gave rise to local decision-making policy.  
 
This order remained unaltered for the remainder of the German campaign. In terms of 
its impact on the camp at Neuengamme, responsibility to apply the command fell to the 
local HSSPF Graf Henning von Bassewitz-Behr. There is, however, confusion who 
ultimately was responsible for planning the evacuation of Neuengamme. Appointed to 
the position of HSSPF on 16 February 1943, Neuengamme camp fell under his 
jurisdiction and therefore he was responsible, in a security capacity, of overseeing the 
camp. In a discussion with his superiors shortly after his appointment to the post in 
Hamburg, Bassewitz outlined his duties as: 
(a) Chief of the Allgemeine SS of the Oberabschnitt Nordsee; 
(b) Representative of the “Reichkommissar für die Festigung Deutschen Volksturm 
im Osten”, that is to say [responsible for] the welfare of those prisoners who had 
been transferred from the East into the Reich as of German blood, with a view to 
being given German Nationality later; 
(c) The care of, supply and welfare of the families of the members of the SS and 
police, killed or wounded in action; 
(d) Liaison between party state administration, armed forces, commerce and trade, 
and the RFSS; 
(e) Organisation of the Werwolves in collaboration with the four Gauleiter’s of my 
command. A complete organisation has not yet been achieved as, in my view, 
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too many different organisations were engaged in the matter, and in particular I 
lost together with Gauleiter Kaufmann of Hamburg.
108
 
 
The role of the senior police chief had over the course of the war developed into a 
position that encompassed many responsibilities covering an array of political and 
social areas.  One of his many duties was to attend meetings with the various bodies of 
the armed forces, political elite, business leaders and state administrators. In this liaison 
role Bassewitz-Behr was potentially an influential and important figure in deciding the 
fate of the prisoners of Neuengamme. The link between the HSSPF’s orders and those 
outlined by order Fall-A dictated that under certain circumstances that Neuengamme 
camp became his responsibility. During July 1944, Bassewitz-Behr received a 
promotion to General of the Waffen-SS and Police, which entitled him to convene the 
necessary military courts, where he saw fit.
 109
  This enabled the local police chief to 
tighten his grip on military and police concerns within his district. Yet the governing 
boundaries were continually changing as the situation – particularly on the eastern front 
– deteriorated.  
 
To understand Bassewitz-Behr’s role in the evacuation process, we must first examine 
his role in Neuengamme concentration camp. Bassewitz-Behr was on good duty terms 
with the camp commandant Max Pauly.
110
 This relationship, for the most part, 
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functioned to provide local businesses with slave labour from Neuengamme. But within 
the camp, conditions declined as the war progressed. A decline in food rations increased 
the camp’s mortality rate. When questioned about the function of the camp, Bassewitz-
Behr suggested that conditions “were good enough that if you wanted to holiday there, 
it would have been possible”.111 As industry continued to demand labour for the war 
economy, nationality had little influence in securing additional rations as it had in the 
camp. Instead, skilled inmates, those most highly valued by industrials, were the group 
that often secured additional food items. One prisoner recalled that  
We received daily for breakfast; ½ litre of a very thin soup or coffee and 125 
grams of bread with it; at midday 1 to 1½ litres of water with some cooked 
swedes, white cabbage, or sometimes potatoes without meat; and in the evening 
250 grams of bread, 15 to 20 grams margarine with 20 to 25 grams sausage or 
cheese, or curds.
112
 
 
By official standards this was significantly less than had been officially allocated by 
central office. Hunger often determined the prisoners’ every thought and action.113 A 
standard breakfast ration would normally consist of approximately 280 grams of bread. 
Therefore Bassewitz-Behr’s comments can be dismissed as it was highly improbable 
that Neuengamme would have been a holiday destination for many Germans.  These 
comments were made to the Allied War Crimes investigators, which would suggest 
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Bassewitz-Behr was attempting to downplay the overall conditions within the camp, as 
well as its overall function. 
 
Food became a key factor which would ultimately decide the fate of individual 
prisoners. The rations received in the camp, albeit insufficient, still enabled prisoners 
for a period of time to undertake work. Yet “the SS had dwindling supplies of food and 
clothing for the prisoners, however did little to alleviate these deficiencies and, starting 
in the fall of 1944, started to blame the prisoners for the situation”. 114  Once the inmates 
left the camp, however, to be evacuated to Lübeck, it became increasingly unlikely that 
food items or water stocks would be provided at the same level.
115
 At a conference held 
in Hamburg shortly after the implementation of Fall-A, the relationship between the 
camp commandant and his superiors deteriorated as conflict arose through a series of 
localised orders.  
 
As German forces came ever closer to a final capitulation, in-house fighting became 
more common. The position of the Gauleiter ran in direct opposition to the authority of 
the HSSPF. Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of Hamburg and the camp at 
Neuengamme. As Bassewitz-Behr and Kaufmann tussled for power, relations between 
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the HSSPF and commandant also became fraught. As part of the directive issued under 
Fall-A, commandants became subordinate to the local HSSPF.  As Pauly later revealed: 
The Senior SS and Police officer then told me that I had to obey my orders, 
failing which I would be put on trial before the SS and Police court for 
disobeying orders, and I received a notification from him that I would be put on 
trial.
116
 
 
Within Pauly’s comments he outlined the need to obey his orders. His orders were to 
follow through the task of making necessary assessments on the logistics of planning 
the evacuation of Neuengamme. The most notable deterioration was the fragile 
relationship between the civilian party officials and the local SS. Kaufmann was 
appointed to the position of Gauleiter in 1929. From this moment he became a strong 
political force within the city of Hamburg and its surrounding area.
117
 By 1933 he was 
further appointed Reich Governor (Reichsstatthalter) for Hamburg and on the outbreak 
of war on September 1939, Reich Defence Commissar for the Hamburg area. At his 
hands Jewish homes and business owners drastically suffered.
118
 In 1943 Kaufmann 
was appointed to the position of Reich Commissar for shipping. This position enabled 
him to exercise governance over Nazi maritime shipping operations. Therefore he could 
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command the use of ships as a means for the continuation of camp prisoners from 
Neuengamme.  
 
Within the city of Hamburg, Kaufmann had sought to look after the elite and old party 
comrades during the recovery of the city from 1943. During his formal statement in the 
postwar investigations, Kaufmann argued that, 
As Reich Commissar for shipping, I directed the operations of German merchant 
ships, with the exception of oil-tankers and passenger ships which were 
subordinated to the German Navy.
119
 
 
This gave him authority to liaise freely with the German Navy to requisition passenger 
liners. The release of the Cap Arcona was the result of extensive negotiations between 
Kaufmann and the Navy, with the set purpose of detaining concentration camp prisoners 
on board. Although passenger liners were not within his domain, the condition of the 
Cap Arcona meant that the German Navy had released the vessel from operational duty 
back to the vessels owners.  
 
It was only a matter of time before conflict arose between the party apparatus and the 
SS machine. The Gauleiter was, in theory, an extended voice of the party, while the 
HSSPF was charged with all military concerns in their district. In practice, the Gauleiter 
                                                          
119
 TNA WO 309/408: Deposition on Oath by Kaufmann, Karl Otto, Kurt, 12 March 1945. For 
the original German, See “Als Gauleiter war ich zuständig für sämtliche Angelegenheiten der 
Partei, mit Aussnahme der SS die ausschliesslich dem HSSPF understand, als Reichsstatthalter 
war ich Chef der – kommunalen und staatlichen – Zivilverwaltung Hamburg, als 
Reichskommissar der Seeschiffahrt leitete ich den Einsatz der deutschen Handelsschiffe mit 
Ausnahme der Fahrgastschiffe und Tanker, die der Kriegsmarine unterstanden”. 
 
68 
 
was considered a form of political ruler who was subordinate to Martin Bormann – who 
would become Reich Governor – and from whom they received instructions. His 
powers specifically enabled him to: 
command respect of the police [which] was restricted to the sphere of work of 
the Hamburg police president; that is to say the uniformed police, the ARP 
police and administrative police in Hamburg.
120
 
 
In support of his position a Führer decree in the autumn of 1944 re-appointed the 
Gauleiter as a Reich Defence Commissioner (also known as 
Reichsverteidigungskommissar, RVKK’s). So in matters of civil defence and 
administration, Kaufmann had the authority to rely on the support of the Hamburg 
police administration as well as influence over their role in matters of civil defence. 
During the bombing of Hamburg in 1943, for example, labour was drafted from the 
main camp at Neuengamme at his insistence to assist in the clearing of the city. This 
criss-crossing of administration further exacerbated confusion in the final weeks of the 
war. Within such an anarchic setting it became increasingly evident that localised 
policy-making was becoming more prevalent.  
 
Establishing the extent of Gauleiter Kaufmann’s power allows us to provide a clear 
overview of how he guided and planned the evacuation process. As Allied forces 
continued to press hard towards Schleswig Holstein, Kaufmann’s appointment as Reich 
Defence Commissioner became important. This, more than other position gifted the 
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Gauleiter similar levels of authority as the local HSSPF. During his postwar trial, 
Bassewitz-Behr stated that he was under the impression that he was in fact subordinate 
to the command of those appointed to that position.
121
 Yet it seems unlikely that a 
senior member of the SS would willingly accepted being subordinated to a civil 
authority or any military governance outside the boundaries of the SS establishment. 
Birn recently argued that “the Gauleiter wanted to break the monopoly of the SS and 
police”.122 In terms of the political rivalry that existed, Kaufmann’s position as 
Gauleiter of Hamburg meant that his authority was almost autonomous by late 1944. In 
fact during a personal discussion with Himmler, Kaufmann was informed that 
Bassewitz-Behr was to be removed from his post as HSSPF in district ten.
123
 The reason 
for this was vague, but Bassewitz-Behr believed that is was because his sister had 
married the chief of the Swedish General staff and he had not informed his superiors of 
this change.
124
 Although trivial, it highlights the precarious nature of the hierarchy 
within the Third Reich and demonstrates the insecurities of its leading commanders. 
Furthermore, Bassewitz-Behr had a relatively unblemished record and only after the 
intercession by Kaufmann did Himmler relent and allow Bassewitz-Behr to remain in 
office. Although they were bitter rivals, Kaufmann’s intercession allowed the Gauleiter 
a chance to have a further control over his SS counterpart. Furthermore with the SS 
position in Hamburg not as prominent as other areas of the Reich, Gauleiter Kaufmann 
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was further able to exert his influence over the local SS police chief. This skirmish 
between the different elements of the party only sought to highlight the personal power 
struggles which were prevalent between the two offices.  
 
 
Decision-making process 
 
In analysing a series of key meetings between Kaufmann and Bassewitz-Behr it is 
possible to determine how the evacuation planning process evolved. During the spring 
of 1944 initial conferences were held to determine, in the event of a need to evacuate 
the camp at Neuengamme, the feasibility of undertaking the task in hand. As Buggeln 
notes “a proposal by the Wehrmacht led to a meeting between representatives of the 
military, Gauleiters, and police officials to discuss the development of a contingency 
plan in the event that the enemy would make an incursion into the area of the North Sea 
coast”.125 During this meeting, the plan was based on evacuating camps close to the 
fighting front to the south and southeast. Although never implemented, this shows a 
determination to ensure that the large prisoner network was not to be surrendered at any 
cost.  
 
As Allied forces pressed into German Reich territory, the matter concerning security 
within the Reich became more critical. It was decided that the local HSSPF would take 
charge of all matters concerning the evacuation of concentration camps within their 
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district. But there still remained an issue as to what the definition of an alert period 
could be. This left scope for localised decision-making and meant that the local HSSPF 
could decide upon the level of action required to mediate the apparent threat. Guidance 
on this issue was not to be found in the confused and countermanding order(s), which 
had originated from Himmler. However, the gap left for interpretation led to disastrous 
and often deadly decisions being implemented. This would eventually lead to the 
unnecessary death of tens of thousands of inmates along painstaking death marches.
126
 
 
Buggeln notes that by “mid-January, the Reichsgruppe Industrie had informed 
Hamburg’s leading business officials of their intention to revamp the composition of the 
workforce”.127 Although Kaufmann had significant interests within certain businesses, 
many leaders began to pressure the Gauleiter to take back camp prisoners. At a national 
level, the Reich Group Industry (Reichsgruppe Industrie) noted, 
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The companies must be granted the right to return the concentration camp 
inmates, Jews, and prisoners of war to the appropriate authorities.
128
 
 
Although early evacuations did not commence until late March, the process to 
determine how best the evacuation process should commence was shaped by this order. 
Many local businesses felt by February that the war would soon be over. Some were 
concerned that if concentration camp prisoners remained in the work place this would 
pose a significant security threat. More importantly, many business leaders feared that 
should the Allies arrive, they would be seen as slaveholders rather than business leaders. 
In reality, most were simply trying to wash away any trace of their involvement with 
camp labour. At a meeting in the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce in mid-February the 
General Commissioner Otto Wolff, Gauleiter Kaufmann and other representatives of the 
business met to discuss the issue of camp labour. After a lengthy and difficult 
discussion, the Chamber announced that “dismissed concentration camp inmates will, if 
possible, be returned to their main camp until further notice”.129 As Greiser notes  
In contrast to the protagonists of the concentration camp system, local powerful 
officials and decision-makers in armaments industries that used camp prisoners 
showed themselves to be considerably more farsighted and capable of adapting 
to the situation at the end of the war. None of them considered encumbering 
themselves with the prisoners’ presence longer than what was necessary, and 
they ensured their removal at an early stage.
130
  
 
Civil administrators, too, wanted the removal the evidence of prisoners being associated 
with industry and slave labour. It was increasingly likely that should these prisoners be 
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liberated evidence would emerge to suggest this link between Kaufmann and the camp 
at Neuengamme. The Cap Arcona was, therefore, seen as an interim solution to the 
issue of removing any association between business and slave labour. As for the SS elite 
the re-location of Neuengamme inmates on board the Cap Arcona allowed the SS to 
retain control over camp prisoners. Coupled with this notion was an inherent belief that 
the military situation was only a temporary setback.
131
 Therefore, the Cap Arcona was 
seen as a continuation, albeit an adaptation, of SS camp policy. 
 
By now the territorial area that remained in the hands of Germany was shrinking at an 
alarming rate. The camp compound at Neuengamme had, for a lengthy period, been in 
receipt of large numbers of evacuees from camps largely located in the East. Once 
business leaders in the city began to implement and act on the announcement from the 
Chamber of Commerce, prisoner numbers within the main camp swelled enormously. In 
July 1944 it was estimated that the main camp held approximately 9,800 prisoners. By 
March 1945 the number had grown to 12,525 inmates excluding those still held within 
the sub-camp system.
132
 This number continued to grow as Neuengamme became a 
central evacuation destination for other camps already under threat of Allied liberation. 
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With agreement now reached amongst the business representation and city 
administration, Kaufmann progressed his plans to ensure that camp inmates were 
removed from Hamburg’s industrial centre. As the Allied advance continued it became 
necessary to instruct the local HSSPF to plan for the full-scale evacuation of 
Neuengamme should the need arise. According to Jacobs, “Bassewitz-Behr disapproved 
of Kaufmann’s plans and felt that the prisoners should be handed over to the Allied 
forces”.133 One possible motive for this suggestion was that military logistics of 
ensuring that the camp at Neuengamme was evacuated was, at first assessment, almost 
impossible. Although the evacuation of Neuengamme main camp began around 16 
April, it is clear from eye-witness reports that the Cap Arcona as well as other vessels 
had arrived in Neustadt bay on 14 April.
134
 The Cap Arcona arrived in Neustadt after a 
series of mechanical failures, and therefore the German Navy were in the process of 
returning the vessel to its owners. As Watson notes the “Cap Arcona was returned to its 
owners Hamburg-Süd as the company was eager to save the big ocean liner for their 
postwar business plans”.135 Therefore we can surmise that the vessel was chartered by 
the office of the Reich commissioner for sea shipping prior to its arrival on 14 April. It 
means that the process of deciding the fate of the prisoners had to have been decided 
prior to the embarkation of the Cap Arcona from Gotenhafen. Therefore, it would be a 
reasonable assumption that the process of arranging the evacuation process was 
completed by the end of March 1945. 
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During March evacuation plans were prepared in line with instructions from the local 
Gauleiter. Kaufmann left responsibility of finding a suitable solution to the evacuation 
problem to Bassewitz-Behr. During his postwar interrogation by British war crimes 
investigation team, Bassewitz-Behr stated that “the Führer has made [him] personally 
responsible for ensuring that no prisoners fall into enemy hands alive”. 136 He 
remembered that he received this order sometime in March 1945. As the enemy forces 
crossed the River Elbe, Bassewitz-Behr felt duty bound to protect the inhabitants of the 
city of Hamburg. It was at this point; he claimed later, that he tasked the camp 
commandant Max Pauly with finding and locating an emergency camp, presumably in 
the district of Schleswig-Holstein or Mecklenburg.
 137
 By then Neuengamme had an 
estimated 13,500 prisoners in the main camp, and some 25,000 men and 10,300 women 
in its sub-camp network.
138
 This made it increasingly difficult to find a suitable 
emergency camp in an area constantly being squeezed by the advancing forces. During 
his last meeting with Himmler, Bassewitz-Behr failed to discuss the evacuation of 
Neuengamme or the logistical problems he now faced. However, shortly before leaving 
his office, Bassewitz-Behr he asked Himmler exactly what he should do with the large 
number of prisoners under his jurisdiction. Himmler’s reply was vague:  “do what you 
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think is right”.139 By this stage Bassewitz-Behr was solely responsible for his own 
actions. 
By this late stage of the war the logistics and scope to evacuate a camp the size of 
Neuengamme was a significant task. At a time when many vital war resources were 
being used to prolong the military campaign, it was increasingly likely that to 
requisition resources like rail trucks and other vital military resources, that close co-
operation between other Reich institutions was necessary. In his position as Gauleiter, 
Kaufmann had the contacts as well as the political influence to organise the use of such 
resources. The population within the camp was largely starved and exhausted. Initial 
evacuations were designated for Bergen-Belsen.
140
 While sub-camps were ordered to 
evacuate, Bassewitz-Behr did not broach the subject of the main camp until March 1945 
when, in meeting with Kaufmann, concerns were raised on the issue of the 
overcrowding of the camp.
141
 However there remained some confusion as to which 
political body was in overall charge of the evacuation of Neuengamme. Bassewitz-Behr 
later argued that “if my office intervened in some cases where transport of inmates or 
the procurement of emergency camps was concerned, this was done for the following 
reasons:- 
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1) To assist the camp commandant in the execution of the orders given by 
the Reichs Defence Commissioner (Reichsverteidigungskommissar). 
2) To promote the smooth running of the evacuation for reasons of police 
security of the districts”.142 
 
By early April it was clear that the evacuation process was in place should the necessary 
instructions be issued. Kaufmann had ultimately decided, in the face of increasing 
pressure from Hamburg business representatives, that the camp at Neuengamme, as well 
as its vast sub-camp network must be evacuated. Evidence of the prison camp should be 
eradicated and any trace of the city’s involvement should be hidden. This remained one 
of the crucial factors in ensuring the evacuation process was well-thought out and well 
organised. In highlighting the fractious relationship between the SS and state 
representatives, a number of points can be made. Firstly, in the case of Neuengamme, 
Bassewitz-Behr was never able to cement his personal authority. The political offices 
held by Gauleiter Kaufmann make it very difficult for the SS to influence policy at this 
late stage of the war. In terms of their relationship Bassewitz-Behr remained a senior 
military officer within the SS and worked productively under Kaufmann at times. 
Moreover, through a series of political meetings, evidence indicates that Kaufmann was 
responsible for the camp evacuation solution and drive to ensure it took place. 
Increasingly, had Bassewitz-Behr been responsible he would have had limited, if any, 
success in acquiring ships. Therefore the evacuations would have had even fewer 
options as the territory under German control rapidly diminished. Moreover the 
relationship between Kaufmann and Hamburg’s elite pressured the Gauleiter into 
finding the solution which utilised the Cap Arcona. 
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Conclusion 
In the midst of the chaos that came to typify the final months of the war, the evacuation 
process from Neuengamme was not a death march, but the result of the determination of 
the civilian administration to clear the area of slave labour. The process from 
Neuengamme was heavily influenced by Gauleiter Kaufmann, which in itself 
underscores the fact that this evacuation was different to that of other camps in March 
1945. Guided by Kaufmann, arguably there was a clear and decisive plan. The purpose 
of this plan was to remove the prisoners from the immediate area in and around 
Hamburg. In transferring the SS social hierarchy to the Cap Arcona we can infer that 
the SS attempted to continue to find some twisted normality in the closing stages of the 
war. Although there was a central order which originated from Himmler, the planning 
process was well underway prior to the re-release of his command. In fact the Cap 
Arcona was docked in Neustadt on 16 April, a mere two days after Himmler’s final 
command concerning the concentration camps. Furthermore at a time when many 
functions and state departments found it increasingly difficult to operate, the political 
structure in Hamburg ensured, at all costs, that a suitable solution to the question of 
evacuation was found. This led to Gauleiter Kaufmann, in his authority as Reich’s 
commissioner for Sea Shipping, requisitioning the passenger liner Cap Arcona. 
However the transferal of the prisoner hierarchy during the evacuation transports and 
aboard the Cap Arcona show clearly that the SS still retained some hold over 
organisation. But this only happened once the camp was evacuated. The impact of chaos 
on the broader theme of planning an evacuation clearly identifies a series of localised 
policy makers, who wished to ensure that evidence of their involvement in the camp at 
Neuengamme was hidden. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Evacuation to Lübeck Bay, April 1945 
 
The evacuation from Neuengamme to Lübeck Bay towards the end of April provides 
another insight into the purpose of utilising the Cap Arcona. The last chapter looked at 
the planning process to evacuate Neuengamme camp. This chapter will seek to discuss 
the evacuation towards Lübeck Bay and set this in the broader context of chaos. 
Although the necessary processes had been outlined to ready Neuengamme for 
evacuation, its final execution and transfer of prisoners from the camp to Lübeck cannot 
be seen as complying with the current death march model for camp evacuations in the 
final weeks of the war. Unlike camps at Bergen-Belsen and Sachsenhausen, the 
administration at Neuengamme had decided to requisition rail trucks. The method alone 
differentiates this evacuation from other camps. Blatman concluded that, 
The killings of concentration camp prisoners in the last phase of the war 
occurred amid a situation in which confusion and disorder were rife and 
supervisory apparatuses and chains of command were disintegrating in all 
spheres of life in Germany. 
143
 
 
Noting that the final weeks and months of the war were marked by this social 
breakdown of order, Blatman’s suggestion that all aspects of supervisory apparatus 
were disintegrating warrants further investigation. In the case of Hamburg, this chapter 
will argue that while the transfer process of moving the prisoners from Lübeck to the 
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Cap Arcona subsequently evolved into chaos, this was not because central authority was 
disintegrating. Instead the civilian administration in Hamburg simple wanted the camp 
closed and the surrounding area cleared of prisoners. In attempting to deal with the 
impending situation, this can be labelled as management by crisis.  
 
In defining the term ‘management by crisis’, communication became central to the 
success of this evacuation. However, once the prisoners arrived at Lübeck harbour, it 
became clear that communication, both locally and centrally, had broken down. This 
was because of a number of factors. At a time when resources within Germany were 
stretched, and communication faltered, the use of rail trucks to evacuate prisoners shows 
a level of organisation that was often non-existent in the final stages of the war. 
However, in doing so, the local administration had failed to account for the arrival of a 
vast numbers of refugees from the East, who in their attempt to flee the Soviet army 
crowded the small area of Neustadt. What was the impact of this on the transports at 
Lübeck? What was the Gauleiter’s response to the problem? Moreover, the transfer 
process from Lübeck to the ships came under increasing resistance from a number of 
military and civilian personnel. This failure to communicate with different Reich 
institutions had an important impact on the prisoners in Lübeck. Why had the German 
Merchant Navy not been instructed on the use for the Cap Arcona; why was Gauleiter 
Kaufmann less concerned with civil resistance at Lübeck?  
 
The evacuation to Lübeck was well-organised. However, once the transports arrived at 
Lübeck, the civilian administration was less concerned with the prisoners’ transfer to 
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the Cap Arcona. In terms of the SS, its close involvement with the evacuation meant 
that the camp properties and prisoner segregation continued throughout. The SS was, 
therefore, determined to ensure that once the prisoners were placed on the Cap Arcona 
that there was a transfer of camp life on board the vessel. Although the SS were able to 
restore some resemblance of control on the Cap Arcona, the situation remained chaotic 
because communication between the different institutions left the ship critically short of 
basic provisions.  
 
Evacuation Overview, April 1945 
By April 1945, the military situation in Germany was one of British forces continuing to 
press hard against the retreating German forces in North Germany. In the East, Soviet 
forces continued their encirclement of the Reich centre.  Those camps still operating in 
the final weeks of the war were forced by SS leaders to evacuate remaining prisoners 
beyond the reach of the Allies. This final phase of evacuations has been considered the 
most deadly by recent historians.
144
 Kershaw argues that “the death marches were 
completely pointless, except as a means of inflicting still further enormous suffering on 
those designated by the regime’s internal enemies”.145 Many evacuation transports in 
this final stage largely had no direct command, nor any direct destination. Often 
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transports were unable to reach their destination, leaving local commanders to find an 
alternative. The result was continued suffering and prisoners killed without a thought.
146
 
One clear distinction between evacuation transports from other camps, compared with 
those from Neuengamme was method. It will argue that once the order to evacuate the 
camp had been given, the process became confused and disorderly as transports arrived 
at Lübeck. A lack of close cooperation and communication between other Reich 
institutions ultimately caused the frantic scenes on the Vorwerk harbour. Although the 
SS were able to restore some aspect of control by implementing a hierarchy on the Cap 
Arcona, the lack of basic provisions, as well as in-house fighting continued to lead to a 
situation that remained disorganised and typical of Third Reich leadership in the closing 
stages of the war. 
 
As the evacuation transports departed Neuengamme, more generally “the spatial 
dimension of the murders changed, as did the circumstances and the reasons for their 
liquidation”.147 In his survey of the German evacuation process in the final months of 
the war, Wachsmann argues that, 
With the German transport system torn apart, trains constantly stopped or 
changed direction. Journeys that should have lasted a day took weeks, and the 
longer they lasted, the more prisoners died.
148
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In analysing the method of the final camp evacuations Wachsmann reaches a 
generalised conclusion. But in outlining his periodisation of the death march phase, 
Goldhagen concludes that “the death marches of the third period, whatever their many 
commonalities, composed a chaotic phenomenon, with sometimes significant variations 
in their character”.149 Goldhagen suggests that there was indeed a common theme for 
camp evacuations in his three-phased model.  But in addition historians have argued 
that “telecommunications [had] virtually collapsed, rendering centralised control 
impossible”,150 and therefore relevant orders and clear guidance were not always 
available. 
 
The evacuation from Neuengamme highlights that it was neither chaotic, nor was it 
indeed similar to other such camps. Other camps in April 1945, that were evacuated, 
included Flossenbürg and Sachsenhausen. Generally, prisoners were grouped together 
to form columns that were often marched out of the camp at the last minute. Many SS 
commanders reacted in desperation to the speed of the Allied advance. Other examples 
include Dachau concentration camp. When the US Army arrived at Dachau camp on 29 
April, they liberated approximately 32,000 prisoners.
151
 Only days prior to the arrival of 
American forces, Dachau and its sub-camps had 67,665 prisoners registered. Over half 
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that number was held in the main compound.
152
 The stark differences between the two 
camps were the involvement of the civilian administration. 
 
Generally, historians view the final evacuation period as a knee-jerk reaction to the 
Allied advance. The remaining camps were subsequently evacuated  
because approaching enemy armies threatened to overrun the institutions 
housing Jews and other prisoners. The Germans found themselves in the 
position of either having to move the prisoners or risk losing them.
153
 
 
There is some disagreement as to whether the camp system in April 1945 was in total 
collapse, or whether it remained highly resilient to the social and economic pressures as 
a result of the faltering military campaign.
154
 In analysing the final evacuation period it 
does indeed suggest that the camp system was in meltdown. In one example the camp 
near Celle, Bergen-Belsen, was liberated by British troops on 15 April 1945 with an 
estimated 60,000 prisoners still within the compound.
155
 The remaining concentration 
camps had effectively become dumping grounds for any and every evacuation transport 
that could not reach its target destination. By mid-April the feasibility of evacuating 
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such vast numbers of prisoners to another secure location remained challenging. Hence 
as Allied troops pressed into the heartland of Nazi Germany during 1945, it was likely 
that the administration no longer feared the loss of the prisoners. The driving factor, in 
relative terms, was a need to hide any evidence of the atrocities that had been committed 
within the compound. Moreover, as the Reich suffered further military defeats, the 
requirement of slave labour within the armaments industry or indeed any military 
institution diminished.
156
 But while there remained a direct order to ensure that the 
camps were evacuated, there was no clear guidance from central government as to how 
this could be achieved. Blatman suggests that “during the evacuation of the camps, 
inmates were ruthlessly pursued and murdered by civilians who had never before lent a 
hand to the Nazi genocide”.157 Set within this context, Nazi Germany had increased its 
terror apparatus on the home front in a desperate hope of maintaining order and social 
control.
158
 Many villages and towns came face to face with the horrors of the camp 
system for the first time. The response from residents was often mixed.
159
 Some 
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residents participated in the continual mistreatment of prisoners, while others attempted 
to offer some relief by providing food.  
 
The first camps to be evacuated were those in the occupied territories. The planning 
process was poor. The camps were evacuated largely as a reaction to the Allied landing 
in Normandy and the Russian Offensive in the East.
160
 For example, in the summer of 
1944 Majdanek became the first camp under threat of liberation by the Red Army. 
Throughout the first weeks of April transports left daily with many unclear as to their 
final destination.
161
 To make matters worse the increase in traffic flow from the East 
made evacuations more difficult and more time consuming.
162
 The local command was 
frequently unclear on the transports’ destinations, with some heading to Natzweiler-
Strufhof, Groß-Rosen and a large proportion was eventually sent to Auschwitz. This 
variety of destinations is seen by Blatman as “changing needs within the labour 
system”.163 This close link between camps and industry guided the principle as to where 
prisoners should be evacuated.  
 
During the second wave of evacuations in January 1945, Himmler issued an order 
stating that “not a single healthy prisoner was to be left behind in the camps under his 
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jurisdiction”.164 This order created confusion amid almost total chaos. The Red Army’s 
big push meant that evacuations of large camps such as Auschwitz and Groß-Rosen 
were hurried through before plans had been finalised. The result was a domino effect on 
the remaining evacuations. By March and April 1945 the system had generally all but 
disintegrated. In the case of Neuengamme, the order and planning stage to evacuate the 
camp was not undertaken until March 1945. By this stage of the war, territory under 
Nazi command was rapidly dwindling. Large parts of central Western and Eastern 
Germany were no longer under the jurisdiction of the Reich, although there remained 
pockets of resistance towards the south. Occupied Denmark as well as the north area of 
Germany, including Kiel, Bremen and Hamburg, provided a brief option for potential 
evacuation sites and destinations.  
 
 
Largely by April 1945 it became increasingly difficult for commandants to evacuate 
camps. Moreover, many camps that had crematoria had destroyed these in an attempt to 
remove evidence of the crimes that had been committed earlier in the war. The camp at 
Sachsenhausen provides an important example. The main camp was liberated by the 
Red Army on 22 April 1945. Around 3,000 prisoners were found languishing within the 
camp grounds.
165
 Only a few days prior to the arrival of the Red Army, SS camp guards 
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began the forced evacuation on foot of 33,000 prisoners.
166
 The destination was 
northwest. In departing the main camp the various groups that were marched out 
became increasingly disorganised as Allied troops drew closer.  This ad hoc evacuation 
led to groups disintegrating which in turn created more opportunities for prisoners to 
flee into open countryside. Guard columns on these types of marches were usually 
overseen by junior commanders. Unable to communicate with their superiors, and 
acknowledging that the war was close to the end, many guards fled during the night. 
Killing within these final transports was not always undertaken by the guards.  
 
As British forces became increasingly desperate to reach the Baltic coast, local 
commanders within the district of Hamburg had been drawing up plans for the 
evacuation of the main camp at Neuengamme. The expansive network of sub-camps at 
Neuengamme meant that evacuations and closures of these camps began in late March 
1944. At this time there were approximately some 57 subsidiary camps operating with 
around 40,000 prisoners.
167
 The furthest camps located in the West were closed rapidly, 
a mere few days prior to the advance of the Allied troops. It was not a knee-jerk reaction 
to evacuate all the sub-camps back to the main camp. The closure process, coupled with 
the Allied advance into Germany, showed that the SS still wished to retain some 
possible future use of slave labour. Those camps closest to the fighting front were 
closed and the prisoners were either deployed to other work camps or returned to the 
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main camp. Had the SS wished to abandon all potential use of slave labour then the 
closure of satellite camps would have been wholesale. In practice the SS continued to 
utilise those camps which remained viable until such time as the Allied threat forced the 
camps’ closure. One useful example was the camp located in Porta Westfalica. This 
particular camp was relocated to camps close to Salzgitter and Braunschweig. This 
indicated that the SS wished to ensure that any potential business output and investment 
was still undertaken. 
 
 
As the Allied threat to the satellite camps at Neuengamme increased, the decision was 
made to evacuate the prisoners towards the camp at Bergen-Belsen. Buggeln argued that 
“between April 6 and April 8 nearly one-third of all Neuengamme prisoners were 
probably in transit”.168 The bulk of these transports related to the large numbers of 
prisoners housed within the satellite camp complex. By April 1945, the main camp – 
like the other remaining camps – was severely overcrowded. According to the 2006 
death register, the camp had around 12,525 inmates housed within the main 
compound.
169
 This figure represented around one-third of the total camp-complex 
population.  
 
There were however extreme cases of marches by foot. One important example was the 
sub-camp situated at Blankenburg-Harz. At the beginning of April the satellite camp 
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housed approximately 400 prisoners. The proposed destination was unknown, although 
the convoy was headed north to Schleswig-Holstein. The prisoners were marched 
through Magdeburg which meant that the total distance on foot was approximately 357 
kilometres.
170
 The subsequent death march highlighted the lack of clear co-ordination 
by local commanders. Once the convoy departed the camp compound, communication 
with other Reich bodies was absent. The convoy departed the following day. As a result 
of such a poor diet many of the prisoners suffered with diarrhoea.
171
 Unable to continue 
on the march most were shot where they stopped. A survivor of the march later recalled: 
After being shot the prisoners’ numbers were written down but were destroyed 
later. They were left where they were shot, and the march went on.
172
  
 
During the march prisoner nationality often failed to protect individual groups, as it had 
done within the physical camp structure. In the case of the march from Blankenburg-
Harz, the callous behaviour exhibited by the guards took place largely without any 
direct orders from above. The brutality exhibited by the guard personnel highlights the 
impact of a lack of clear direction. Young guard personnel, often without military 
experience, were the root cause of the violence. Buggeln notes that death caused during 
these death marches exhibited “many years of socialisation in violence”. 173  
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Map One: Route from Blankenburg via Magdeburg to Schleswig-Holstein by Foot. 
 
 
Map One indicates an approximate route forced upon the inmates of Blankenburg-Harz. 
During the evacuation the logical choice of route would have been via Brunswick, as 
this as the most direct route. At a time when many observers acknowledged that the war 
would soon be over, the prolonged agony and suffering of inmates was void of any 
logic or meaning. This example shows a very typical evacuation in the final weeks of 
the war. Often the destination was unknown, or beyond the realistic reach of the SS 
guard column. What remains different to the Neuengamme camp complex is the lack of 
detailed planning. Even the evacuation of the satellite camps was generally conducted in 
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a timely manner. The example of Neuengamme camp therefore shows that the SS still 
held some short-term aim for the continued use of prison labour.  
 
 
The study of Blankenburg-Harz highlights a number of common themes in the final 
evacuation period. Firstly, a lack of co-ordinated plans left considerable scope for the 
guard columns to interpret their orders as best they could. Secondly, there was often no 
long-term planning, and prison columns were often marched through German 
countryside on an endless goal of nothing more than extinguishing life. In many 
instances guard columns in April 1945 simply fled. In stark contrast, the main camp at 
Neuengamme continues to provide clear planning which implies that the civilian 
administration, rather than the SS, had a further use of the inmates from Neuengamme. 
 
 
In terms of Neuengamme the evacuation was markedly different because of the 
relationship between Kaufmann, the SS and business leaders. The use of passenger 
liners to continue the detention of camp prisoners shows a clear divide in priorities. 
Lange notes that  
 
[Kaufmann] requisitioned the ships as he wished to surrender Hamburg without 
any fighting and wanted to avoid any inconvenient inquiries. That is why he did 
not want to have any concentration camp prisoners in Hamburg.
174
 
 
Once the evacuation transports reached Lübeck, Kaufmann’s drive and motivation to 
follow through on their placement on board the vessels stopped. However in the case of 
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Blankenburg-Harz, the clear lack of planning coupled with the Allied advance meant 
the SS guard column simply turned to murdering the prisoners. Up to this point there 
have been examples of evacuation transports that, in this final period, highlight the often 
volatile and chaotic situation the guard columns faced once they had departed from their 
starting destination. This often ended in a significant loss of life.  
 
As evacuations departed Neuengamme, a survivor, Paul Weissmann described his 
experiences on the evacuation: 
 
On 20 April, the prisoners had to stand on the parade ground. As guards began 
counting, we were forced into wagons, around 80 prisoners in each. The trains 
left immediately…we arrived around noon in Lübeck…from our train there was 
around 50 prisoners who had died during the transport. They were removed and 
buried in a grave next to the track embankment.
175
 
 
Survivor accounts like that of Paul Weismann describe the poor conditions inmates 
faced on a regular basis. At a time when “the transportation system was in a shambles 
and telecommunications were in hopeless disarray”,176 the guard detachments were 
instructed to make careful notes of the number of inmates that boarded the rail trucks. 
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During the short rail journey north to Lübeck there were a number of inmates that died 
as a result of the conditions in the crammed wagons. However, while the guard 
detachment continued to move the remaining inmates, care was taken to bury those who 
had died. In burying the bodies there remains a level of care and attention that had not 
been obvious during evacuations from other similar camps. For instance, during the 
evacuation from Buchenwald both the method and level of attention differed drastically. 
As US forces approached the camp, SS personnel began to evacuate around 28,000 
prisoners housed in the main camp.
177
 Conditions on these marches were appalling. 
Historians estimate that approximately one third of the evacuees died en-route or shortly 
after they arrived at their destination.
178
 Many of the prisoners that had been forced on 
the evacuation were largely Soviet POWs and Jews.
179
 Unlike the careful and precise 
evacuation from Neuengamme camp, during the marches from Buchenwald the guard 
detail shot and killed those who staggered or fell. Their bodies were left where they 
were killed.
180
 Another key example is the camp at Bergen-Belsen. Unlike other camps 
– which were evacuated in direct response to the Allied approach – Belsen began a long 
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drawn out process of evacuating prisoners.
181
 Moreover, while the camp continued to 
evacuate transports to other camps, the camp itself became a central receipt camp for 
other evacuation transports. The SS program began in the spring of 1944 with the 
evacuation of sick inmates from the Mittelbau concentration camp complex. By April 
1945 the camp was severely overcrowded. In a desperate attempt to remove the 
thousands of dead, the SS charged those still capable of walking to remove the corpses 
to a mass grave site.
182
 Three train evacuations left prior to the liberation of the main 
camp in April 1945. Approximately 8,000 Jews, between 6 April and 11, were crammed 
on trucks. One of the trains reached Theresienstadt, while the other two were liberated 
by US troops near Magdeburg and Soviet troops near Tröbitz after roaming the 
countryside.
183
 The majority who died during these evacuation transports were left on 
the countryside or within the rail trucks. Compared to other similar evacuation methods 
and evacuation dates in 1945, the organisation from Neuengamme appears on the 
surface comparatively well organised. 
 
The camp system and structure at Neuengamme relied heavily on the support of camp 
elders to assist in the evacuation process. In the move to Lübeck Bay, we witness the 
camp’s external properties moved and extended to passenger liners. As the first 
evacuation transports arrived at the Vorwerk harbour, the Cap Arcona, Deutschland and 
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Thielbek were all docked in Neustadt Bay. At this stage of the transfer process, the 
owners of the Cap Arcona, Hamburg Süd, remained unaware of the full intention of the 
Reich commission for sea shipping, Gauleiter Kaufmann. Although the vessel had 
previously been requisitioned by the German Navy, owing to mechanical defects, the 
Cap Arcona was to be released back to Hamburg-Süd before the intervention of 
Gauleiter Kaufmann. Once the vessel was no longer under the military jurisdiction of 
the German Navy, Gauleiter Kaufmann was able in his role as the Reikosee to 
requisition the further use of the Cap Arcona. 
 
This level of diligent administration and planning ensured that the camp and its 
associated sub-camps were ready for evacuation months before any imminent threat. It 
was this organisation to plan the evacuation that delivered a smooth transfer to Lübeck. 
The example of the death march from Blankenburg-Harz illustrates clearly the 
difficulties associated with an SS driven evacuation. The number of deaths, coupled 
with the method and disorganisation show that the only concern was to remove the 
prisoners from the advancing Allied forces. There existed no short term plan for these 
inmates, other than their eventual death. This example further highlights that the 
evacuations were commenced solely in the face of Allied forces. In addition, as shown 
above, SS officers were without clear guidance, which led to a rise in the number of 
deaths. In comparison, the evacuation from Neuengamme suggests that there was a clear 
aim and direction, although not solely driven by the SS. By this late stage it was 
increasingly difficult for the SS to simply murder all inmates in Neuengamme. 
Resources were a challenge, but also the civilian administration was the driving force 
behind the direction the evacuation should take. Although not in direct control of the 
97 
 
evacuation, the transferring of a structure on board the ships was a way in which the SS 
retained some control. As the German military campaign continued to suffer defeats on 
all fronts, it became increasingly unlikely that the SS had any long-term plans for the 
prisoners held on the Cap Arcona. By this late stage, the only plausible suggestion was 
that the SS which to retain some resemblance of normality from camp life by continuing 
the detention of prisoners on the vessels in Lübeck.  
 
Evacuation transports began departing the main camp between 19 and 20 April. This 
group of prisoners consisted solely of those of Scandinavian nationality who had been 
released to the Swedish Red Cross.
184
 The remainder of the camp prisoners were to be 
loaded onto cattle trucks and transported to Lübeck. Over the course of four days, 22-26 
April, some 6000 prisoners made the short trip.
185
 The final evacuation transport left on 
29 April for Flensburg via Hamburg. This last convoy consisted mainly of accounts 
staff and camp elders who had been held back to destroy administration records. During 
the final days, the camp crematoria were pulled down, evidence of atrocities was 
cleared and other parts of the camp were burned and destroyed. All evidence of any 
camp atrocity committed in Neuengamme was cleaned and covered up.
186
 There is, 
however, some confusion as to the ultimate aim of the Hamburg administration. During 
this final period the administration surrendered a significant number of prisoners, while 
going to extreme lengths to evacuate the remainder. Extensive negotiations took place 
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between the SS and SRC, and Neuengamme benefited from a range of extensive inputs 
from different administrative bodies.
187
  
 
Lübeck Harbour 
 
Although the evacuation plan, on paper, had been well-thought through, the transfer 
process from the harbour to the ship evolved into chaos. The initial execution of the 
evacuation process from Neuengamme began in a controlled manner, once at Lübeck 
harbour the process developed into chaos. As the numbers of prisoners began to 
increase rapidly, it became crucial for those organising the logistics to move the 
prisoners onto the vessels docked at Neustadt. This section will argue that a lack of 
communication and co-ordination between key Reich departments allowed the 
evacuation transports to evolve into chaos at Lübeck. Moreover basic planning and 
assessment of prisoner numbers led to severe overcrowding. Not only did the local 
administration fail to assess the true scale of this transfer process, negotiations were still 
on-going with the Cap Arcona’s owners Hamburg-Süd vis-à-vis the proposed leasing of 
the vessel. In addition to the discussions with Hamburg-Süd, communication between 
the Merchant Navy, German Navy and the office of the Reikosee was non-existent. This 
led to frantic and often chaotic scenes at the quay side as well as on board the vessels. 
Weismann remembered that, 
Immediately after the arrival of the train, the transfer [to the ships] began. 
Prisoners mounted the ship and were forced through hatches into the holds of the 
ship. On both ships, these rooms consisted of two rooms. The overcrowding was 
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such that no one had room to stretch out. The conditions in the lower hold were 
particularly catastrophic.
188
 
 
As more prisoners were forced from the quay side to the two vessels docked at the 
harbour, any further planning once these prisoners were placed on ships was largely 
sporadic. In turn, this meant that large numbers of prisoners were held longer on the 
harbour side that had been planned. Weismann identifies that segregation of prisoner 
nationalities still played an integral part of prisoner daily life.  
 
One possible reason was the subsequent breakdown of communication. But while civil 
administrators and other Reich institutions functioned jointly to achieve a successful 
evacuation, once transports arrived at Lübeck, the situation descends into chaotic 
circumstances because of a lack of clear communication. The most crucial element 
throughout was to remove the prisoners from Neuengamme and Hamburg. Once the 
transports arrived at Lübeck, the primary motive for Kaufmann had been achieved. 
Although Kaufmann had been responsible for requisitioning ships for the purpose of 
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placing prisoners on board, his interest began to wane once the prisoners arrived at 
Lübeck. The prisoners no longer occupied any physical space in the city of Hamburg. 
And it remains clear, particularly during the early transports that their transfer to the 
ships seemed a mere formality. This evolved into a disorderly situation because 
Gauleiter Kaufmann was less concerned with the prisoners once the transports cleared 
Hamburg. In examining why there was a breakdown in communication, what will now 
follow is a reconstruction of a series of communications between the SS, civilian 
administration, Merchant Navy and the German Navy. I will argue that the plans for the 
evacuation from Neuengamme were a closely guarded secret, and the use of the vessels 
in Neustadt Bay was not known to other departments engaged in the evacuation process. 
 
In light of the enemy advance an estimated 10,000 prisoners had been forced to the 
small Baltic port of Neustadt. The civilian administration in Hamburg as well the local 
SS had planned to house these prisoners on board three main ships. The Thielbek 
accommodated some 2,800 prisoners, while the Athen was to hold some 2,000 
prisoners. The remainder were planned to be placed aboard the Cap Arcona.
189
 But by 
26 April it had become clear that these plans had not been communicated effectively to 
other departments. As transports were brought to the Cap Arcona, it quickly became 
apparent that the volume of prisoners was too great for the few vessels that had been 
requisitioned. Bassewitz-Behr and Kaufmann received daily reports on the 
overcrowding and deteriorating sanitary conditions. As this presented a real problem to 
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the plans of detaining prisoners on board ships, Walter von Lewinski was charged by 
Heinrich Horn SS to act as a consultant in Neustadt for maritime affairs. Due to the task 
ahead Lewinski decided to work with Captain Kahrt who was the liaising Maritime 
officer in Lübeck. In deciding the numbers destined for each vessel, Kahrt argued that 
“there should be about eight thousand concentration camp inmates, loaded by the SS on 
the steamer Cap Arcona, who was lying in the Bay of Lübeck”.190 The problem was that 
the plans and intentions of the Gauleiter had not been communicated effectively to the 
crewmen of the Merchant Navy. This led to a refusal to accept any prisoners. The Cap 
Arcona’s Captain, Heinrich Bertram refused to take this number on board. In fact the 
first refusal had come from his first officer, Jeske, while Bertram was away seeing his 
wife in Neustadt.
191
 
 
The transfer process, on paper, was simple. Prisoners would be loaded on the Athen, and 
then taken out to the Cap Arcona. The Athen, under the command of Captain Nobmann, 
had been informed of the situation by the naval authority. The ship was simply being 
used as a shuttle to transfer the prisoners. On two occasions the Athen was forced back 
to port with its cargo as a result of Bertram’s refusal. Major Christoph-Heinz Gehrig 
had been placed in charge of managing the shipment of these prisoners onto suitable 
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vessels. Having recently been promoted to the rank of Hauptsturmführer, he had been 
charged with the destruction of administrative records in the main camp. His task was to 
organise the loading of prisoners onto the ships docked in Neustadt. The first time was 
during dusk on 23 April when the refusal was given due to lack of sufficient light. 
Again in the morning, the Athen set steam and tried to moor next to the Cap Arcona. 
This time the refusal was given for several reasons. On board, Otto Thummel toured the 
ship. It became immediately apparent that the ship could not take 8000 prisoners. 
Thummel noted that “they found the ship completely inappropriate. Accommodation in 
the small cabins was too crammed, and there were not sufficient food or water facilities 
to cope with the demand”.192 More importantly, the structure on board the vessel clearly 
indicates that the purpose of the vessel was to serve as an extension of the concentration 
camp.  
 
That the merchant crew continued to refuse further access to the Cap Arcona presented 
the administration staff with a number of complications. Firstly, prisoner numbers on 
the quayside at Lübeck continued to swell. This meant that further provisions, housing 
and some food stores were required. But the situation also meant that although the 
evacuation from Neuengamme had been successful, there were still prisoners visibly 
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near or close to industrial businesses. The fear was that businesses would be linked to 
slave labour after the war.
193
 This increased pressure on the civilian administration in 
Hamburg naturally led to a swift resolution. After the final refusal by the merchant 
crew, the situation was untenable. To overcome the issue, SS staff led by Gehrig was 
told to use force to ensure that the inmates were successfully transferred onto the Cap 
Arcona.
194
  
 
In its operation days the Cap Arcona was built and designed to hold around 2,000 
people including its crew.
195
 With this in mind, Lewinski argued that “in his view, too 
many prisoners were aboard the Cap Arcona, and for sanitary reasons not more than 
4,500 people were to be allowed on the ship”.196 Because of problems surrounding the 
housing of prisoners in Lübeck, a meeting was arranged for the evening of 25 April 
1945. The purpose was to discuss how best to overcome the problems that had become 
apparent in Neustadt. At this meeting Horn, the commandant Pauly, von Lewinski, 
Rickert and an SS Doctor from Neuengamme Max Specht were present. Having 
digested the report by Lewinski on the prevailing sanitary conditions and complaints 
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from the ships captains, they agreed to send Max Specht to investigate the claims 
further and report back. As a temporary measure, until further assessments were done, 
all parties agreed to place no more than 4,500 prisoners on the Cap Arcona.
197
 The 
importance of the captain’s continued refusal showed that communication, as well as 
poor planning, led to the chaotic scenes in Lübeck. The breakdown and eventual failure 
of the planning and execution of Gauleiter Kaufmann’s evacuation plan was the result 
of a lack of clear communication. Once Hamburg and the immediate area was clear 
from any involvement with slave labour, the Gauleiter was less concerned about the 
actual loading process in Lübeck Bay.  
 
On 26 April, Specht accompanied Lewinski to Lübeck as instructed at the night’s 
previous meeting. On arrival in Lübeck, and subsequently on the ships Thielbek and 
Elmenhorst, initial conditions were confirmed. Over the course of the following days, 
Specht inspected all aspects of the complaints. Alongside his visit, Otto Thummel, who 
was part of Pauly’s staff at Neuengamme camp noted that, 
In regards to the accommodation on the Cap Arcona, the following should be 
noted: The Russian and Polish prisoners were housed in the hold of the ship, the 
French, Belgian and Dutch prisoners in the decks from B to G, along with some 
German prisoners. There had to be separation between East and West because of 
many instances of theft, violence and stealing of food.
198
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Thummel identified in his statement the ongoing segregation of certain nationalities and 
type of prisoners. Furthermore he recognised that the purpose of the Cap Arcona was 
seen as an extension of the physical camp structure. The continued segregation of 
prisoners on different decks, as well as the continued maltreatment of Russian and 
Jewish prisoners highlights this. For instance, a Soviet prisoner of war was ranked just 
above his Jewish inmate, while a Western prisoner – French, Belgian, and Dutch – 
would occupy the higher decks of the vessel.
199
  
 
The issues of communication appear to centre round Gauleiter Kaufmann. In his 
position as Gauleiter of Hamburg, as well as his position as Reich Commissioner for 
Sea Shipping, Kaufmann led the decision-making process which monitored the 
evacuation from Neuengamme. It was therefore his offices that were responsible for 
ensuring that other relevant departments were made aware of the short-term plan and 
most notably the housing of prisoners on board requisitioned passenger liners in 
Neustadt. Prior to embarkation from Gotenhafen, many of the ship’s crew had been 
granted leave, while most of the life-saving equipment had been removed. The 
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remaining crew were under the impression the ship was going to be laid up.
200
 On the 
evening of 21 April Lieselotte Wiese, secretary to the Reich Commissar for shipping 
received an important telephone call. She revealed in her deposition that: 
during the night, as far as I can remember, the Navy told me  - although the 
conversation was interrupted several times – that the ship stands at our disposal, 
but that the Navy do not take responsibility for the crew, food, water or 
bunkering of the vessel.
201
 
 
The Cap Arcona docked in Neustadt on 16 April.
202
 Wiese reveals that it took a further 
five days before the release of the vessel had been guaranteed by the German Navy. 
Moreover, by this stage of the evacuation process it was only the Gauleiter and SS who 
were in a position of knowing what was happening. Although the German Navy had 
released the ship, its involvement in the transfer process was limited. But the merchant 
crew, as well as the ships owners (Hamburg-Süd) had not entered into any part of the 
decision-making process. Ultimately the initial transfer of prisoners was done without 
the authority of the owners. This is relevant because it shows that the continuation of 
planning and organisation once the Cap Arcona arrived in Neustadt had either stalled or 
the Gauleiter and SS merely hoped that there would be no complications with the 
transfer. 
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Bertram arrived in Neustadt on the morning of 22 April where he was made aware that 
the Cap Arcona was no longer under the authority of the German Navy. The ships 
company, Hamburg-Süd, had been in direct conversation with the office of the Reikosee 
and more specifically Horn. There does appear to be some confusion between the two 
offices. While the Navy released the Cap Arcona on the evening of 21 April, it was not 
until 24-25 April that the ship’s company were fully aware. A telegram from John 
Eggert to Bertram stated: 
Reikosee informs that acceptance of prisoners due to suggestion of Admiral 
Engelhardt. You are to communicate with and to carry out the orders of 
Engelhardt.
203
 
 
But if the ship had been released by the German Navy, it was no longer the 
responsibility of Admiral Engelhardt to govern the use of the Cap Arcona. Engelhardt 
revealed that he received a telephone conversation from someone in the office of the 
shipping ministry: 
on behalf of Gauleiter Kaufmann, he requested the Marine (Navy) to load the 
‘Cap Arcona’ with 2200 concentration camp prisoners. He gave as a reason that 
in Lübeck area there was no other possibility of accommodation. I refused with 
the following words: ‘The Navy does not deal with such matters’. I will place 
the ship, at your disposal… I think that it was before 13 April 1945.204 
 
Engelhardt disclosed a number of important points. The number of prisoners expected 
to be loaded onto the vessel totalled 2,200. Kaufmann had calculated that this would be 
a sufficient number to house on the Cap Arcona. However this clearly highlights that 
Kaufmann had failed to fully grasp the scale of the situation. During the planning stages 
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he had been unable to calculate the number of prisoners that would be part of the 
transfer process.  This lack of efficient planning and scope by the Gauleiter suggests 
that there were a number of factors that Kaufmann had to make a final decision on. 
Firstly, we can infer that this situation continued to be the best way the Hamburg 
Gauleiter could manage the increasing pressure from business industrialists. Namely 
that once the transports left Hamburg, they deemed this to be a satisfactory solution. 
Furthermore evidence suggests that once the transports departed the camp, Kaufmann’s 
personal interest in the problems that arose at Lübeck can be considered less 
enthusiastic to engage and solve the on-going crisis.   
 
 
Kaufmann ignored his own estimates and opted to cram the Cap Arcona with over twice 
the number of prisoners as previously estimated. His primary concern was his 
determination that the prisoners were hidden from view, particularly as British forces 
were close to the surrounding area. Secondly, the decision process to use the Cap 
Arcona to detain prisoners further highlights the spontaneous nature of the Hamburg 
administration. The decision to utilise shipping was made by the end of March 1945, 
only two weeks prior to the first embarkation from Neuengamme. Therefore the 
continued planning to ensure a smooth transition from the harbour to the Cap Arcona 
was further delayed because Gauleiter Kaufmann had failed to communicate his plans to 
the Merchant Navy.  
 
 
One important aspect of the Cap Arcona was the overall condition of the ship. 
Conditions on board the Cap Arcona, as well as the way prisoners were continually 
109 
 
treated, help provide indicators as to the overall purpose of the vessel. As numbers 
increased in Lübeck, the SS became determined that all the prisoners would be held on 
ships. A survivor, Sam Pivnik suggested that 
This [Arcona] was a floating hell and there was nowhere to go in the congested 
space. The dead, we discovered, had already been thrown overboard, to float like 
human debris in the black waters of the Bay of Lübeck.
205
 
 
In relatively cramped conditions it was difficult, almost impossible for the small number 
of merchant crew on board to improve the conditions on board. Kaufmann argued that 
the Red Cross (SRC) would take over the Cap Arcona and the prisoners on board.
206
 In 
reality the dwindling conditions, combined with a lack of basic provisions largely 
suggested that the placement of prisoners on the Cap Arcona had not been undertaken 
with humanitarian aims in mind. Moreover, the likelihood that such prisoner numbers 
would be handed over directly to the Red Cross was also unlikely given the location of 
the vessels, and wider military situation. As the number of deaths increased provisions 
were made to stop the bodies being thrown overboard. The shuttle boat Alma was used 
to ferry the dead from the Cap Arcona where mass graves had been dug on the shoreline 
of Neustadt.
207
 It was no longer the case that deaths occurred occasionally. It became 
common place for significant numbers of prisoners to perish before the boat returned. 
Although the placement of prisoners on board the Cap Arcona was seen by many 
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popular historians as a knee-jerk reaction to the Allied advance,
208
 the process of 
placing inmates on board was the direct result of extensive negotiations driven largely 
by the city administration of Hamburg. 
 
As for the provision of basic rations, Rudi Goguel painted a bleak and shocking 
description of the horrific conditions which faced the prisoners. He describes how his 
captors, the SS and ship’s crew continued to eat food, withholding much needed 
supplies from the prisoners who were dying from hunger and thirst.
209
 Philip Jackson 
was an American citizen working as an interpreter before his capture. He argued that 
“the food was very irregular. Sometimes we got nothing; sometimes one-seventh or 
one-eighth of a loaf of bread with some soup”.210 Because of dwindling supplies aboard 
the Cap Arcona, many of the already meagre inmates’ rations were cut further.  In some 
instance – as noted by Jackson – they simply did not receive anything. Paul Weissmann 
recalls that “the food was during these few days a little piece of thick bread and a 
quarter to half-a-litre of vegetable water that was too salty, and as a rule inedible”.211 
                                                          
208
 Watson, Nazi Titanic, pp. 79-98. 
209
 See Rudi Goguel, Cap Arcona: Report über den Untergang der Häftlingsflötte in der 
Lübecker Bucht am 3. Mai 1945 (Röderberg-Verlag: Frankfurt, 1982), pp. 51-53. For original 
German, “Wie dem auch sei: Die Morgen beginnt wie die vorhergehenden mit den üblichen 
Routine-Angelegenheiten: es wird Appell abgehalten, oder – genauer gesagt – die Farce eines 
Appells; die im Laufe der Nacht angefallenenen und auf Deck aufgestapelten Leichen werden 
über Bord geworfen; die Häftlingsärzte kümmern sich um die sterbenden Kameraden; 
Wachmannschaften und Schiffsbesatzungen fassen Essen, während die Gefangenen weiterhin 
dem Hunger und – noch schlimmer – dem Durst ausgeliefert sind. Die illegale Häftlingsleitung 
berät die neue Situation, und Kuriere eilen durch das Schiff, um die neuesten Meldungen und 
Informationen weiterzugeben”. 
210
 TNA WO 309/863:  Record of Evidence of Philip Jackson, Exhibit No.1, p. 29. 
211
 BAB BY 5/V 279/ 7A:  Report on the evacuation of Neuengamme Camp and the sinking of 
the “Cap Arcona” and “Thielbeck” on 3.5.1945 in Neustadt, Paul Weissmann, taken on 
111 
 
Unlike within the physical camp surroundings, there was no opportunity for the 
prisoners to wash or obtain any form of medical assistance.
212
 This in turn led to an 
outbreak of typhoid fever which took its toll on the already weak prisoners. Long term 
planning no longer existed. As evacuation transports departed Neuengamme camp the 
continued involvement of the civilian administration became less significant as the SS 
became more heavily involved. Therefore we can infer that the primary aim of the 
civilian administration was simply to clear Hamburg and immediate areas of any 
evidence of slave labour. Furthermore with a rapid decline in conditions the purpose of 
the Cap Arcona continued to be seen as prison ship, opposed to a temporary holding 
vessel awaiting the Red Cross. 
 
Another survivor, Benjamin Jacobs was held in the lower decks of the ship with his 
brother Josek. He noted that “in the darkness and confinement of a crowded storeroom 
below [the] waterline in a rusting hulk”,213 many prisoners concluded that they would 
be held on board until such time as German forces had a definitive plan. This temporary 
measure was arguably effective, although further planning once the prisoners were 
placed on the Cap Arcona was simply absent. The area under German control was 
rapidly shrinking. Lange notes that “the Soviet prisoners were squeezed into one room 
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on the Cap Arcona without light or fresh air”.214 Their treatment within the holds of the 
ship was brutal, and the opportunity to be released for air and light was minimal. One 
survivor suggested that the situation on the higher decks “was like something out of an 
old painting of hell because the porthole windows had been painted over and only a 
grey dim light filtered through onto the huddled passengers”.215 
 
The overall operational effectiveness of the Cap Arcona has been the subject of much 
speculation. It was clear that during the evacuations from East Prussia the Cap Arcona 
damaged her propellers and subsequently developed a boiler defect. This meant that the 
vessel could no longer undertake any lengthy sea voyage, nor could the ship retain large 
quantities of fuel. The conditions of her boilers meant that the ship could only hold a 
small amount of the overall quantity of fuel needed to fill the tanks.
 216
 On the morning 
of 3 May, the oil tanker Forbach was instructed to load both the Cap Arcona and 
Deutschland with fuel. For the Deutschland this seemed an even stranger move, as the 
ship was in the process of being re-fitted as a hospital ship.
217
 Of more interest is the 
evidence that Max Pauly gave during his post-war deposition. He claimed that the Navy 
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simply would not release fuel for either the Cap Arcona or Deutschland.
218
 Furthermore 
he suggested that “fuel had to be got against direct orders of the Navy. Water had to be 
fetched from Neustadt and rations from different food depots”.219 
 
While the Cap Arcona was anchored in Neustadt, there were a number of concerns 
raised by the ship’s captains. The main concern was the display of a Red Cross flag or 
insignia to represent those held on board the ship. However the problem was that there 
were SS and Wehrmacht troops on board. Under the Geneva Convention flying a Red 
Cross flag whilst military personnel were on board was forbidden.
220
 Although it was 
seemingly unlikely that any members of the SS would obey and conform to the 
requirements of the Geneva Convention, we can infer that in all likelihood the Red 
Cross flag was never considered by the SS. Had this been the case, the inclusion of 
basic rations and supplies would also have been made available to the prisoners. 
Gauleiter Kaufmann alleges that: 
I then told Bassewitz-Behr [around mid-April], and I am certain that Horn was 
present, to make all the detailed transport arrangements with the Swedish Red 
Cross: that is to say, ports of embarkation, names of the ships, route, Red Cross 
flags etc.
221
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During his interrogation Kaufmann continued to allege that he had tasked Bassewitz-
Behr to make arrangements with the Red Cross bodies, but depositions taken from 
Bernadotte state categorically that the office of the Swedish Red Cross had not been 
approached by either Kaufmann or Bassewitz-Behr with regard to the prison ships in 
Neustadt Bay. Additionally, Pauly alleges that “as for the marking of the ships with the 
Red Cross, I remember, that this, as well as notification of place etc. to the Swedish Red 
Cross, was suggested by Gauleiter Kaufmann”.222 But in voluntary depositions, the SRC 
representative Folke Bernadotte stated clearly that 
the mission was never approached by Gauleiter Kaufmann, HSSPF Bassewitz-
Behr or Max Pauly concerning the evacuation of further nationals.
223
 
 
Therefore any claims by the SS or Civilian administration regarding the fate of the 
prisoners and their supposed transfer to the SRC are strongly disputed. 
 
Watson recently argued that the “ship’s engines were barely functioning, the crew was 
at inadequate strength for an ocean voyage, and fuel, food and supplies were scarce”.224 
The Cap Arcona was released by the Navy as the ship’s operational capacity no longer 
allowed it to be used for evacuations from the East. Moreover the ship was technically 
and mechanically unfit for active service, and the ability of the ship to undertake an 
arduous voyage to Norway or Sweden was highly limited. While the Cap Arcona 
remained under the office of the Reikosee, its owners Hamburg-Süd were still under the 
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impression that the ship was commanded by the German Navy. On 23 April the deputy 
chairman of the board of directors for the ship’s company spoke with Bertram to offer 
assistance regarding the transfer of prisoners. Bertram had informed the owners that the 
number of prisoners was too many and that it was quite impossible to accommodate all 
safely on board.
225
 Lange describes the ship’s captains as “making clever arrangements 
[…] in keeping the number of prisoners comparatively low on board their ships”.226 In 
doing so he argues that there was an element of care and consideration for the 
prisoner’s’ well-being. Furthermore Bertram noted that “any responsible seaman knows 
that the risk at sea to take on human beings without absolute necessity during wartime is 
dangerous enough, especially such masses”.227 This statement suggests there was a 
perceived need to ensure the safety of the crew, rather than the safety of the prisoners 
and therefore Bertram’s refusal was not on humanitarian grounds. 
 
 
The debate over whether Captain Bertram should continue to exercise his right to refuse 
the prisoners carried over into the morning of 24 April. In light of Bertram’s stance the 
Reikosee gave Georg Dittmer – a board member of Hamburg Süd – instructions to force 
Bertram to accept the prisoners.
228
 The directors were not informed of this change until 
sometime around 24/25 April by Captain Bertram, who had spoken with Engelhardt 
regarding the transfer of prisoners to the Cap Arcona. Dittmer “received the information 
                                                          
225
 TNA WO 309/873:  Deposition of Heinrich Bertram, Captain Cap Arcona. 
226
 Lange, Cap Arcona  Summary, p. 6.  http://media.offenes-archiv.de/Cap 
Arcona_summary.pdf, [Accessed 17 July 2016]. 
227
 Watson, Nazi Titanic, p. 148. See also Jacobs, The Dentist of Auschwitz, p. 192. 
228
 TNA WO 309/408: Deposition on Oath of Georg Dittmer, 11 April 1946. 
116 
 
by telephone from Captain Bertram that Admiral Engelhardt would have nothing to do 
with the taking over of the prisoners, and that the Cap Arcona had been transferred to 
the Reich Commissar for Shipping”.229 The impact of this refusal increased the growing 
problems on the quayside. During the evacuation, plans had not been made regarding 
the provision of additional stores and supplies for prisoners on the quayside. It had been 
anticipated that the transfer of prisoners to the Cap Arcona would be a swift procedure. 
A delay in this transfer evolved into desperate scenes of hungry prisoners in squalid 
conditions. This continued delay further shows that only the requisitioning of rail trucks 
and the prisoners re-location from Neuengamme to the harbour at Lübeck had been well 
planned. The delay further added to the confusion whilst conditions rapidly declined. 
Primary responsibility for this delay can be attributed to Gauleiter Kaufmann, who had 
failed to fully appreciate the scale of the process and the logistics involved in the 
transfer of inmates from Neuengamme. We can therefore surmise that although the idea 
to evacuate the prisoners onto ships was deemed the most practical solution, the impact 
of the wider military situation placed pressure on Gauleiter Kaufmann to fully assess 
and grasp the magnitude of the scale of the task he faced. Furthermore once the 
evacuation process began, any further planning simply sought to manage the situation in 
Lübeck, rather than provide the adequate support needed on the quayside. 
 
Finally on April 25, Captain Gehrig along with Kurt Rickert SS and other officers went 
aboard the Cap Arcona. This time Bertram accepted a reduction in prisoner numbers, 
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from 8,000 to around 4,500.
230
 On the threat of a summary execution Bertram relented 
and the prisoners were loaded onto the ship. As a precaution, the water supply to the 
crew and inmates was shut off twice a day for one hour at a time in a vain attempt to 
make supplies last. On Friday 27 April and into the following morning, Lewinski came 
aboard the Cap Arcona to monitor the deterioration of the supplies. The lack of food 
and water, coupled with severe overcrowding, meant that the situation on board the Cap 
Arcona was desperate. Lewinksi and Gehrig made the decision to travel to Hamburg 
with the aim of speaking directly with Kaufmann regarding these issues. A meeting was 
held on 29 April. Bertram felt at this point it was his duty to relate to Kaufmann the 
problem surrounding his standing order.
231
 During this meeting at the Reikosee’s office 
they were met by General Abraham and camp commandant Max Pauly. While other 
officers were also present, Bertram remembers that he was informed by Pauly himself 
that “we all have a load off our minds because Count Bernadotte from Sweden has just 
made a declaration that he is ready to fetch the concentration ships and take them to 
Sweden or Denmark”.232 This information had not been passed on to Kaufmann, nor 
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made available to senior SS staff. During the planning stages the primary goal was 
simply to remove evidence of the close business-camp relationship. The Cap Arcona 
was in no viable position to make the arduous journey, certainly without adequate 
supplies and crew. Furthermore SRC and ICRC representatives remained in Lübeck 
carrying out further Red Cross duties. At no time were these men approached by 
Gauleiter Kaufmann or Bassewitz-Behr. The Red Cross ships docked in Lübeck, Lillie 
Matthiessen and Magdalena, sailed from Lübeck with an agreement having accepted 
some 250 sick prisoners from the ship Athen.
233
 
 
Conclusion 
The transfer process of loading the prisoners onto the ships at Lübeck and the 
subsequent delays was arguably the direct responsibility of the Hamburg civilian 
administration. In attempting to understand why the transfer process broke down, 
personal motives within the Hamburg civilian administration play an important role. 
Gauleiter Kaufmann’s primary aim was to clear the immediate area in and around 
Hamburg of any association with slave labour supplied from Neuengamme camp. To 
that end, the Gauleiter achieved this aim. In defining this process as ‘management by 
crisis’, this term is applied to suggest that while the civilian administration had seen 
some success in the initial evacuation phase, the lack of further planning or 
communication with other Reich institutions suggests that the process was at times ad 
hoc. Once the transports arrived in Lübeck, the situation rapidly deteriorated. 
Communication and further planning remained crucial. Kaufmann’s inability to liaise 
further with the German Navy and Merchant Navy further argues that his primary 
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concern was simply to re-locate the prisoner’s away from Hamburg. Moreover his 
complacency in assuming that the transfer process would take place was misguided. A 
lack of clear communication and coordination between other Reich bodies, including 
the Merchant Navy, further demonstrate Gauleiter Kaufmann’s level of complacency. 
The Cap Arcona had been chosen because the vessel had recently been released by the 
German Navy and therefore was considered no longer fit for service. Moreover, the use 
of the Cap Arcona during the East Prussian evacuation had indicated that a significant 
number of inmates could be held on board. With this in mind, the use of the ship to hold 
inmates presented an opportunity. This much is seen by the initial plans to force near 
9,000 prisoners on board. The evacuation to Lübeck was the result of two key factors. 
The first was the Allied advance to the north. This led to increasing pressure on the Nazi 
camp system. But more crucially the area available to evacuate such numbers simply no 
longer existed. 
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Chapter Four 
 
British Military Policy in 1945 234 
 
This chapter will argue that as a result of discussions at Yalta, British military policy 
became geared towards halting the Soviet advance westwards. Previous research into 
the sinking of the Cap Arcona has largely failed to address why British forces pressed 
hard to Lübeck. In doing so this chapter will begin by investigating further the impact of 
the Yalta conference on deciding and steering British strategic policy. The results of the 
Yalta conference demonstrated to the Western Allies that Berlin should no longer be 
consider the primary military target. British commanders therefore opted to press 
towards Denmark and the North Baltic. It was this change of direction that arguably had 
a direct impact on the attack of ships on 3 May. Once the wider policy has been 
outlined, its application will be used more locally, and highlight the impact this strategic 
policy had on Second Tactical Air Force. To understand why Second Tactical Air Force 
launched a final aerial attack on 3 May 1945, we must first examine why British 
military policy became hurried in the final weeks of the campaign. Through a 
combination of the broader political stance and local military policy, the change in 
operational direction had dire consequences for Britain’s military strategy in the closing 
stages of the war. Finally, this chapter will apply this broader theme more locally and 
examine the wider impact of this strategic change of direction on the air operations of 
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Second TAF. What was the impact on communication? What were the primary targets 
in April 1945? How did this further the wider military aim? 
 
Throughout 1945, crucial decisions were made regarding British military policy, 
particularly in the wake of the conference held at Yalta in February. In the West, 
Kershaw argues, “the Wehrmacht […] was by now in a truly desolate situation”.235 
This, however, did not mean that Allied armies encountered limited resistance. Hastings 
suggests that “the American and British armies were advancing against only spasmodic 
resistance, suffering few casualties, knowing that their task was all but complete”.236 
Yet the area in and around Hamburg was heavily supported by both Wehrmacht units 
and numerous SS divisions. With the area under Nazi control ever-shrinking, the district 
of Schleswig-Holstein became an important battle area, with many high-ranking 
officials fleeing to the relative safety of the North. Kershaw further suggests that “the 
British and Canadians made slower progress against the still relatively strong forces of 
Blaskowitz’s Army Group H”.237 This progress was made more difficult as the 
Wehrmacht held important North Sea ports with links to Denmark and Norway. In 
reality, British forces often encountered intense pockets of fierce resistance and this was 
met with swift attack, usually by Allied aircrews. In terms of Britain’s strategy, 
Kershaw notes that, 
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On 15 April the Western Allies had laid down their immediate future objectives: 
in the north, press on to Lübeck, consolidate positions on the Elbe in central 
Germany, and in the south, advance to the Danube and into Austria.
238
 
 
In attempting to define why Britain made such military decisions, it is necessary to 
analyse the impact of the conference held at Yalta in February 1945.  
 
Overview of Military Policy 
After political discussions by Allied powers, potential military zones of occupation had, 
in part, been agreed at Yalta. Churchill felt that the Western powers should guide 
military policy towards taking Berlin.
 239
 This was not to happen. For his part, 
Eisenhower noted that Berlin fell into the Soviet zone of occupation and that this was 
naturally less of a military advantage than deploying forces elsewhere.
240
 The result of 
this discussion highlighted that Britain, although an influential figure in the campaign, 
had less of an impact at Yalta. From this point alone, it is evident that Churchill felt 
side-lined. Britain’s Foreign Policy therefore turned away from focusing on the Reich 
Centre towards halting the Soviet advance further east.  
 
The Yalta conference in February 1945 was a valuable turning point for Britain’s wider 
strategic policy. Agreements reached here had a direct impact on military policy in May 
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1945. These decisions ultimately contributed to the sinking of the Cap Arcona. What 
was the outcome of the discussion over Military strategy and direction for British 
policy? As Allied troops crossed over the banks of the Rhine political leaders began to 
consider how best to bring the war to a swift end. Aside from the negotiations, it 
became evident that Churchill and Roosevelt were highly sceptical of the Soviet 
premier’s future objectives. This heavily guided the Western Allies’ policy in planning 
and co-ordinating future attacks. As the Soviet forces pressed ever more fiercely in the 
East, Britain became increasingly concerned that Soviet troops would advance into 
Denmark. In order to stem the advance into Denmark, British policy was altered to push 
hard and fast along the Baltic coast, and in doing so stop a Soviet incursion into the 
West. The planned capture of German ports at Kiel, Hamburg, Travemünde and Lübeck 
meant that Britain would be in a strong position to open up a sea-routed supply chain in 
the immediate aftermath, and have the ability to spare Denmark the pains of Soviet 
occupation. 
 
As the big three Allied powers met at Yalta in February 1945, German military forces 
were largely entrenched within their own borders. While the focus was primarily on 
deciding post-war boundaries, Churchill attempted to press the Soviet Premier on free 
elections within Central Europe and Poland.
241
 In attempting to guide policy, Britain 
and Churchill were almost side-lined by US-Soviet discussions.
242
 During this 
discussion it was apparent to the Western Allies that Berlin was no longer a strategic or 
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viable military objective. The Soviet advances towards the Oder meant that their forces 
were closer to Berlin than their Western counterparts. As the conference concluded, it 
emerged that the West had to re-evaluate their campaign. While the postwar boundaries 
have been outlined, the Anglo-Soviet relationship began to show signs of strain and 
tension. American forces had been determined to reach Berlin. With this no longer 
strategically viable, both Britain and American forces had to seek an alternative military 
goal. This change in policy not only fuelled a mistrust of Stalin, but resulted in further 
strains between Churchill and Roosevelt. In re-shaping British strategy it was decided to 
press an assault northwards towards the Baltic region. To outline the extent of the 
impact of the talks had at Yalta, the following is a re-construction of key meetings 
between Churchill, Roosevelt and Truman. After extensive negotiations at Yalta in 
February 1945 Western Allied opinion continued to develop policy to stem the tide of 
the Soviet advance into the West. For the public on-lookers, the conference at Yalta was 
largely deemed to be successful with the three Allied powers having negotiated terms 
for post-war Germany. In the background perception amongst ground troops and pilots 
was that “there was almost [a] total distrust of Stalin and his evil regime”.243 
 
Britain’s aerial policy in the final months of the war was largely a by-product of its 
foreign policy aims. By April 1945 Allied forces were on the brink of success. As forces 
reached the Elbe, British troops paused before launching their next assault. Many 
commentators have suggested that in the closing weeks of the Second World War, 
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British forces became increasingly hard pressed to reach the Baltic coast.
244
 This section 
will look more closely at Britain’s foreign policy and assess whether external factors 
such as a mistrust of their Allies necessitated their approach. 
 
After extensive discussions at Yalta, America felt that any further advance on Berlin 
was impulsive.
245
 In a secret telegram issued by the British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill to his then Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden, Churchill stressed his worry 
regarding the war situation. He emphasised that: 
It is thought most important that Montgomery should take Lübeck as soon as 
possible, and he has an additional American Army Corps to strengthen his 
movements if he requires it. 
246
 
 
From his communication, it became evident that Churchill had realised the importance 
of saving Denmark from Soviet occupation. Furthermore, by halting the continued 
advance of Soviet forces into the North East, British interests in the Ruhr area could be 
further safeguarded. If Britain and her Allies could stop Soviet forces pushing into 
Denmark this would naturally allow for the Danish Monarchy to be restored, and while 
Churchill was concerned directly with the immediate future of the war, his thoughts also 
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turned to what was to happen after the war. Churchill’s views became more apparent 
during a meeting with Eden, when he stressed “our arrival at Lübeck before our Russian 
friends from Stettin would save a lot of argument later on”.247 Moreover Churchill felt 
quite adamantly that “there is no reason why the Russians should occupy Denmark”,248 
and therefore his concerns over the need to save Denmark were quite plain. During this 
series of telegrams, it became obvious that Britain and her attitude towards Russian 
forces were less than amicable. By April 1945, the Allied powers had begun to plan and 
draw up postwar zones of occupation. 
 
Churchill’s feelings towards the Soviet premier are clearly highlighted throughout his 
communications with foreign office staff. For instance in a previous telegram, the 
British Foreign Office had written to Washington to discuss how best to operate joint 
zones of occupation. It is clear that the British, along with their American counterparts 
also had a high level of mistrust for the French. The Foreign Office argued that: 
Political influences might easily affect the administration of the French zone. I 
understand that General Eisenhower is telegraphing to the United States Chief of 
Staff on this subject. I am sure you should support him.
249
 
 
What the Foreign Office suggested was that a fragmented French state only wished to 
achieve its own aims rather than liaise and negotiate with the Allied powers. The French 
design of occupational zones meant that it would unite the France of General de Gaulle 
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with Russia and divide the British and American forces.
250
 By April 1945 the Allied 
nations were heavily engaged in discussions which would decide the political situation 
and the fate of postwar Germany. More importantly, these events impacted directly on 
post-war life. Tensions between the Allied powers continued to escalate in the final 
weeks of the campaign. This tension would later evolve into early Cold War conflicts. 
This series of political negotiations led to a military strategy which impacted directly on 
the Cap Arcona. The policy that followed led to the normal aerial procedures being 
side-lined in place of this wider military strategy. 
 
Although Churchill had emphasised that Allied troops must take Lübeck, his aims 
stretched far wider. In fact, if British forces could take Lübeck prior to the arrival of 
Soviet forces, Churchill believed that Allied troops could thereafter “push on to Linz to 
meet the Russians there”.251 Therefore for the course of the rest of the war and its 
aftermath, Lübeck was pivotal for the British and Churchill’s plans. Crossing the Elbe 
to the Baltic coast, Allied forces were to encounter mixed resistance. The decision to 
march North East was taken on 18-19 April. By this stage, the Cap Arcona was docked 
safely in Neustadt awaiting her final orders. 
 
The impact of this decision to press hard to Lübeck at a time when there was limited 
strength or organisation within the German rank and file, suggested that Allied plans 
were to totally crush Hitler’s Third Reich. In fact this directive – as will be discussed in 
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Chapter Six – had dire consequences for the KZ inmates in Neustadt. While Britain’s 
Foreign policy showed direct signs of growing tensions with their Soviet ally, 
Germany’s ability to continue effective communication with remaining military units 
was almost non-existent. This communication blackout only further exacerbated the 
chaos that had gripped Nazi Germany. For Himmler, the issuing of directives seemed an 
almost fruitless task.
 252
  As Kershaw noted: 
In March, as part of his attempt to reach some arrangement with the Allies, 
Himmler had ordered that Jews should be treated like other prisoners, informing 
camp commandants that they were no longer to be killed.
253
 
 
The direct impact of this order was two-fold. Firstly for those prisoners still languishing 
in the remaining camps this order had a big impact on their future. The commitment to 
suspend the killing of Jews was a major concession. Secondly, his small offer of 
concession was met with a unanimous vote to reject this proposal. Bernadotte who had 
been engaged on Red Cross activities relating to Neuengamme was heavily involved 
acting as an intermediary between the West and Himmler. Considering the lengthy 
discussions between Victor Mallet, Bernadotte and Himmler, Mallet concluded that, 
Himmler hoped to continue resistance on the Eastern front at least for a time 
which Bernadotte told him was scarcely possible in practice and not acceptable 
to the Allies. Himmler mentioned for instance that he hoped that the Western 
Allies rather than the Russians would be first to enter Mecklenberg in order to 
save the civilian population.
254
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The terms proposed by Himmler were rejected almost immediately. Himmler’s attempt 
to continue the fight in the East while offer surrender in the West highlighted that 
Himmler was all too aware of the Western allies’ mistrust of the Soviet premier. 255 If 
anything, Allied resolve strengthened in the face of adversity. So much so, Allied 
commanders were determined to see a capitulation on all fronts. Moreover Germany 
was in no position to demand terms for the surrender of German forces. In light of the 
offer, Churchill was quick to write to Truman. He felt that:  
There can be no question, as far as His Majesty’s Government are concerned, of 
anything less than unconditional surrender simultaneously to the three major 
powers. We consider that Himmler should be told that German forces either as 
individuals, or in units, should everywhere surrender themselves to Allied troops 
or representatives on the spot.
256
 
 
Feeling within the War Cabinet and the stern wording of this document clearly indicated 
a stronger determination to defeat Hitler and his Third Reich than to turn against Soviet 
forces. Communications such as this were important in determining the overall Allied 
policy. This single event helped to cement a strong and united front, but as discussed 
earlier, the Western Allies had emphasised an urgent need to reach Lübeck before the 
Russians could occupy Denmark. In response to the partial surrender, Marshal Stalin 
wrote to Churchill outlining that: 
I consider your proposal to present to Himmler a demand for unconditional 
surrender on all fronts, including the Soviet front, the only correct one.
257
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Secretly the British moved forward at an ever-increasing pace, and by enjoying relative 
air superiority, were able to direct attacks and movements largely at ground targets and 
military installations. 
 
Strategic Aerial Policy 
As British forces continued to press into Germany, aerial policy evolved to meet the 
growing demand of its service. Through the final months of the conflict Allied aircrews 
were able to benefit from a lack of Axis resistance in the air. This has been attributed to 
a lack of trained axis pilots combined with chronic fuel shortages for aircraft. This 
meant that German aerial resistance was limited to the protection of major cities and 
important military installations.
258
 This section will look to provide an overview of how 
Britain’s aerial policy evolved in the final months of the war. In doing so, it will focus 
on the impact of the constant change of location for squadrons and its effects on 
communication. Moreover, in providing a survey of the type of mission that squadrons 
were engaged on, target selection becomes a core focal point. By analysing the type of 
mission and target selection, we can better understand the focus of British aerial strategy 
in the closing stages of the conflict. Finally, in analysing the type of target selection we 
can better understand how this had a direct impact on the target selection on 3 May 
1945. In considering the attack on ships in Neustadt bay it is necessary to discuss 
whether the normal protocols of disseminating intelligence continued to function as the 
pace of battle increased.  
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Historians have concluded that in the final months of the war Britain’s aerial 
achievements were largely successful.
259
 Overy, for instance, has argued that “the 
Western Allies happily embraced air power as one of the most important instruments for 
achieving power”.260 This was further aided by the fact that, by 1945, the German 
Luftwaffe was no longer able to mount any successful form of attack or defence. While 
Britain embraced and heavily engaged in the use of aerial warfare, its purpose and 
application has caused much controversy. This section will not engage in a lengthy 
discussion of the practices or legality of Bomber Command operations, rather it will 
provide a more focused exploration of the air operations of Second Tactical Air Force.  
 
By May 1945 Second TAF were leading the final aerial assaults over North Germany. 
Sir Arthur Coningham was responsible for the co-ordination of strategic air operations 
in the final months. His actions in guiding aerial policy stemmed from his extensive 
experience during the North Africa campaign. Furthermore he has been extremely 
successful in making sure that Second TAF was constantly keeping up the pressure on 
the dissipating German forces. He was appointed C-in-C of Second TAF on 21 January 
1944, succeeding Air Marshal Sir John d’Albiar. Coningham had played a strategic role 
in organising a decisive and important series of attacks in North Africa during 1941-42. 
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By late 1942, the overall command structure of Air forces in North West Africa were to 
be re-shuffled. This meant that Coningham was to take charge of the Northwest African 
Tactical Air Force.
261
 His role and influence throughout the North African campaign 
was to prepare him for his role in the final months of the war. 
 
The overall military situation for both air and ground operations by April 1945 was one 
of chaos and fierce pockets of fighting in the remaining German-held territory.
262
  In 
dealing with squadron operational targets, often commanders looked for aircrews to 
support the ground advance northwards. This was not the sole purpose of Second TAF, 
but one largely that showed close co-operation with the Army. On a day-to-day basis, 
operational commanders were tasked with choosing and outlining primary target 
objectives to aircrews. However, in particular circumstances, operational commanders 
could and, often did, use their initiative in electing to strike at second-choice targets that 
offered themselves unexpectedly.
263
 Furthermore, during the final months of aerial 
engagement “innumerable targets were attacked without any request being made”.264 In 
terms of outlining a viable military target, this was often the result of the experience of 
the pilot concerned. Largely Second TAF operations during April were largely focused 
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on any form of motorised transport.
265
 The number of barges or shipping vessel’s that 
were attacked or destroyed remained relatively low. One possible reason was that 
during April 1945, Group operations were largely supporting ground operations. In fact, 
shipping did not even feature as a secondary target option to any great extent. 
 
Lange summarises Britain’s military aim as “to completely defeat German forces 
militarily”.266 Commenting on the RAF attack on the Cap Arcona, he viewed the tragic 
sinking as reflecting the brutalisation of war practices during the final months of 
conflict.
267
 In the official records an alternative targets brief made it quite clear that 
“where there was a great array of targets, pilots of ground-attack aircraft would be 
expected to strike a target, return to base, refuel and re-arm, and get airborne again as 
quickly as possible – often without any necessity for briefing”.268 This type of official 
policy highlights that aerial policy was becoming fast-paced in the closing stages of the 
war. With this outline of what was expected of Second TAF, the scope and 
interpretation of whether a target was viable, or should be viable, was left to those pilots 
engaged in the attack. There are a number of factors to consider. Firstly, in terms of the 
attack on 3 May, the district of Schleswig-Holstein was packed with German civilians, 
refugees and military personnel. This had been the case since early March and these 
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numbers had increased by the end of April. This meant that any proposed attack on a 
specified area, in line with aerial policy, needed to be properly surveyed to gain a clear 
understanding of the situation on the ground. The second point relates to the location of 
Britain’s airfields. As the advance moved further into Germany, captured airfields 
allowed squadrons to be housed closer to the fighting front. This therefore allowed 
squadrons to be deployed more quickly, to land and take off and to be airborne again in 
a short space of time.
269
 One drawback to this strategic approach was the dissemination 
of information. With the potential speed that a squadron could be airborne, it was not 
always possible to brief the pilots on military changes. This slowing down of 
information led to a situation whereby the wider strategic policy outweighed the need 
for processing information. In turn, this collapse of communication added to the 
existing issue of chaos on Britain’s strategic policy. 
 
The impact of the Allied advance North led to a series of concentration camp closures in 
the remaining German territories. The subsequent evacuation transports, too, were often 
caught in the attack. One notable example was outlined by the Israeli scholar Daniel 
Blatman. In describing a train convoy from Wilhelmshaven on route to Bergen-Belsen, 
he noted that while the prisoners remained locked in cattle trucks at Luneburg Rail 
station, it was subsequently attacked as part of an Allied bombing raid.
270
 The Allies 
aerial policy was primarily designed to destroy enemy communication systems. But 
secondary targets, often transportation infrastructure, were targets that Allied aircrews 
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attacked with full vigour. In this example the attack proved costly. The second 
important factor for Allied forces was the Nazi camp system. As ground troops 
continued to press into German territory, British troops came face to face with the 
horrors of the camps. In confronting the horrors found within the camp complex or 
evacuation transports, these images strengthened the Allies resolve to seek an end to the 
ongoing conflict.
271
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 Map of Allied advance into Germany, January – May 1945. 272 
 
Military policy continued to be driven by the wider policy of reaching Lübeck. Lange 
notes that Allied reconnaissance efforts to ensure a rapid advance of its forces to Lübeck 
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Bay in April 1945 were undertaken to reduce and limit its losses.
273
 But the push 
northwards was in response to the rapid Soviet advance East. In a determined stance to 
halt the Soviet drive into Denmark, British forces continued to press hard and fast to the 
Baltic coast. In doing so the impact and processing of information was severely 
impaired. A fast-paced attack could not wait endlessly for reconnaissance to filter 
through to the squadrons involved. In an interview Typhoon pilot David Ince DFC was 
asked about how, as a pilot, they were able to distinguish between military and civilian 
targets from the air. In his analysis, he suggested that:  
Obviously there were mistakes. But in general, if the intelligence information 
was giving us an accurate target, then the target was attacked with considerable 
accuracy. All right, there must have been bombs going wide […] and civilians 
killed.
274
 
 
Acknowledging that mistakes did happen, Ince outlines that often during aerial 
engagement policy to attack these targets was often rushed. Therefore this wider 
strategic policy of reaching the Baltic coast directly impacted on Second TAF ability to 
co-ordinate and operate effectively. However, during aerial engagement it became 
increasingly difficult to target accurately. Aircraft speed as well as weather was an 
important factor to consider. Moreover, there were numerous reports made by neutral 
powers and humanitarian workers that stated that they often came under attack from 
friendly fire.
275
 As the war reached its climax in the final weeks, friendly-fire incidents 
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became all too common.
276
 This suggests that Britain’s aerial policy became 
increasingly reckless and disorganised. 
 
With the drive northwards, squadron locations were constantly changing. The pace of 
Second Army was blistering. Their advance from the Rhine to the river Elbe, a distance 
of two hundred miles, was accomplished in just over four weeks.
277
 But this raised 
important administrative problems. The use of additional supplies and resources, as well 
as additional fuel reserves show that Allied forces were still in a position to plan and 
organise effective strategic operations. Its impact on Second TAF meant that there was 
often a reliance on finding German airfields intact. That way the additional supply of 
scarce resources, such as fuel, could be utilised to load Second TAF planes. But the 
constant movement and re-location of squadrons presented its own problems. This 
move meant that basic supplies, such as fuel, ammunition and food provisions, were not 
often forthcoming, and communication was often intermittent. 
 
In response to this pressure assistance was provided by no.38 and 46 Group under the 
guidance of Cator. This was designed to support Second TAF as they moved 
northwards. During the month of April those squadrons that were active in this 
operation were able to fly in 1318.7 tons of petrol for Second TAF operations, in 
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addition to other commitments for supplying Twenty-First Army Group.
278
 This 
measure demonstrates the commitment of Allied forces to continue their advance north. 
In response to this pressure, German forces were forced to evacuate camps that were 
close to the frontline. Often this process was chaotic and without clear direction.
279
 
During this operation both 83 and 84 Group continued to push northwards. Second TAF 
HQ remained based in Süchtlen until the end of the conflict. This meant that careful 
planning and co-ordinating of aerial attacks, as well as ground support operations, were 
dealt with centrally from HQ. Evidence indicates clearly that communication between 
central HQ and other aerial departments operating on German territory was not always 
available.
280
  
 
During April Second TAF were temporarily fighting a war on two fronts. With German 
forces cut off in Denmark and British forces moving rapidly northwards to prevent a 
Soviet advance further East, squadron movements continued at a brisk pace,  
No.83 Group headquarters left Mettingen for Wunstorf just west of Hannover. It 
remained there for the following week while the assault on Bremen took place 
and then moved forward to Bispingen, east of Soltau, in company with Main 
Headquarters, Second Army.
281
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In support of this move, aerial engagements were often sporadic. For instance, David 
Ince stated that, 
We scoured the roads with a renewed sense of urgency, evading the occasional 
bursts of flak, hitting and burning the lorries and half-tracks as they tried to 
move from cover to cover under the trees. 
282
 
 
Tasked on a general roaming mission, Ince gives a useful insight into the attitudes 
amongst the pilots, namely that they were determined to attack German forces at every 
opportunity. Furthermore his statement became typical of typhoon pilots in the final 
weeks of the war. Often intelligence results were not always processed in a timely 
manner and aerial attacks, such as Ince describes, were the result of search and destroy 
policies. Additionally within Ince’s statement there appeared a steadfast resolve from 
the pilots to continually harass and attack the enemy. 
 
Movements for April were fast-paced and while there were various pockets of 
resistance, Air groups were largely able to launch operations with nearly no German 
fighter resistance. The advance of 83 Group during the month of April highlights the 
key operational targets of the Group. Coningham noted that 83 Group “carried out a rail 
interdiction programme which proceeded to isolate Hamburg and Bremen”.283 
Furthermore, “successful attacks were made against enemy airfields which were 
showing signs of congestion”.284 If airfields were congested, actual movements of 
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enemy aircraft remained at a minimum and this was largely attributed to the overall lack 
of fuel available in the North-West corridor.
285
 As for the German Army, it had become 
clear that as Allied forces continued to press on towards the district of Schleswig-
Holstein, it had split its ground forces into two main defences. The first was found in 
the south, with the area surrounding Berchtesgaden, while the second main pocket of 
resistance was with the remaining commanders gathering in Schleswig-Holstein.
286
 As 
significant numbers of German forces gathered in Schleswig-Holstein, Allied policy-
making became hurried. 
 
Increasingly as many commanders felt that the war would soon be concluded, these 
normal protocols, namely the gathering and interpretation of intelligence, did not 
necessarily play a significant role in guiding policy. Once Allied forces had reached the 
banks of the River Elbe, German forces were unable to retreat in an orderly fashion. The 
evacuation of military headquarters, as well as airfields often proved extremely difficult. 
Allied forces, throughout April, remained relentless in their attack and drive into North-
West Germany. But in doing so, this led to often chaotic and infrequent 
communications, as a result of the constant re-location of squadrons to airfields closer 
to the fighting front. During April, it remains clear that some intelligence was filtered 
through to the squadrons that were actively engaged in a variety of planned missions. In 
terms of the impact for the Cap Arcona, shipping during the month of April was 
unlikely to feature as a priority target. Until Allied forces were close to the coast, the 
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greater importance was with land-based attacks. Moreover the number of available 
targets, as well as those that posed a threat to the Allied advance was given priority. 
 
A closer analysis of Second TAF operations were primarily against land-based targets, 
rather than shipping. The operation report for 84 Group during April further underlines 
the Allied commitment to continually drive to the North-West Coast. Coningham 
suggested, 
84 Group was able to devote almost its entire resources to the destruction of 
transportation, close support, flying bomb and rocket installation targets and 
surface vessels and submarines which were still attempting to interfere with our 
Antwerp sea lane from bases in Western Holland.
287
  
 
Dedicating 84 Group to armed reconnaissance work shows the mind set of Allied 
forces. This form of aerial engagement was designed to allow squadrons to seek the 
opportunity to attack a set of targets should the chance present itself. The unique 
situation, whereby pilots have a certain level of freedom to choose ‘targets of 
opportunity’ gave considerable scope and an element of power to those squadrons 
engaged on these aerial operations. Largely armed reconnaissance work was undertaken 
without a specified target in mind. This meant that pilots engaged in this type of mission 
were often operating without clear and decisive orders. Instead there was a general brief 
issued identifying what targets pilots should be looking for.. 
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Shortly after the liberation of Holland, Allied forces wasted no opportunity to open a 
sea-routed supply chain. This provided an alternative line of support as opposed to a 
permanent land-based route. In terms of ground support, while 84 Group continued to 
attack transportation, 83 Group were tasked with clearing military installations prior to 
the advance of Twenty-First Army Group. With movements interlinked, this manoeuvre 
would allow ground forces to capture key German cities such as Hamburg and Lübeck. 
While it remained important to press forward to the coast, Coningham argued that once 
the task had been achieved, “the Army would make no advances across the frontier into 
Denmark until further orders”.288  
 
While the overriding military objective was to reach Lübeck with haste, Second TAF 
continued to provide aerial surveys of German ports, as well as ground installations. For 
instance Second TAF records indicated that,  
It became necessary to keep a close watch on the Ports in the Heligoland Bight 
and Western Baltic in order to have early information of any large-scale 
evacuation of enemy material and personnel to the Northward.
289
 
 
The Naval liaison section of Second TAF were therefore responsible for gathering 
intelligence, processing the information and accountable for any potential aerial attacks 
on shipping within their jurisdiction. As part of their observations, 34 Wing were 
assigned to monitor and survey shipping. Throughout April 34 Wing “were asked to 
increase the intensity of their recce in these areas, especially at last light and to pass any 
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intelligence as speedily as possible to the Naval Liaison Officer”.290 In practice, the 
process of passing this intelligence to those capable of interpreting the information was 
hindered in the final weeks with the continual movement of operational locations. This 
delay in transmitting the latest intelligence to the squadrons engaged on roaming 
missions had consequences for that series of operations. 
 
In general aerial roaming missions were wide-ranging but also face paced in the final 
weeks. General roaming missions, which formed the core basis of many aerial missions, 
were targeting transportation and ground installations. One example was the summary 
of 84 Group for April. Coningham noted that, 
84 Group was able to assist 83 Group in the Schleswig area, where such of the 
German Air Force which was liable to interfere with the British Zone of 
operations was now concentrated.
 291
 
 
In his notes, Coningham describes a situation that 84 Group were simply attacking 
anything that moved. Although the military campaign was reaching its climax, this level 
of destruction was largely through a number of armed reconnaissance operations, which 
left considerable scope for interpretation.  
 
On 22 April, the commander in charge of Twenty-First Army Group convened to 
change the direction of both land and air attacks against enemy forces. Originally 83 
Group were ordered to provide armed reconnaissance support to Second Army, who 
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were advancing towards Lübeck. In addition, the First Canadian Army would continue 
their right hook westwards support by 84 Group.
292
 In a communication from Second 
TAF HQ, this indicated that on 22 April that “there had been clear indications that there 
were two main areas of resistance; Schleswig-Holstein and the low country between the 
mouths of the rivers Elbe and Weser”.293 Intelligence surveys had indicated two main 
areas of direct military concern. As aerial policy continued to evolve 83 Group was now 
ordered to occupy airfields as far forwards as possible so that the Axis of their 
operations should be northwards to maintain air supremacy over the entire Danish 
peninsula.
294
 Furthermore, 83 Group would now also be entrusted with monitoring the 
coast of that peninsula for Axis forces fleeing from the British zone of occupation. But 
with this change of policy 83 Group resources, in particular its intelligence resources 
were spread more thinly over a larger area.  
 
Aerial surveys of Axis shipping noted in the intelligence results of a number of ships 
that were port bound. While many larger vessels, like the Cap Arcona, had been used in 
the evacuation of East Prussia, Germany was simply running out of ports and harbours 
to dock their remaining tonnage. This meant that the number of vessels docked within 
the perimeter of German ports was significant although many were unlikely to be 
further utilised. German commanders continued in a vain attempt to repeatedly change 
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the use of these vessels. But even towards the end of April 1945, this movement of 
shipping in Axis ports remains of little consequence to Allied commanders. During 
April, the number of ships docked in and around Lübeck continued to rise as German 
commanders attempted to dock their vessels in home ports. For the British, this 
continual growth in port activity does not appear to have caused concern. We can 
therefore presume that throughout April, the wider military strategy of reaching Lübeck 
in the North greatly outweighed the potential threat of a sea-based evacuation by 
German forces. Therefore, shipping attacks by Allied aircrews throughout March and 
April 1945 remain relatively low in comparison to ground attacks. In terms of the 
sinking of the Cap Arcona this points to a number of factors. As British military policy 
presses to Lübeck, armed reconnaissance missions formed the primary basis of military 
strategy. The threat or perceived threat from shipping was almost non-existent. The 
focus on military and aerial strategy was in support of the ground advance north. It 
would therefore be a fair assumption that German commanders did not see the 
placement of prisoners on the Cap Arcona in April 1945 to be subject to a significant 
threat from aerial attack. 
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Allied air activity records for April 1945 provide a useful insight into the areas of 
primary engagement for Second TAF. 
 
Type of Attack Destroyed Damaged 
Enemy Aircraft in the Air 199 80 
Enemy Aircraft on the 
Ground 
97 210 
Motor Transport Vehicles 1618 6387 
Armoured fighting 
Vehicles 
22 63 
Locomotives 119 900 
Goods Trucks 657 2934 
Ships 4 61 
Barges 12 149 
   
Total 2728 10784 
Table One: Summary of Second TAF Operations for the Month, April 1945.
295
 
 
The statistics from Table One highlight a number of important and useful insights. 
Firstly, we can conclude that Second TAF operations were largely formed of armed 
reconnaissance work” changed to “The majority of operations undertaken by Second 
TAF consisted mainly of armed reconnaissance missions with a focus on motor 
transport. This is unsurprising as the potential availability of this type of target to attack 
would be high as the enemy continued to flee northwards. The focus on transportation, 
excluding shipping, also highlights that British policy was to attack anything that 
moved. Therefore, the Allied mind set was one of determination to destroy German 
forces. Secondly, while German forces were attempting to harbour their remaining 
tonnage, the number of ships and barges attacked remained comparatively low 
compared to other ground targets. Intelligence summaries, as well as interpreters based 
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at Second TAF HQ evidently felt that the potential threat from the ships docked in the 
remaining northern ports was comparatively low. Even at this late stage of the drive 
northwards, accurate and reliable information remained difficult. A number of factors, 
such as the speed of the advance, coupled with an increasing number of different 
military departments, further fuelled this issue. 
 
Squadron Operations April 1945 
 
This section will look more closely at aerial policy in April 1945. In doing so it will 
then apply this policy to Second TAF, and examine the impact of this change on 
squadron operations. In his research Lange identified that as British forces pushed 
forward there were coordination problems between the Allied Expeditionary Force 
(AEF) and Allied air crews.
296
 This final section will seek to evaluate the impact of poor 
communication on air operations. The purpose of analysing squadron reports is to 
identify what Second TAF deemed a viable target and how decisions were made. This 
type of resource is invaluable as we attempt to reconstruct Britain’s aerial actions in 
April 1945. Previous works largely suggests that attack on ships were part of a wider 
military strategy. At the beginning of May aerial policy became heavily focused on 
shipping strikes. Therefore, it is important to understand how aerial policy evolved in 
the closing stages of the war. Although there were sporadic shipping strikes, general 
guidelines will show that squadrons were to only engage shipping as an alternative 
target should the primary target be unavailable. 
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The area to the North had a variety of important production lines as well as key military 
installations. In his memoirs, Coningham noted,  
The significant feature of the operations of the Second Tactical Air Force during 
the enemy’s retreat from the Rhine was the emphasis which could be placed 
upon attacking ground targets. The disorganisation of the German Air force in 
the area was almost complete. Apart from the tactical area of 83 Group in 
Schleswig Holstein, the enemy made very few appearances in the air over the 
British area either by day or by night.
297
 
 
The focus turned away from ground installations and other land-based military vehicles 
as British forces became concerned with the area around Neustadt. The small town of 
Neustadt was home to a U-boat training school, and since this remained a highly valued 
military target, shortly the area in and around Neustadt would become a target. In turn 
this meant that other shipping vessels, including the Cap Arcona would be caught in the 
subsequent military efforts to alleviate this perceived threat. 
 
During April the number of reconnaissance missions rose dramatically. As the area 
under surveillance increased, this remained crucial for prompt and accurate intelligence. 
Operation intelligence collated the post raid outline which stated that:    
Shipyards at Hamburg and Kiel were subjected to heavy attacks both by Bomber 
Command and USSTAF. In an attack by 304 aircraft on the Blohm and Voss 
yards by Bomber Command on 8/9 April very great physical damage was 
sustained. It was the largest submarine building yard in Germany and all the 
eight floating docks were severely damaged, thus requiring the outfitting of 
submarines elsewhere.
298
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The report indicates a series of important factors. The attack on Hamburg’s dock 
installations was by no means random, but part of a series of co-ordinated attacks on 
Germany’s infrastructure. It further notes that submarines were being serviced and 
repaired on site and therefore this shows the level of detailed intelligence that Second 
TAF were able to gather. The damage report indicates no Allied losses which alone are 
surprising given the strength of Axis units in and around Hamburg in April 1945. One 
of the drawbacks from this range of attack, particularly as the conflict was drawing to a 
close, was that dock installations provided a useful means of supply and immediate 
access to a military area. Their complete destruction would weaken the Allies attempt to 
re-build and re-supply in the immediate post-war years. However intelligence 
summaries suggest that:  
In consequence of a naval appreciation, U-Boat production was included on 
priority list, to prevent an otherwise inevitable U-Boat attack on a large scale in 
March 1945. E boat bases also needed constant watching and attacking 
periodically. Finally, there was the potential menace of the few remaining big 
ships of the fleet.
 299
 
 
Coningham’s statement in relation to naval transportation notes that U-boats and other 
military vessels were added as a priority to attack. It further highlights that from March 
1945 there were few larger military vessels remaining in the German fleet. Therefore, 
other than co-ordinated attacks on U-boat production, attacks on shipping remained 
comparatively low. The continued monitoring of shipping movements as well as 
infrequent operations attempted to reduce any potential threat posed from naval ports. 
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Turning to ground targets, the enemy were retreating at such a pace that it became 
impossible to sabotage any equipment that remained. Air records for instance indicate 
that, 
On the 13
th
 April he [Nazi Germany] was observed to be burning his aircraft at 
Luneburg airfield. Lack of fuel and the speed of our advance was making it 
impossible for him to evacuate his crowded airfields before they were overrun. 
The disorganised nature of his retreat was clearly shown by the number of 
aircraft and the amount of serviceable equipment, which was found intact on the 
airfields, which we captured.
300
 
 
The fast-paced movement of Second TAF required aircrews to capture airfields intact. 
This supported the continued drive northwards and allowed Second TAF to continue the 
support for ground movements. 
 
In closer inspection of operational summaries for the month of April, there are clear 
contrasts among aerial operations. For 83 Group, Table Two shows a mixed picture of 
the military situation in April.  Evidence within the table suggests that the Group were 
not overly active in the use of photoreconnaissance. Although this type of intelligence 
had grown throughout the course of the war, its limited use through 83 Group suggests 
that the wing was provided intelligence elsewhere. Richards and Saunders concluded 
that the swift advance of Second TAF was largely “helped by the tactical 
reconnaissance flights of No 39 Wing”.301 
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83rd Group           
  Spitfire Typhoon Tempest Met./3. Total 
Fighter Cover/ Escort  & Patrol 4500 16 502 16 5034 
Photo Reccon. 197   
 
  197 
Weather Reccon. 19   4   23 
Armed Reccon. 3153 1350 940   5443 
Arty. Spotting 5   
 
  5 
Tactical Reccon. 769   
 
  769 
Close Support Calls 60 2288 27   2375 
Nickelling 
 
7 
 
  7 
Contact Reccon. 80   
 
  80 
  
 
  
 
    
Total 8783 3661 1473 16 13943 
Table Two: Summary of target strikes by 83
rd
 Group, April 1945.
302
 
 
Table Two gives further insight into the wider military policy, namely that of fast-paced 
movements and continuous aerial engagement. The total number of armed 
reconnaissance operations above all other potential areas of attack highlight that the 
Allied thought process was continually to attack German ground forces and 
transportation.  
 
Table Three provides a closer analysis of 84 Group who were attached to Second TAF. 
During the month of April the group was formed of a range of aircraft. In both tables 
the use of the Typhoon aircraft was mainly for close support calls. As Allied forces 
crossed the Rhine, Thomas argues that “attacks were also made against the remaining 
Luftwaffe airfields, where a considerable number of aircraft were claimed destroyed”.303  
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84 Group             
  Spitfire Typhoon Tempest Mustang Met./3. Total 
Fighter Cover/ Escort & 
Patrol 547   133   24 704 
              
Photo Reccon. 181 22 103     306 
Weather Reccon. 52 26 16 2   96 
Armed Reccon. 3461 976 865   92 5394 
Arty. Spotting 
 
  
 
      
Tactical Reccon. 436 5 
 
272   713 
Close Support Calls 1300 1505 2     2807 
Nickelling 
 
5 
 
    5 
Contact Reccon. 
 
  
 
      
  
 
  
 
      
Total 5977 2539 1119 274 116 10025 
Table Three: Summary of target strikes by 84
th
 Group, April 1945.
304
 
As with 83 Group, Table Three also highlights that armed reconnaissance operations 
formed the primary target base for operations. Both operational Groups were tasked to 
survey a wider area and seek targets of opportunity, namely anything German that posed 
a potential military threat.  
 
A closer inspection of individual squadron operational records does indicate that locally 
pilots did have the opportunity to seek and destroy shipping. For instance 263 squadron, 
under the charge of Martin Rumbolds, was regularly engaged with his squadron 
attacking barges or ships. On 1
st
 April “the aircraft went on an armed reconnaissance of 
Enschede-Almelo-Coevarden, [where] five barges south of Lingen were attacked and 
one was damaged”.305 More importantly the two days, 17 and 18 April represented a 
real high for 263 Squadron. Reports which provide a summary of missions flown 
indicate that: 
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This operation was against shipping Texel-Berkam. Three barges were attacked 
with R/P off Terschelling. One was damaged and a possible direct hit with R/P 
on another. Five more barges and a hospital ship were seen at U6639 but not 
attacked. A convoy of nine vessels south of Borkum (Q3350) was sighted.
306
 
 
Operations did not end there. Rumbolds continued to keep his squadron engaged in 
continuous air activity, so much so that the daily logs for 17 and 18 April required one 
full page. On 18 April orders were given to attacking shipping. The log notes that 
the operation was against ships in area Q.14 Approx. 16 ships heading north 
were found at Q.2852 in three lines. The two rearmost stragglers [were] attacked 
with R/P. One of Approx. 3000 tons coaster type received direct hits and was 
still giving off greyish white smoke after attack. The other ship of 2-3000 tons 
also had direct hits and was seen to be listing and black smoke coming from it. It 
is claimed as seriously damaged and possibly sinking.
307
 
 
When shipping was attacked, the use of rocket projectiles (RP’s) was not a normal 
choice. In a report produced shortly after the war, British divers undertook lengthy 
studies to investigate the effectiveness of certain weapon types against shipping. In the 
initial report, the primary use of the 60lb HE RP was “not primarily an anti-ship 
weapon, the 60lb explosive heads were used by Second TAF against shipping just 
before V.E.Day”.308 Although there is limited evidence, this suggests that with the drive 
northwards, ammunition and supplies were not always available. Moreover it appeared 
that in order to keep squadrons actively engaged, commanders were willing to utilise 
different weapon types. 
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The report does show that clear observations were being made by the pilots engaged on 
these missions. The location and direction of the vessels was clearly marked as well as 
their classification and damage. Locally, the process of disseminating information 
appears straightforward. Furthermore the number of resources used not only show a 
firm commitment to attack potential shipping targets, but also to survey the area after an 
attack to note and report the damage. In his report, Ince felt strongly that,  
In the event the major effort was to be eastwards against the surviving enemy 
forces- supported by their remaining elements of aircraft and flak. Challenging 
enough in itself and unpredictable to a degree.
309
 
 
For the Typhoon pilot, no indication was given that the priority for British personnel 
was to attack and destroy enemy shipping. Thomas suggests in the final months of the 
war that “harbours and waterways were targeted too, as some German elements strove 
to escape across the Baltic Norway”.310 While the vessels were docked in the northern 
ports of Germany, there remains no evidence to suggest that these vessels were readying 
to flee to Norway. Thomas’ statement fails to account that as the area of battle 
continued to decline, the number of available ports for German vessels to dock was 
limited. With this in mind, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that the crews of 
these ships simply made for their nearest German home port. 
 
There appeared an overwhelming sense amongst the pilots to continue to destroy the 
enemy at all costs. As part of the alternative targets brief, the document suggested that  
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Innumerable targets were attacked without any request being made. On those, 
and similar ‘targets of opportunity’, briefings simply could not be given in 
advance: and that situation intensified as the target area continued to shrink.
311
 
 
From the report it becomes clearer that as the end of the conflict was in sight, many air 
operations and roaming orders were left to the pilots concerned. The pace of battle and 
engagement dictated that aircrews were expected to use their experiences to determine 
what should be engaged. Moreover pilots no longer sought a request to attack a target, 
rather using their initiative to engage the enemy. The report continued stating that 
Eventually, there was hardly time to consider or even worry whether the best 
type of armament was being used – or even if it was available.312 
 
The tone of the statement implies that air commanders no longer carefully selected 
targets, nor did they ensure that each plane was suitably equipped for the mission. This 
further indicates that while squadrons were still able to mount an attack, supplies as well 
as accurate information was not always provided. 
198 Squadron 
Target Type Damaged Destroyed 
MT 9 30 
Houses 23 14 
Railway 
Trucks 8 30 
Locomotives 4 - 
Tanks 3 - 
Ships 6 - 
Barges 5 - 
Tugs 2 - 
Table Four: Summary of Target Types by 198 Squadron, April 1945.
313
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In examining one squadron that played an integral part of the final operations in the 
closing weeks, 198 Squadron demonstrate that the target types were varied. Compiled 
by Squadron Leader Durrant he notes that “the squadron had a very successful month 
[as] many varied targets [were] being attacked”.314 Clearly the squadron records indicate 
that the bulk of operations were not flown against shipping. Aerial strategy was clearly 
designed and engineered towards the wider military strategy, namely the advance 
northwards to Lübeck. In terms of strategy the impact of this drive to the Baltic coast 
and drastic change in operational policy had dire consequences for the evacuees from 
Neuengamme.  
 
Conclusion 
In applying the wider military strategy more centrally to Britain’s aerial strategy, it 
becomes clear that certain aerial procedures that had been at the forefront of British 
planning fell to the wayside in the final months of the war. In identifying policy that 
was designed to halt the Soviet advance further West, aerial policy was designed to 
achieve this. Largely Second TAF during March and April were engaged in armed 
reconnaissance work. Outlining a policy of identifying targets of opportunity, this often 
gave considerable scope to the pilots engaged in the attack. Squadrons were tasked with 
surveying a wide area and expected to attack anything of military threat. Often aircrews 
found that there was limited, if any, resistance from German defences. In line with 
regular aerial reconnaissance and intelligence summaries, the level of accurate detail 
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and intricate note taking of movements within the enemy camp demonstrates that 
Britain devoted substantial resources to gathering information. However, as the conflict 
entered the final stages, the wider strategic aim of halting the Soviet advance into 
Denmark meant that the speed of the Allied advance influenced operations. 
 
Once the wider strategy is applied more locally to those squadrons engaged in North 
Germany there is clear evidence of its impact on aerial operations. One area of 
importance is the type of target chosen for attack. What appears to happen between 
March and May is that the normal protocols for choosing a target are partially side-
lined. This gave the pilots a greater sense of freedom and as many records have 
indicated, there were numerous civilian casualties. As disorganisation began to impact - 
because of the push north – Allied aircrews became determined, and at times careless in 
their approach. In many instances, the removal of authority or permission to attack 
meant that innocent civilians were often caught in the battle area. Overy summarised 
that “the mobile population was more exposed to risk, particularly once Allied aircraft 
began routine strafing of vehicles and trains, and evacuees found themselves in areas 
thought to be safe […] but now subject to random attack”.315 In terms of the sinking of 
the Cap Arcona, the impact of this strategic development highlights that even during 
April 1945; the potential risk of attack had greatly increased. 
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Chapter Five 
 
What the British knew 316 
 
This chapter focuses on a major aspect of the Cap Arcona tragedy, namely the question 
of the dissemination of intelligence. Previous attempts to address this topic have often 
drawn mixed conclusions.
317
 Existing historiography has previously outlined a series of 
piecemeal evidence relating to potential sources of intelligence relating to the Cap 
Arcona tragedy. As yet, there has been no clear analysis of the relevance of this 
information, nor the impact of wider strategy on the dissemination of this information. 
As the need to reach the Baltic coast before our Russian allies took priority over British 
strategy, the timely dissemination of intelligence suffered as a result of the broader 
strategy. This chapter will begin by looking at British policy towards intelligence and 
argue that for most of the war there was a great deal of investment in and attention to 
intelligence. But as British forces continued to press into North Germany during March, 
this attention to intelligence suddenly changes. 
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Once the broader policy on intelligence has been discussed, this will be applied more 
locally to a series of case studies. In doing so it will argue that Allied behaviour towards 
the dissemination of intelligence became clouded by the broader strategic policy to 
reach the Baltic coast. 
 
British Policy 1945 
Throughout 1945 British military policy in the air underwent a shift in primary 
objectives. Overy notes that “the criticisms of bombing from politicians and soldiers 
became more widespread as the gulf between the exaggerated claims of the air forces 
and the reality of bomber operations became more obvious”.318 As successive aerial 
campaigns have bombarded Germany cities, critics such as Portal, continued to 
condemn the strategic policy of Bomber Harris and his strategy of destroying German 
moral. This criticism led to a divide in the decision and nature of British aerial policy in 
the closing months of the campaign. One particular area of focus was Britain’s attention 
to intelligence. Cox argues that “intelligence is a jig-saw, and the ability to cross-check 
and reinforce information from one source with intelligence from another was a vital 
part of the process”.319 In attempting to piece this together, Cox points to the 
overwhelming need to corroborate and confirm important intelligence findings. One 
drawback with corroborating and interpreting the intelligence was time. If intelligence 
                                                          
318
 Richard Overy, The Air War 1939-1945 (Brassey’s US: Nebraska, 2005), p. 115. 
319
 Sebastian Cox, “The Organisation and Sources of R.A.F. Intelligence”, paper presented to 
the Air Intelligence Symposium, Royal Air Force History Society, Bracknell, 22
nd
 March 1996, 
p. 12. http://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/Research/RAF-Historical-Society-
Journals/Bracknell-No-7-Air-Intelligence.pdf. 
161 
 
did not reach the right individual or department in time it was considered useless.
320
 But 
with significant resources at their disposal, Britain had a wealth of opportunity to 
continually survey the remaining German ports, as well as other military targets. In 
most discussions on the sinking of the Cap Arcona, commentators often note that 
examples of the situation in Neustadt had been presented to British forces.
321
 In doing 
so, this section will begin by analysing the wider processes and methods of Britain’s 
intelligence sources. It will examine more closely the role of intelligence services and 
discuss whether the broader military aim hindered the dissemination of information. 
 
While much has been written as to the role of Bomber Command, there are fewer 
studies that focus on the aerial activities of Second Tactical Air Force (TAF).
322
 The 
role of Second TAF and their use of photographic reconnaissance to supplement and 
support their ability to gather intelligence were paramount to their role in the closing 
stages of the war. As Lange has identified,  
During the war the Allies possessed three crucial opportunities to raise 
awareness as to the basis for aerial planning and intelligence. First, espionage by 
resistance fighters and spies, secondly, analysis and decoding of radio messages, 
and thirdly, aerial reconnaissance.
323
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In terms of evaluating the impact of aerial reconnaissance, the most crucial factor was 
locational knowledge by RAF personnel. For those more experienced pilots, 
intelligence gathering was markedly easier than for an inexperienced pilot. One 
important area where locational knowledge was crucial was in the detection of smaller 
concentration or work camps. As Price notes, “it was as good as hopeless for the Allied 
military intelligence to detect the whereabouts of the concentration camp prisoners in 
detail”.324 This meant that although technological advances supported gathering 
potential intelligence, what was lacking was the necessary skills and knowledge of how 
best to decipher the information. While there were significant improvements in the 
development of technology to source potential intelligence, one drawback remained the 
ability of intelligence staff to decipher the information. One crucial link was experience 
and geographical knowledge of the area that was under surveillance. Without this prior 
knowledge, the timely dissemination of this type of information was often hindered by 
in-experienced staff. 
 
An area of importance in the advance of British intelligence was the development and 
implementation of photographic reconnaissance (PR). After the outbreak of war in 
1939, PR was still in its infancy.
325
 As the war progressed scientific improvements were 
forthcoming. Policy therefore developed to support the further and future use of PR. 
Price claimed that towards “the end of World War II in Europe, the Royal Air Force and 
USAAF reconnaissance units were well-equipped and highly efficient collectors of 
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intelligence”.326 But while potential intelligence could be sourced, it was the 
interpretation and dissemination that provided the crucial link in making sure the 
information gathered was of strategic value. 
 
By February 1945 Germany’s ability to sustain any long-term or effective resistance 
was almost non-existent.
327
 British aerial policy up to February had largely been 
targeted to destroy morale on the enemy’s home front.328  However, almost one month 
later Churchill took the decision to shift British policy. In a memo to his Chief of Staff 
Committee he stated: 
 
It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of 
German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other 
pretexts, should be reviewed.
329
 
 
In an attempt to distance himself from the media coverage of the bombing of Dresden, 
Churchill signalled that Britain’s aerial campaign should no longer target non-military 
installations. As Watson notes, “Churchill also shifted primary responsibility for 
targeting along Germany’s northern and coastal airspace from Bomber Command to 
                                                          
326
 Alfred Price, Targeting the Reich: Allied Photographic Reconnaissance over Europe 1944-
1945 (Greenhill Books: London, 2006), p. 24. 
327
 See various Watson, The Nazi Titanic, pp. 82-84; Richard Bessel, Germany 1945: From War 
to Peace (Simon & Schuster: London, 2010); David Stafford, Endgame 1945: Victory, 
Retribution, Liberation (Thistle Publishing: London, 2015), pp. 349-367. 
328
 See Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945 (Allen Lane: London, 2013). 
329
 Winston Churchill, Memo to His Chiefs of Staff Committee, 28 March 1945 
[www.winstonchurchill.org, accessed 22 July 2016]. 
164 
 
Fighter Command”.330 In practical terms Fighter Command also lacked the extensive 
aerial reconnaissance capabilities that Bomber Command had develop through the 
course of the war. Although Fighter Command did not unknowingly attack a 
concentration camp, there is evidence that Red Cross convoys were strafed. The issue of 
the fog of war and the Allied mind set will be discussed later. This change in policy and 
tactical operations would directly impact upon the Cap Arcona. By altering existing 
operational practice, coupled with the lack of reconnaissance capabilities, this ultimately 
led to the attack on Neustadt Bay on 3 May. 
 
While intelligence was continually sourced, the availability of this information was 
often hindered by the time in which it would take to process this information. The 
intelligence could only be seen as useful if its potential and impact on military strategy 
could be pieced together. Ehlers argues that “the vital attribute air intelligence brought 
to bear was an ability to make reasoned and accurate judgments about airpower’s 
effectiveness in hampering the German war effort”.331 But aerial intelligence could only 
make accurate judgements depending on the skill of those who were attempting to 
decipher its information. Although extremely valuable, the use of intelligence in 
concluding the impact of bombing German war industry was difficult. In some 
instances, German war production was moved underground, and therefore the use of 
bombing had a limited effect.
332
 Moreover aerial intelligence that examined military 
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sites and installations relied heavily on interpretation and information from those on the 
frontline. As the war effort continued to gather pace, the accuracy and timely 
dissemination of this information was critical to its usefulness.  
 
As the movement of military groups were constant, this relocation of key tactical units 
further exacerbated the difficulties over communication. For instance, Second TAF AIR 
records stated, 
During the month of April, Headquarters, 84 Group moved once and 
Headquarters, 83 Group moved twice, all the moves being across territory where 
the provision of landline communication was extremely difficult and even when 
established, the long distances involved resulted in the circuits being very 
unreliable for some time.
333
  
 
The constant re-location of group headquarters was arguably detrimental to sustaining a 
reliable communication network between HQ and squadron locations. Moreover with 
increasing pressure on squadrons to be operational once re-located, often supplies lines, 
as well as communication lines, were unreliable. The impact of the wider strategy on 
intelligence therefore led to a number of instances whereby aircrews undertook air 
combat without sufficient intelligence. 
 
From a humble beginning in early 1940 with one dedicated photoreconnaissance 
Spitfire and the Aircraft Operating Company, the RAF’s photoreconnaissance 
squadrons and the Allied Central Interpretation Unit had by 1943 become capable 
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intelligence providers. They were part of a much larger, highly integrated, and 
exceptionally capable collection of agencies […] which together made up a mature and 
crucial interagency structure.
334
 In terms of photographical reconnaissance, this was 
often flown at a high-level altitude in an attempt to broaden the area surveyed. By this 
late stage of the war the altitude was approximately 40,000ft.
335
 One important topic 
related to the pilot’s ability and experience. This was crucial in order to ensure that the 
correct surveillance area was covered at the correct height.  In his discussion on aerial 
intelligence, Overy argues that by 1944-45 
 
[The] more important the intelligence thus acquired was interpreted and 
disseminated through higher echelon intelligence agencies, which were in turn 
integrated into the wider intelligence system. 
336
 
 
The impact of this type of resource remains important for the discussion on the Cap 
Arcona tragedy. By this stage of the aerial campaign the gathering of intelligence 
became paramount. The use of photographic reconnaissance, with particular focus on 
North German ports, as well as significant military installations remained the focus for 
most aircrews. Second TAF utilised 34 Wing for photographic reconnaissance. The Air 
support signals unit was responsible for organising tactical reconnaissance missions. 
Any requests for photographic reconnaissance needed to be made the previous day. This 
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was designed to allow forward planning by British ground forces. During an aerial 
survey, the pilot provided verbal information throughout the mission. Once landed, the 
photographic film was taken away to be developed, while the pilot provided a report. 
The Air liaison section officer was then responsible for communicating between the 
RAF tactical groups and Second TAF HQ. By late 1944 attacks on transportation targets 
accelerated as a direct result of the use of photographic reconnaissance results.
337
 This 
did not necessarily lead to a positive outcome. Although Overy suggests that the 
importance of the intelligence ultimately depended on the level of expediency assigned 
to the information, processing this intelligence was still reliant on time. In building on 
earlier discussions the impact of timely dissemination in the final weeks of the war was 
also hindered by other factors. Any delay in the relay of intelligence could invalidate its 
relevance. But as British forces pressed to Lübeck a chaotic situation has evolved and 
its impact on intelligence cannot be underestimated. The impact of failing to 
disseminate information in a prompt manner meant many key decisions were made 
without all the facts having been taken into account. In turn this lack of communication 
led to an increasing number of friendly-fire incidents. 
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Sources of Intelligence: “The White Buses” 
Existing historiography often identifies several independent strands of intelligence that 
existed prior to the attack on the Cap Arcona on 3 May.
338
 Although these strands of 
intelligence have been identified, their relevance, timing and provenance were not 
always fully explored. One such example was the white bus rescue operation. What will 
follow is a closer analysis of this operation set within the broader context, namely the 
chaotic final weeks of the Second World War. It will argue that this example gives us an 
insight into Allied behaviour in the closing stages as well as highlighting the impact of 
the fog of war of British military operations.
339
  
 
In attempting to identify possible intelligence sources, Lange notes that “the German 
collapse, and the problems caused by refugees and troops fleeing, made it impossible 
for British aerial reconnaissance to identify camp evacuation transports or potential 
destinations”.340 But as British forces pressed northwards, were they actively seeking 
camp evacuation transports, or were these identified by chance? One aspect that 
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hindered reconnaissance was the movement of refugees. The movement of civilians, 
troops and a large number of refugees exacerbated the reconnaissance operation as they 
fled the onslaught and reprisals from the advancing Soviet forces.  
 
The case study of Folke Bernadotte and the white bus rescue mission is a useful 
example to highlight the problems with aerial reconnaissance and the dissemination of 
intelligence. Humanitarian and rescue missions to save prisoners incarcerated within the 
German camp system, where by 1945, becoming more frequent. The example of the 
Scandinavian rescue operation is unique because of the scale and logistics needed for 
the operation to succeed. Research into the sinking of the Cap Arcona often references 
the negotiations that took place between the Swedish Red Cross (SRC) and Heinrich 
Himmler SS. 
341
 Bernadotte negotiated closely with the Allied High Command during 
his extensive talks with Himmler. Much of their discussion was centred on the rescue 
operation for Scandinavian nationals from Neuengamme. The tangible link between 
Bernadotte and Himmler largely focuses on his working knowledge of the camp at 
Neuengamme. But in discussing intelligence issues for British forces, Bernadotte’s 
work is often side-lined. Throughout the duration of the rescue operation from 
Neuengamme a small number of Red Cross convoy’s fell victim to aerial attacks by 
Allied forces. Therefore was intelligence from external agencies considered valuable? If 
so, why was this not disseminated in a sufficient time frame? 
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The Swedish Red Cross rescue operation began in Neuengamme at a time when the 
remainder of the camp was being readied for evacuation. By January 1945, Allied 
advances on both fronts triggered a second wave of evacuations. As camps in German 
occupied territories moved their prison labour force closer to the Reich centre, the 
attitude of the German guards and SS functionaries towards the prisoners continued to 
enforce unnecessary suffering and misery in the overwhelming face of defeat. At this 
stage of the war, Swedish ministers began to investigate the possibility of securing the 
release of Scandinavian nationals held in German camps. The majority of the planning 
was undertaken by the Norwegian Government in London. Folke Bernadotte was 
appointed to head the possible operation. In order for the mission to work, Bernadotte 
was determined to set up a meeting with Himmler to discuss the possibility of the 
humanitarian mission.
342
 Through a combination of various intermediaries, he was able 
to finally meet Himmler on 19 February. These negotiations took place without the 
consent or knowledge of Hitler. Bernadotte noted in his diary that “Himmler declared 
his unswerving loyalty. But his freedom of action was restricted”.343 Bernadotte wished, 
at all costs, his mission to be kept secret after the recent dealings between Himmler and 
the Jews of Theresienstadt. 
 
Bernadotte had hoped to reach an agreement to consolidate Danish and Norwegian 
nationals in a collection camp prior to embarkation to Sweden. The agreement was 
reached shortly after Bernadotte’s departure. The focus was on the collection of 
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Scandinavian nationals within the main camp at Neuengamme. Although this 
concession had been reached, the Red Cross body was charged with supplying their 
own fleet of trucks and fuel. As Cesarani noted, 
[Bernadotte] assembled a fleet of thirty-six white pained buses, a dozen trucks, 
and a supply vehicle to cross to Denmark and thence drive to the Neuengamme 
Camp.
344
 
 
The mission departed on the 8 March. One of the most crucial factors was the 
possibility of attack by Allied planes. Prior to embarkation, Persson notes that, 
The Swedish Foreign Office promised as far as possible to supply the Allies 
with information concerning the various routes the vehicles would be plying and 
timetables for the transportation through Germany.
345
 
 
The role of Bernadotte and his mission during this operation was, in essence to provide 
relief and support to Scandinavian nationals. At various stages throughout his mission, 
the Red Cross were in a position to relay their movements to the British Authorities, as 
well as credible information regarding his discussions with Himmler. This was done in 
an attempt to prevent any friendly fire attacks on relief transports. Therefore, in 
providing a detailed timetable of their movements, it was hoped that this information 
would filter down to the squadrons in the area this mission was engaged. 
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The chaotic situation that came to typify the final weeks of the war meant that “the 
Swedish foreign office promised as far as possible to supply the Allied nations with a 
list of the various routes the vehicles would be plying”.346 Furthermore the air attacks – 
largely conducted by the RAF – were in support of the advancing land forces. By the 
end of April the bridge heads on the river Elbe were being threatened by Allied forces 
and by attempting to scale back air activity, could allow for enemy resistance to 
strengthen key strategic locations. The British response was clear: 
 
After discussion with 21 Army Group consider restriction proposed by you 
would prejudice speedy capture of Lübeck and establishment of Eastern Flank of 
Wismar-Schwerin line.
347
 
 
 
Regardless - in some cases – of the cost to neutral or friendly bystanders the overriding 
need to arrive at Lübeck was the main, if not the sole priority.  
 
Although the bombing of towns and cities was largely co-ordinated within a wider 
military framework, there were times when judgements were not wholly accurate. But 
this did not reduce the threat of attack. And by March 1945 territory under German 
control continued to shrink which in turn meant that the risk of aerial attack was greatly 
enhanced. As Persson argues, 
 
The main threat to the white buses now came from the low flying Allied aircraft, 
Tieffliegar, which, unhindered, strafed all German roads. And they, especially 
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the British pilots, no longer respected the white buses with their Red Crosses 
and Swedish flags.
348
 
 
In essence, Persson suggests that the British pilots were deliberately attacking Red 
Cross convoys, although estimates of the numbers killed were small at around twenty 
five. What this highlights is that Allied pilots mistrusted the use of Red Cross trucks as 
genuine humanitarian convoys. Although the Swedish ministry had provided adequate 
intelligence to the British government, this instance shows the impact of the fog of war. 
Moreover Persson seems to be suggesting within his argument that British policy was to 
shoot at Red Cross vehicles. 
 
 
In attempting to seek answers for attacks on Red Cross convoys, one Squadron leader 
questioned the legality of the convoys. He argued that “the Germans being very crafty 
would sometimes decorate Lorries with Red Crosses and it was always a tossup whether 
it was a genuine Red Cross vehicle or not”.349 The problem with his testimony is that 
there is no other evidence to support the Germans use of false Red Cross trucks. If this 
was the case the view from a pilot’s cockpit would be extremely limited and would 
require further intelligence to verify whether the convoy was in fact genuine. Again the 
dissemination of intelligence and communication to the pilots and squadrons actively 
engaged in the military zone of conflict was not forthcoming.  
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As British forces continued to press hard to the Rhine, the Red Cross mission was under 
direct threat of aerial attacks on former German roads. In his diary, Bernadotte noted 
that 
 
The Allied authorities had announced in Stockholm that because of the 
intensification of the air war, immunity for the Swedish Red Cross vehicles 
could not be guaranteed.
350
 
 
 
Bernadotte was therefore suggesting that the relative protection that had existed over 
Red Cross transports could no longer be guaranteed within the existing climate. To 
distinguish a Red Cross vehicle in the moment of battle was arguably made more 
difficult as the conflict gathered pace. But in removing a guaranteed protection for 
humanitarian workers at a time when British forces were advancing at a rapid pace 
placed the aid workers at significant risk. Secondly, as Britain’s air war intensified, it 
reduced the level of resistance from German aircraft almost to none. In reality, Overy 
recently argued that  
 
By spring 1945, no part of the contracting German empire remained untouched. 
Bombing by day and by night did not affect every area simultaneously and many 
towns were bombed just once.
351
 
 
SHAEF command sent an important signal to Second TAF headquarters which 
suggested a restriction of fighter activity on vehicle and pedestrian attacks. This was 
issued in response to a previous allegation by the Swedish Red Cross.  Part of the signal 
indicated grave concern: 
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Air attacks by fighter aircraft against Red Cross trucks, POWs and refugees of 
various nationalities including Swedish, Danish and Norwegian personnel have 
increased to the point that it endangers the good reputation of the Allied Air 
Force and has resulted in the cancellation of all distribution by the Red Cross.
352
  
 
 
More importantly it had been previously suggested that Red Cross activities be 
restricted to either ports or areas which were outside the main fighting zones.  Due to 
the narrow zone of battle, it remained ever difficult to limit the scope of activities 
planned by Second TAF. In turn the white bus rescue mission had to be re-routed to 
avoid a significant threat of Allied aerial attack. As Allied plans to increase aerial 
activity over North Germany were developed, the potential threat to life also rose 
dramatically. But with as the speed of operations also increased, so too did the German 
plans to evacuate the camps. This meant that there were many more potential casualties 
outside the camps in the final weeks.   In turn the dissemination of aerial reconnaissance 
to those at the frontline was often slow and lacked the necessary detail that had been at 
the forefront of Britain’s aerial campaign. One important example was an attack on a 
freight depot at Celle. The building was used by German forces to house a group of 
prisoners. By this late stage of the war, German commanders knew only too well that 
this type of structure was deemed by British and American forces as a legitimate 
military target, and would likely be attacked.   
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On the evening of 8 April, a U.S. attack on the freight depot at Celle partially destroyed 
a long train, which had arrived with almost 3,500 prisoners from Neuengamme and 
Buchenwald; several hundred were killed, many more badly wounded.  
Although the attack took place at night, there was no attempt by German forces to paint 
the train, nor make provisions for the prisoners in the event of an air raid. German 
officials were aware of the threat from the air, and this event shows that the transport 
was left to the chances of whether the Allied planes would attack a crucial military 
installation. The example of Britain’s engagement with the Red Cross demonstrates that 
even when intelligence was made available, there were often occasions of friendly-fire. 
We can further surmise that Allied behaviour was being driven by the broader military 
strategy to reach the Baltic coast and halt a Soviet advance further West. In addition, the 
normal protocols and procedures that provided clear guidance on strategic policy fell to 
the wayside. 
 
As Swedish Red Cross co-workers finally gained access to Neuengamme on 29 March, 
the squalid conditions became apparent. Ingrid Lomfors writes: “from these quarters a 
group of creatures who scarcely seemed human was swept, pushed and led. Emaciated 
to a point that would not be regarded as possible […] these poor people stumbled and 
crept into our buses”.353 The Scandinavian part of the camp had been cleaned to portray 
a better standard of living conditions. Although exact figures are difficult to find, some 
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estimate that between March and May 1945 nearly 16,100 inmates perished either in the 
camp or during the evacuation of the camp.
354
 This meant Red Cross workers were 
exposed to the full extent of the conditions that were present in the camp system. 
During Red Cross operations in the camp evacuation routes and transport details were 
continually reported to the British. Through his deposition in July 1946, Bernadotte 
stated that he could only arrange additional transports once he had received authority 
from the Allies.
355
 Therefore this example shows that British authorities were well-
informed of SRC operations in North Germany. Bernadotte continued to relay clear 
information to the necessary authorities regarding his mission. As the number of 
transports increased, so too did the timeframe of operations.  The extensive involvement 
of Bernadotte in the final weeks of war at Neuengamme provided a useful and much 
needed insight into what the British knew, or were made aware of, regarding the camp 
at Neuengamme and its movement of prisoners. But it further highlights a number of 
failings in the timely processing of information. 
 
During Bernadotte’s operation in Neuengamme, the main camp was continually in 
receipt of prisoner transports as surrounding camps closer to the fighting front were 
rapidly closed. This continual movement of prisoners further signifies the problems that 
faced British reconnaissance groups. By providing a survey of similar camps in this 
final phase of evacuations it is clear that Neuengamme remains a unique case. Other 
                                                          
354
 See various, KZ-Gedenkstaette website, “Death”, http://www.kz-gedenkstaette-
neuengamme.de/index.php?id=990, (accessed 19 May 2014); Herbert Obenaus, “Die Räumung 
der Hannoverschen Konzentrationslager im April 1945”, in Christoph Gutman, Rainer Fröbe, 
Claus Füllberg-Stolberg, Rolf Keller, Herbert Obenaus and Hans Hermann Schröder (eds.) 
Konzentrationlager in Hannover: KZ-Arbeit und Rüstungsindustrie in der Spätphase des 
Weltkrieges (Verlag August Lase: Hildsheim, 1985), pp. 497-502. 
355
 TNA WO 309/408: Deposition of Count Folke Bernadotte 6 July 1946, p. 1. 
178 
 
camps were liberated by Allied forces with significant numbers of prisoners still within 
the camp grounds. For instance Sachsenhausen was liberated on 22 April where Allied 
forces found around 3,000 inmates inside the grounds.
356
 Buchenwald, after extensive 
evacuations was liberated by American forces on 11 April where they found an 
estimated 21,000 prisoners still in the camp.
357
 All existing documentation had been 
destroyed and prior to the Allied liberation, the number of inmates in the main camp 
had been drastically reduced through a number of death marches. As part of the 
arrangement, Red Cross vehicles collected foreign nationals from all over Northern 
Germany. Again this movement of vehicles at a time when the Allied air campaign had 
dramatically increased meant that the Red Cross were constantly informing the British 
of the transport routes to and from Neuengamme. Increasingly, the movement of Red 
Cross workers and their vehicles against the number of friendly fire incidents suggests, 
at times, Britain was able to prevent some attacks. 
 
During the white bus operation, Bernadotte provided humanitarian relief to other 
Western nationals that were on a death march. The extensive negotiation process 
between Bernadotte and Himmler provide us with some clear examples of what 
information had been passed to British forces. This information is further supplements 
by other sources which were available to intelligence agencies. One such instance was a 
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small evacuation transport led by Scharführer-SS Max Schmidt. A survivor, Benjamin 
Jacobs noted that on 28 April  
a long black limousine was the first glimpse we had of the Swedish mission 
[…] out of the limousine stepped three men, wearing pressed Khaki 
uniforms […] one carried an elegant baton under his arm. I assume – but 
don’t know for sure – that he was Count Bernadotte.358 
 
Schmidt, isolated from any source of direct command had decided to march the 
prisoners to his family’s farm in Neu Glassau in the district of Schleswig-Holstein. 
Bernadotte’s mission offered humanitarian support to a significant number of prisoners. 
We can presume that after extensive negotiations with the West during his time at 
Neuengamme, Bernadotte had felt that it was now within his ability to assist other 
Western nationals. The destination of the truck was Neustadt Bay. However the trucks 
were not destined for the Cap Arcona, but for one of two Red Cross ships that were in 
the bay near Lübeck. Bernadotte had received assurances from his representatives near 
Flensburg that he had two boats made available to carry non-Scandinavian prisoners to 
Sweden.
359
 The first vessel, the Lillie Matthiessen had previously been chartered to ship 
350,000 litres of fuel to the port of Lübeck, plus other stores and 6,000 gift parcels for 
prisoners at the German Camps.
360
 The second vessel was the Magdalena. But in 
making the necessary arrangements for this rescue mission, Bernadotte needed 
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permission from Allied HQ prior to movement. 
361
 The movement of any Red Cross 
transport was now greatly at risk from Allied air strikes as the area under German 
control diminished.  
 
Local Information Sources 
As prison transports embarked at the Vorwerk harbour in Lübeck, there were other 
members of neutral countries that provided support. In the port a member of 
Bernadotte’s mission, Dr Hans Arnoldsson, was actively engaged in humanitarian 
arrangements. The prisoners had arrived to Lübeck either by goods trains, or had been 
forced to march from their respective camp.
362
 As the prisoners were gathered near the 
grain silos of the Vorwerk Harbour they were to be ferried onto ships in Neustadt Bay. 
By this stage the vast majority of prisoners were sick, mal-nourished or too weak to 
offer any significant level of resistance towards their captors.  
 
While he was engaged in Lübeck he was ultimately entrusted with arranging safe 
passage for some 300 female inmates from Ravensbrück concentration camp to the Red 
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Cross ship’s Lillie Matthiessen and Magdalena.363 He was assisted in his activities by 
Bjorn Heger, a Norwegian who had arranged for the prisoners held in Schmidt’s barn to 
be collected. The problem that faced these men was the lack of space available to 
transport the prisoners. Docked also in Lübeck around this time was the ship Athen. 
After Captain Bertram – Cap Arcona – had refused to exceed numbers of four thousand 
five hundred prisoners, those remaining were ferried back to the shore by the crew of 
the Athen.
364
 Originally functioning as a freighter ship, the ship was damaged during 
operation during sometime in 1943; the vessel was re-built and eventually served its 
remaining months primarily as a prison ship.
365
 As the Athen was docked alongside the 
harbour in Lübeck, Arnoldsson negotiated with an SS-Hauptsturmführer who was 
responsible for the Athen, to secure the release of an estimated 2-300 prisoners who 
were suffering the most.
366
 The problem was what to do with the remaining prisoners 
aboard the Athen. It was evident from Arnoldsson that the ships at his disposal were 
insufficient and therefore an alternative solution had to be found.  
 
By 30 April Allied forces were close to capturing Lübeck. The town of Elmenhorst and 
surrounding areas had been taken by the swift advance of the British 11 Armoured 
                                                          
363
 GeNA, Letter from Swedish Red Cross Gunner Nyby to Dirk Martin, 29 January 1990, p. 1. 
364
 For a discussion as to the activity of the ship Athen, see Lange, Cap Arcona; See also TNA 
ADM 213/917: Survey of damaged shipping in Northern Germany and Denmark, 1947. 
365
 The Athen was first seen as half a vessel at Rotterdam prior to October 1943. During that 
month this half was dry docked and a new fore port was constructed. The new vessel was re-
launched on 6.8.44. See TNA ADM 213/917: Survey of damaged shipping in Northern 
Germany and Denmark, 1947. 
366
 See various, Lange, Cap Arcona, p. 4; Hans Arnoldsson, Natt och Dimma, (Bonnier: 
Stockholm, 1945). 
182 
 
division. The overall situation meant that within forty-eight hours (at most) the city of 
Lübeck would be surrounded.
367
 The only viable and practical solution, as Arnoldsson 
suggested, was to hand the remaining prisoners over to the British forces. Furthermore 
Arnoldsson instructed the commanding officer that he was to await the arrival of the 
British and to leave the surrender of these people to him.
368
 At this point, Arnoldsson 
becomes an influential and important figure for the prisoners already on board the Cap 
Arcona. As he returned to the position where the Athen was docked on the 2 May, he 
learnt that the Athen had sailed to Neustadt Bay. It was at this moment Arnoldsson 
learnt from a German officer of the concentration camp inmates on board the Cap 
Arcona. His plan of action was to inform the British authorities of this situation 
developing over Neustadt bay on their arrival. 
 
On the morning of 3 May, Dr Arnoldsson told British headquarters of the concentration 
camp prisoners on board the ships in Neustadt Bay. From Arnoldsson’s published work, 
we can surmise that he informed the British commander liberating Neustadt on the 
morning of 3 May by communicating a similar message to that of de Blonay. The 
liberating commander was Major General Roberts.
369
 Given the over-riding military 
situation and the potential threat posed to the prisoners, Arnoldsson was determined to 
seek further counsel.
370
 This information was taken seriously by the British, who on the 
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afternoon of 3 May sent two officers to the office of the Swedish Red Cross to ask Dr. 
Arnoldsson for further details on the information he had passed on to the British.
371
 The 
problem was that any action was too late. Although this information had been made 
readily available to British forces, their ability to communicate effectively with Red 
Cross departments was slow and clumsy.
372
 Information relevant to prevent significant 
loss of life should have been passed on sooner. This particular example clearly shows 
that when in receipt of important information, the channels of dissemination were slow. 
While British authorities were sent back to request further information, there were other 
methods of intelligence gathering that the Allies could have utilised to clarify the 
situation. Instead by returning to question Arnoldsson on the information he had 
provided the British, the delay in acting on this credible intelligence led to the attack on 
the Cap Arcona. 
 
During the war British intelligence considered information via the Red Cross to be 
extremely reliable. But as combat became more intense and the Allies’ advance 
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quickened, evidence suggests that the processing and disseminating of information was 
greatly hindered by the speed of their advance. Further information regarding the 
prisoners on board the Cap Arcona existed. The relationship, communication and 
coordination between the various Red Cross institutions throughout the war were often 
fragmented. The ICRC often attempted to deal with the terms of the Geneva Convention 
1929. Other national Red Cross institutions, like the SRC, operated independently of the 
ICRC. In the case of Neuengamme, the SRC were primarily concerned with the rescue 
of Scandinavian nationals. While the Swedish Red Cross conducted extensive 
operations throughout Northern Germany, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) were also extensively involved in operations in North Germany. The port of 
Lübeck was the centre of the ICRC’s northern supply operations.373 An important 
drawback that hindered the ICRC’s involvement throughout the war was the 
organisation’s overall weakness.374 By April the port of Lübeck was becoming an 
important military target for Allied air crews. The continuation of humanitarian support 
at a time when there was a lack of communication between neutral observers and British 
forces posed a problem. A Swiss delegate, Paul de Blonay was operating and guiding 
ICRC operations. During the final days of April, de Blonay was conducting his duties in 
the Harbour with regards to shipments of Red Cross parcels. In his postwar deposition 
he stated: 
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I noticed a ship ss. Thielbek at the place where I was accustomed to unload Red 
Cross petrol supplies. Whilst I was walking past this ship, a box of matches 
dropped beside me. I could not find who had thrown it. This box contained a 
letter in German signed by a Pole telling me about the state of some deportees – 
about 7000 – in the three ships ss. Thielbeck, ss. Athen and ss. Cap Arcona.375 
 
What de Blonay discovered was information regarding the developing situation in 
Neustadt Bay. Furthermore, the information stated clearly the number of prisoners and 
ships which were undefended in the bay of Neustadt. With this information, de Blonay, 
a neutral spectator, now sought some form of clarification on the situation. The 
following day he was engaged in a meeting with SS Brigadefuhrer and General Major 
Schröder. Schröder’s function in Lübeck was senator and general of the police in 
Lübeck, and therefore he would likely be answering any questions that de Blonay had 
regarding the prisoners on board the three ships. During the meeting de Blonay “offered 
food for the prisoners on board the ships’ which would have made the situation on 
board the ships slightly better”.376 German commanders reacted angrily to the offer. 
Schröder seemed to be angry that a neutral spectator had discovered the prisoners on 
board the ships.
377
 Schroder also rejected the application for the ICRC to support the 
prisoners through food parcels.  
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In amongst the confusion and chaotic scenes, emphasis was placed upon local 
commanders to ensure, to the best of their abilities, that orders were followed 
through.
378
 In fact Wachsmann poignantly argues that “the transports were dominated 
by camp SS men, after all, who were already accustomed to murdering prisoners if 
escaping or for losing their strength”.379 This meant that any attempt to help by neutral 
spectators would be refused. On 29 and 30 April, de Blonay was once again active at 
the harbour front in Lübeck. This time he was more persistent with Schröder. During 
this discussion he requested for the foreigners or non-Germans on board these ships to 
be released into his trust, but Schröder refused to comply. 
380
 Much needed resources 
for the war effort were diverted to the continued detention and imprisonment of 
prisoners. Gauleiter Kaufmann who liaised with HSSPF Bassewitz-Behr remained ever 
obstinate to ensure that the remaining prisoners from Neuengamme camp were neither 
liberated nor released.  On the following day, after de Blonay’s unsuccessful 
conversations with Schröder, he met with a fellow colleague, Dr. Arnoldsson. His 
colleague had rather more to discuss with de Blonay. In actual fact he had “received 
permission to take about 300 prisoners as International Red Cross cargoes to Sweden on 
two ships which had just loaded Red Cross parcels in Lübeck and which had already 
about 500 women prisoners from Ravensbrück”.381    
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In terms of information and its relevance to the Cap Arcona, de Blonay’s information 
was passed directly to the liberating British forces of Lübeck on 2 May. As British 
forces took control of the town, de Blonay requested a meeting with the liberating 
commander. The most likely format of this information would have been verbally 
communicated between de Blonay and Major General Roberts. From his statement 
below it is clear that Major General Roberts phoned the message through to central 
headquarters for further analysis. A Brigadier, Major General Roberts of 11 Armoured 
Division met with de Blonay around 15:00 hours on 2 May. De Blonay states that: 
 
I told him about the three ships in Neustadt Bay and that I was certain that these 
ships had been put there in order to be sunk. I told him there were 7000 to 8000 
prisoners on board. In my presence he spoke on the phone in his armoured car. I 
did not hear what he said but I am sure he passed my message on to higher 
authority.
382
 
 
 
The crucial case-studies of Red Cross activities demonstrate that external agencies had 
successfully gained useful and credible intelligence. In particular, at a localised level the 
works of Arnoldsson and De Blonay provide solid evidence that the information 
regarding the prisoners did exist and in both cases this was passed clearly to the British 
authorities. But more importantly the discussions and evidence of the meetings between 
Bernadotte and Himmler provide a crucial assessment of just how complicated and 
difficult the political situation had become in Nazi Germany. These discussions show 
clearly that there was never any real intention to surrender the remaining camps. We can 
therefore infer that Himmler only wished to stall and delay the Allied advance into 
North Germany. What this meant for Neuengamme was that the evacuation moved 
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forward, and because no concession was reached, the prisoners were placed on board 
the Cap Arcona. In broader terms the impact of chaos and its impact on British military 
strategy are clear. With an increase in the number of friendly-fire related incidents in 
North Germany, it remains clear that the broader strategic policy was having a negative 
impact on the normal protocols of military combat. Moreover, with valuable 
intelligence being passed to British authorities, it highlighted the processing of this 
information was often slow. 
 
Often, the information that de Blonay passed to the British liberating forces is quoted in 
general historiography on the Cap Arcona.
383
 But set within this context of chaos, the 
relevance of his information is crucial in highlighting the failings of Britain’s 
intelligence sector. While in receipt of key and crucial information there were 
increasing concerns that Britain did not have sufficient resources to deal with the scope 
and breadth of information. 
 
British sources of intelligence 
 
There has over recent years been a debate as to whether British forces were in receipt of 
intelligence that depicted the situation in Neustadt prior to any air attack.
384
 Any attempt 
to analyse potential sources of British intelligence have suffered from a lack of 
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surviving archival material. But careful analysis of official British records can help us to 
piece together a picture of events. While the reconstruction is largely based on “official 
sources”, this information will be cross-referenced with witness testimony and other 
primary sources. While British records appear incomplete, primary source material from 
archives in Germany, and other institutions have been used to further support the claims 
highlighted in the official British report. In the case of the Cap Arcona, in the 
immediate aftermath of the war British forces were initially keen to analyse the key 
facts that led to the disaster in Neustadt.
385
 It should be made clear that the focus of the 
report was on the wider discussions relating to Neuengamme camp, with a sub-section 
focusing on the disaster in Neustadt. The report was focused not solely on the disaster in 
Neustadt, but also on the wider investigations of the operations in Neuengamme camp. 
Understandably, British investigators were less concerned with the actions of the RAF, 
and more concerned with potential German war crimes. Within the report, it does 
highlight that prior to an aerial assault over Neustadt that British intelligence was not as 
efficient as it had previously been throughout the war. 
 
In terms of the Cap Arcona, there were two prime opportunities handed to the British, 
prior to an aerial attack, to prevent the attack on the vessels in Neustadt. Major Till was 
a civilian solicitor who joined Number two war crimes investigation team. He was 
tasked with investigating the disaster at Neustadt bay, as a sub section of his overall 
report. Quoted in almost every detailed account on the Cap Arcona, Major Till noted 
that: 
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the intelligence officer with 83
rd
 Group RAF has admitted on two occasions – 
first to Lt. H.F. Ansell of this team and on a second occasion to the investigating 
officer when he was accompanied by  Lt. H.F. Ansell – that a message was 
received on 2
nd
 May 1945 that these ships were loaded with KZ prisoners but 
that, although there was ample time to warn the pilots of the planes who attacked 
those ships on the following day, by some oversight the message was never 
passed on.
386
 
 
While Till acknowledges within the report that information had existed prior to 3 May, 
this shows that there were continual failings in Britain’s ability to process adequately 
and disseminate information. Moreover, Till’s wording highlights this breakdown of 
communication as a mere oversight.
387
 The report and its tentative conclusions tend to 
suggest that British forces were protecting their own reputation. Although certain 
agencies had been made aware of the impending situation, British investigators fail to 
reflect on the severity of this miscommunication. Furthermore why does Till – as 
thorough as the rest of the report is - fail to name the intelligence officer? While we 
might speculate about the identity of this officer, what is far more intriguing is that Till 
notes that the intelligence officers’ confession was documented. Till’s report suggests 
that the officer had provided a statement during his interview.
388
 The problem for 
historians is that since the release of records from 1972, there appear to be gaps in the 
records Till used to collate his report. In fact a collection of reports by RAF and the 
statement provided by this intelligence officer have not been located in any archives 
either in the UK or abroad. The implication that this collection of documents has since 
been removed from public consultation add weight to the growing collection of 
conspiracy theories. This would naturally suggest that there was information contained 
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in these reports which the British HQ did not wish to be made public. The stance of the 
British report can clearly be seen in the tone and comments made by Till. He states, 
 
In view of the grievance which was found to be held by some of the survivors of 
this disaster at the bombing of these ships by Allied planes, it is strongly urged 
that an official enquiry by held by the responsible authorities into this failure to 
pass [on] vital information.
389
 
 
 
The report acknowledged the problems associated with such an attack, and the growing 
concern of the survivors at the lack of study into the operation. Seventy years have 
passed since the attack and sinking on the vessel, yet no further report has ever been 
conducted. The recommendations made by Major Till were ignored. In light of the 
allegations that intelligence did exist and that British authorities were in possession of 
key facts, it is difficult to comprehend why the British military or British government 
failed to follow through on an official and thorough investigation.  
 
The Till report remains, even today, the only British investigation that looked into the 
Cap Arcona tragedy. In highlighting a number of flaws, Till points to a problem with 
intelligence. Although there was relevant information concerning the fate of the 
prisoners, this is labelled as an oversight because it was not passed on. But this was 
much more than an oversight. We can infer that throughout the final months of the war, 
the processing and dissemination of intelligence was greatly hindered by the speed of 
the Allied advance. Subsequently the build-up to the attack on 3 May was the 
culmination of a series of missed opportunities by British forces to halt any attack. More 
importantly Till further suggests that while British intelligence officers had credible 
                                                          
389
 TNA WO 309/1592: Major Till report section B, p. 15. 
192 
 
intelligence, there was a delay in transmitting this information to those concerned. 
However, it became increasingly likely that because of the military situation, 
intelligence officers simply did not know how best to interpret this intelligence. The 
delay and confusion surrounding this information failed to halt the impending attack. 
The problems with the wider social breakdown of communication are evident when 
analysing the dissemination of information. The wider military and political aim to 
reach Lübeck created an environment that was marked by chaos. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the war, intelligence formed a core component of British military strategy. With 
technological developments and high levels of investment, aerial intelligence was used 
heavily in military operations in the latter half of the war. But during 1945, broader 
military strategy has been shown to directly impact on Britain’s ability to gather, 
interpret and disseminate information. One clear example of this breakdown was the 
white bus operation. Throughout the war information passed from the Red Cross 
agencies to Allied intelligence was considered extremely valuable and often taken 
seriously. But during the SRC operation in March 1945, this processing of valuable 
intelligence was considered less important in terms of Britain’s broader policy. Allied 
air attacks appeared more sporadic and less co-ordinated. With aerial policy focusing on 
armed reconnaissance, this led to a situation that poses significant threat to the Red 
Cross operation. Numerous attacks on marked convoys suggested that Allied behaviour 
was less caring. Although there was a suggestion that German forces were taking 
advantage of Red Cross convoys, and therefore pilots were often unsure as to who was 
actually in the convoy, the Allied mind set evolved into one that was determined to 
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attack German forces. In reaction to the knowledge that genuine Red Cross vehicles had 
been attacked, many of the pilots concluded on the basis that the fog of war was the 
reason for these attacks. This further highlights that Second TAF was uncertain as to the 
overall military situation, and less caring of the end result. 
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Chapter Six 
The Bombing of the Cap Arcona, 3 May 1945 
 
This chapter will attempt to focus on the final short-term factors that ultimately led to 
the tragic sinking of the Cap Arcona. This unique set of circumstances that culminated 
in the final days of the war can only be understood by interweaving both German and 
British narratives. In order to understand why the Cap Arcona was attacked we must 
consider two important factors. Firstly, we must understand the political governance of 
Hamburg in the final days of the war. In doing so, we must consider the administrative 
functions of the Party apparatus and the factors behind Hamburg surrendering; and why 
the Gauleiter was determined not to fight. But British aerial strategy played a pivotal 
role in the surrender of Hamburg, and it is important to understand why aerial policy 
changed drastically in the closing weeks of the war. Was there a genuine fear of troops 
fleeing to Norway? Did weather play an important part in the processing of 
intelligence? In placing the sinking into this context of chaos, not only does this broaden 
our scope of the wider issues, it also highlights the sinking was a culmination of a series 
of unfortunate events that were not necessarily inter-linked. 
 
With any historical discussion into this tragic event, the main emphasis of research 
appears to focus on the topic of responsibility. But in attempting to proportion blame, 
the historical narrative detracts from other key areas, such as attempting to understand 
why the prisoners were on the ship. One recent example was written by the American 
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scholar Robert Watson. In concluding his research into the tragic sinking, Watson 
summarised that “ultimate responsibility is with the Nazis”.390 In a similar stance to 
earlier historical narratives, he followed a similar line of enquiry to that Wilhelm Lange. 
Lange’s reconstruction set the sinking against a narrowing context. Lange however 
argued that: 
The main responsibility for one of the worst maritime disasters in history is to 
all appearances on the German side having laid a trap for the Allies. On the other 
hand, there were serious errors in the transmission of information regarding the 
situation within the British services.
391
 
 
One weakness in his argument is that this conclusion is based largely on a limited 
analysis of the available primary source material. Therefore there are claims that are 
unsubstantiated. For example his suggestion that German forces knew in April 1945 that 
Second TAF would attack Neustadt Bay in May 1945 was unlikely. It therefore seems 
highly improbable that the prisoners were intentionally placed on the Cap Arcona fully 
expecting an Allied attack. 
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How Hamburg was governed in April and May 1945 
 
As British forces began to surround Hamburg, Allied forces issued the city with an 
ultimatum, namely that the city would be bombed into submission should Kaufmann not 
surrender.
392
 The threat of renewed and intense aerial bombardment played a significant 
role in how the Hamburg administration attempted to deal with the final weeks of the 
war. Moreover, Gauleiter Kaufmann had guided the city through reconstruction after the 
firestorm raids in 1943, and would be all too keen to avoid a repeat. Also this pressure 
on the civilian administration arguably further drove the evacuations from Neuengamme 
camp. Grenville argued that “during the last few weeks of the Nazi Reich the Hamburg 
administration lived in a world of unreality”.393 His suggestion that the local party 
apparatus were attempting to function in a utopian ideal further highlights that the 
civilian administration, in particular Gauleiter Kaufmann, were able to operate 
independently of the Reich centre. 
 
Throughout April Allied air crews continued almost unopposed to strike at German 
industrial targets. However, as Allied commanders felt that the war would soon be over, 
they wished to speed up Germany’s capitulation. One could argue that the city of 
Hamburg had become Kaufmann’s life. He was respected amongst the business and 
industrial leaders as well as those within the party. It is therefore unsurprising that 
Kaufmann wished to save the city from further aerial bombardment after the horror of 
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the firestorm raids in July 1943. In his memoir’s armaments minister Albert Speer 
noted: 
The Commandant of the city had received order’s to fight for Hamburg, he told 
me. But the British had issued an ultimatum that if Hamburg were not 
surrendered; they would order the heaviest bombing the city had ever 
received.
394
 
 
The impact of this ultimatum can be seen as two-fold. Firstly many politicians and local 
industrialists could recall the devastation inflicted in the 1943 fire storm raids.
395
  This 
memory alone would ensure that some industrialists would wish to avoid a complete 
destruction of their business assets. Secondly, Kaufmann played an active and decisive 
role in restoring balance to the city in the aftermath of the bombing. His drive to avoid a 
repeat action would strike at the very core of his determination to prevent a further 
bombardment.  
 
During a meeting between Gauleiter and armaments minister, Speer noted that 
“Kaufmann told me, that if necessary he would mobilize the masses to active resistance 
against the defenders of the city”.396 The general feeling was that a lack of credence was 
now being given to the promises of the Nazi concept of Volksgemeinschaft and in turn 
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this led to open criticism of NSDAP policies.
397
 Although Kaufmann was arguably a 
staunch Nazi, after a meeting with Hitler in early April, he concluded that “his leader 
had now lost all touch with reality”.398 This breakdown of trust, as well as defiance 
against the wishes of Hitler demonstrated decisively that central government was now 
almost non-existent. In economic terms, Kaufmann largely directed business and 
industry growth within the city. By 1945 this influence over political, social and 
economic control evolved into local governance as central command continued to falter. 
 
One aspect that requires a brief discussion was how Kaufmann evolved the planning 
process to meet the pressure he faced. Although one important factor for the surrender 
relates heavily to industrial pressure, Kaufmann was further driven by the thought of 
post-war Hamburg. In outlining his case for surrender, Kaufmann felt that he had to 
consider the impact on post-war industry, but after the war Germany would need to be 
fed. This meant that any severe attack on Hamburg’s dock installations would 
dramatically hinder the city’s ability to feed its population.399 As Kaufmann came under 
intense pressure to save the city from aerial bombardment it became paramount to 
surrender the city without any indication of businesses using forced labour within their 
industries. Furthermore should prison labour be liberated within the boundaries of 
Hamburg, the stark harsh conditions these prisoners were in would be all too clear. 
During a meeting in the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce Kaufmann met with local 
business leaders. The conclusion of this meeting led to Kaufmann issuing Bassewitz-
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Behr with clear instructions to evacuate the camp at Neuengamme.
400
 By late April 
British forces had begun an assault on the Harburg area. 
 
Map One: Outline of Harburg Area 
 
As the outer limits became under intense fighting, Kaufmann remained within the city 
boundaries determined to ward off any attempt at large-scale resistance. Furthermore 
Kaufmann surrounded “himself at all times with a bodyguard of armed students”.401 
This further highlighted the rather fanatical and fragile structure of the political system 
in April 1945. The younger generation widely prepared to fight on, while the older, war 
wary generate was longing for surrender.  
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Communication remained an important factor in the fate of the city. By this late stage of 
the campaign, direct, succinct communication from the Reich Chancellery was non-
existent. In turn any orders from the Reich Chancellery were almost ignored. In a 
deposition sworn before Major Lewinski, Bassewitz-Behr later claimed that 
At the risk of death I participated in discussions about not defending Hamburg. 
These discussions some of which were in my house, were in secret between the 
Gauleiter Kaufmann and the military authorities.
402
 
 
This series of secret meetings further demonstrate the social breakdown of order within 
the remaining territories of Nazi Germany. Although Kaufmann had made his intentions 
clear, the continued need to meet in secret shows that not all groups within Hamburg 
agreed on the direction the city should take. Himmler’s wishes that Hamburg should 
fight on had only briefly been considered by Kaufmann. Moreover with a series of 
political appointments gained by Kaufmann, there was limited if any possibility that the 
SS could stage some form of challenge to his demands.
403
 
 
On 3 May British forces accepted the surrender of Hamburg. This however did not halt 
any planned air strikes in the surrounding area, nor did it prevent British ground troops 
pressing eastwards towards Wismar. The ability of German commanders to ward off 
                                                          
402
 TNA WO 309/408: Deposition on oath of Graf Bassewitz-Behr, p. 4. 
403
 On Nazi terror changes see, Eric A. Johnson, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews and Ordinary 
Germans (Basic Books: New York, 2000); Nikolaus Wachsmann, KL:  A history of the Nazi 
Concentration Camps (Little Brown: London, 2015); Frank McDonough, The Gestapo: The 
Myth and Reality of Hitler’s Secret Police (Coronet: London, 2015); Tim Mason, Social Policy 
in the Third Reich: The Working Class and the National Community (Berg Publishers: Oxford, 
1993). 
201 
 
capitulation had rested solely on the strength and loyalty of local commanders.
404
 In 
reality the mounting of any long term sustainable defence rested on the loyalty and 
strength of the local fighting units. Jones argued that as Allied troops entered Hamburg 
they witnessed “Wehrmacht troops – fully armed – yet looking scared and wanting to 
surrender’ began to submit to the West.405 But Allied forces were all too aware that SS 
and Wehrmacht troops were still fleeing towards the Baltic coast and the remaining 
ports. As a result of a growing trend in port activity, Allied command turned their 
attention away from land-based assaults and increased attacks against shipping.  
 
Second Tactical Air Force Operations May 1945 
While research debated the callous and needless attacks on Dresden and the stance of 
Bomber Harris, operations by Second TAF, Coastal Command and Fighter Command 
have largely remained forgotten. This section will now analyse the actions of Second 
TAF during the beginning of May 1945. It will seek to argue that previous scholarship 
has largely failed to address crucial questions regarding the actions of this group.
406
 For 
instance many commentators suggest poor weather hindered and suspended 
reconnaissance flights. However this section will explore wide-ranging source material 
and demonstrate this was not the case. Second TAF operations in the previous months 
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were crucial for the support of ground forces. On the outbreak of war RAF wings had 
been hesitant about the use of photographic reconnaissance as a further option to gather 
credible intelligence. But by 1945, Command HQ had come to understand the benefits 
of the use of photographic intelligence.
407
 In turn the wider policy of using this type of 
intelligence gathering led to a dramatic increase in the number of planes equipped for 
photo reconnaissance. Babington-Smith suggested that,  
Both the armies and the Tactical Air Forces that fought their way across Europe 
were equipped for photographic reconnaissance on a prodigious scale. Each day 
that weather permitted, these ‘private fleets’ of aircraft sped back and forth 
taking photographs.
408
 
 
The use of photographic reconnaissance, particularly in the final weeks of the war, is an 
important short-term factor. While there was a dramatic increase in the reliance of this 
type of intelligence, the final weeks of the war witness a slow-down in the use and 
processing of this type of intelligence. While different squadrons were able to utilise 
photographic reconnaissance, its use and implementation in the final weeks was left to 
the individual Wings. Research into the immediate build-up to the sinking of the Cap 
Arcona has largely concluded that air operations between 1 May and 4 May were 
severely hindered by poor weather.
409
 As squadrons had relocated to airfields closer to 
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the fighting front, they were increasingly hindered by fog and mist rolling in from the 
North Sea. But what was the operational effectiveness of Second TAF? Second TAF 
was formed through the combination of a number of RAF groups. 83 Group was heavily 
involved in attacking the Cap Arcona on 3 May. A closer examination of intelligence 
summaries for early May suggests that the weather was not a problem for some 
squadron groups. 
 
Operating from airfields near Hüstadt (Bochum), Ahlhorn B111 and Plantlünne B 103, 
the intelligence report stated that “apart from sweeps over airfields on 1 May, no. 83 
group made a big attack on transport escaping from the Russian front, and 343 vehicles 
were claimed to have been destroyed and 594 damaged”.410 Intelligence for such an 
attack was the product of an aerial survey which provided an overview of the military 
strength and capacity prior to an attack being order. Webster and Frankland argued that,  
All strategy depends on whether it is operationally possible. If it is seen that the 
operations in use are not effective for their purpose the decision has to be made 
whether to proceed with the strategy and find new and more successful 
operational methods or change the strategy to conform to what is operationally 
possible.
411
 
 
In terms of aerial policy it still remained unclear as to who ultimately made the decision 
as to the operational effectiveness of a chosen strategy. As British forces approached the 
final days of conflict, the overall level of enemy resistance became sporadic and 
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therefore it became difficult to plan against an ever-evolving strategy. Because 
squadrons were located in different areas of North Germany, it was increasingly 
difficult to find a general overview of how the weather hindered operations. For those 
squadrons located further inland, operations weren’t hampered as much as those closer 
to the coastal areas. Therefore what will follow is a short survey of the various 
squadrons actively engaged on 3 May. 
 
 
There were instances when squadrons were not grounded because of poor weather. 
Squadron leader Martin Rumbolds of no. 263 was based at an airfield near Ahlhorn 
B.111. This was directly to the east of Hüstadt where some aerial flights were still able 
to engage the enemy. Writing in his log book, Rumbolds notes 
 
the weather continues too poor for operations and most of the day is spent in 
making ourselves comfortable in the new quarters. News comes through that 
Hitler is dead resulting in such celebration.
412
 
 
Although 263 squadron were not engaged in aerial activity on 1 May, the weather was 
not the only factor that hindered the squadrons operations. It remains clear in Rumbolds 
statement that his squadron had only recently re-located to Ahlhorn and therefore 
provisions and operational functionality were still on-going. Furthermore squadrons 
were re-located more frequently in the hope that aerial support would be more constant. 
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On 1 May no. 184 Squadron was led by Squadron Leader W Smith DFC, who had 
commanded since November 1944. The squadron had the honour of being the first RAF 
squadron to be based operationally on German soil. The typhoons, which now formed 
the basis of the squadron, had been re-fitted to accommodate 60lb rockets. This type of 
rocket, it must be noted, was not specifically designed to target shipping, or to be 
strategically used against shipping. Its main use was for attacks against ground 
installations and ground targets such as rail interdictions, motor transports and armed 
vehicles. This sudden change highlights the impact of short-term operational factors on 
Second TAF ability to operate efficiently. The change of ammunition, we can surmise, 
indicates that the speed of the advance led to shortages of basic provisions. The use of 
this type of ammunition had not been tested, nor designed for use on shipping. Writing 
in his log on the evening of 1 May, Smith noted that: 
 
[The] weather was clamped at first light and remained so until lunchtime. The 
C.C. led the first show and attacked the village of Tramm and Wellersen. These 
were suspected gun positions holding up our forward troops. Fires were started 
and the army enjoyed our efforts immensely… Claims were 18 destroyed and 30 
damaged for M.T.
413
 
 
Smith’s report demonstrates that at the first possible chance of any aerial action his 
squadron was airborne.  
  
In the final days of the war, Second TAF became increasingly responsible for 
monitoring the operational activity of the ports of Lübeck, Kiel and Travemünde. By 
this stage planned aerial operations were largely subjected to the over-riding military 
requirements. Intelligence summaries compiled from aerial reconnaissance by various 
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groups attached to Second TAF, indicated quite strongly that there was a dramatic 
increase in port activity. As all remaining German tonnage was being utilised in 
transporting refugee’s, civilians and troops from the East to relative safety in the 
West.
414
 A summary report from Second TAF revealed that: 
 
ships of all kinds were pressed into service by the enemy and large convoys 
began to assemble in the expansive bays of Lübeck and Kiel. It appeared that 
they were preparing to make a dash to Norway from where perhaps they might 
continue the struggle.
415
 
 
Throughout any discussion on the Cap Arcona, justification for a British aerial attack on 
Neustadt was the result of this rumour that these ships were preparing to flee to 
Norway. Thomas argued that an assumption was made by RAF HQ that the vessels 
were transporting “German leaders and SS troops’ intent on carrying on the war”.416 
Aerial strikes in the final days of the war were largely guided by this principle. But what 
discussions have failed to take into account was that the number of ports still in German 
control was diminishing. It is therefore a reasonable assumption that as the military 
campaign was nearing the end, Germany would secure their remaining shipping tonnage 
either in home ports, or neutral ports. This would lead to a dramatic rise in the number 
of vessels entering, or docked in the Northern ports. 
 
The monitoring of shipping and port activity had throughout the war been a core 
component of the reconnaissance wing. Lange argued that “aerial reconnaissance results 
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for the RAF remained incomplete due to bad weather by the end of April and into the 
beginning of May”.417 This was not the case. Throughout April the intelligence section 
of the RAF invested significant resources to monitoring port movements in Northern 
Germany. Interpretation report no. 7461 was produced on 10 April 1945. Largely 
focusing on what the British perceived to be Eastern Germany, ports included 
Travemünde, Lübeck and Kiel. In Lübeck, for instance the summary of shipping 
activity is well documented. The report stated: 
 
There has been an increase in naval shipping, while the number of U-boats 
probably remains approximately the same as on 23.3.45. There have been some 
movements and turnover in merchant shipping since last full cover.
418
 
 
 
By April 1945 it became increasingly common for German shipping to be constantly 
moving between the remaining ports of operation. This was largely due to the 
evacuations from East Prussia. It was not merely a case of a quick fly-by, but each port 
was carefully surveyed and a careful note of the various categories of shipping was 
noted. For instance in Lübeck the report notes the following: 
 
There has been considerable activity both amongst the naval and merchant 
shipping. All U-Boats (except 3) and other naval craft have departed; there has 
been a marked change round in other shipping...At Lübeck the only U-boat is 
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the 150’ inactive one lying at her usual berth in the Vorwerk Basin. This is a 
decrease of 6 x 250’ P.F and 1 x 500 tons at Flenderwerke since 14.4.45.419 
 
 
The report is quite clear. Allied air crews had noted that much of the naval craft had 
since departed Lübeck. The accuracy of such reports testifies to the resources given to 
track movement within Axis ports. It was not simply a case that once a vessel left a port 
of operation it was forgotten. Allied reconnaissance planes were able to track the 
movements of various classes of ships. In a shipping summary dated 4 May 1945 it 
concluded: 
 
Shipping 
Summary 
(Undamaged) Amount/ Type 
Naval Nil 
U-Boats 1 x 500' U-boat (Inactive) 
Non-Naval M/V 345' M.366 
  M/V 350' P.FP.C 
  M/V 300' Standard HANSA type 
  7 M/Vs 250/300' 
  3 M/Vs 200/250' 
  1 Sailing vessel 200/250' 
  1 Coaster 
  1 Sailing Vessel 200/250' 
  1 hulk 200 
  4 Coasters 150/200 
  4 Floating cranes 
  2 armed tugs 
  Barges, small craft 
Table One: Shipping Summary of Undamaged vessels, Lübeck Bay, 4 May 1945
420
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Table One shows the extent to which the Allied crews documented the different types of 
shipping. The table summarises a number of undamaged vessels that had been observed 
up to 4 May. The table further highlights that due care and attention had been taken to 
document clearly the type and class of vessel. After the attack on 3 May it shows that 
the bulk of remaining vessels were non naval, and therefore the attack had targeted 
specific naval vessels. The second crucial point regarding the report is that the Central 
Interpretation Unit (CIU) regularly undertook in-depth surveys of the certain ports. 
There is no mention at any point of the weather causing problems for the surveys. In 
fact future reports compiled by the CIU seem to provide a general trend that German 
Naval forces were far from being disorganised.  
 
 
In fact operations and port movements continued. A report on Lübeck, no. 7526, 25 
April 1945 suggested that “one M/V 250’ approx. is a new arrival alongside the small 
M/V on north bank, but apart from this there has been no change in shipping present 
since the last cover of this section”.421 While the evidence presented has focused on 
Lübeck, this remains important for understanding British logic to focus their attention 
towards shipping in the early days of May. 
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Map Two: Final Air Operations 1-4 May 1945. 
422
 
 
The operational chart shows the breakdown of working areas for each section of the 
RAF. Coastal Command was responsible for the area located towards Norway and the 
Flensburg channel. In its weekly resume presented to Churchill’s war cabinet, it stated 
that “few mines have been swept”.423 This meant that many crucial and important 
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shipping routes remained too treacherous to risk. A significant problem was that 
“further out to sea Bomber Command had laid mines in the Kattegat and Oslo Fjord a 
week before the end of April”.424 In terms of a potential evacuation to Norway, heavy 
mining by British forces should have lessened the fear that this was possible. 
Nonetheless, Second TAF still felt that an evacuation to Norway was feasible.  
 
Air operations became more frequent in the final days of the war. They remained 
heavily guided by a series of operational day orders. These give a useful insight into the 
Allies’ stance on deciding the focus of their air operations. Up to the end of April, these 
orders were designed to support the military drive northwards. In doing so, much of 
their target base was military installations and vehicles. For instance, order 69 stated, 
No. 83 Group are to note that operations South and East of the line Hamburg – 
exclusive of Bremen – along the coast to Poel Island are to be confined to 
defensive fighter patrols and immediate support.
425
 
 
 
This order was issued by Second TAF to all groups within its domain. The order 
remained inclusive of operations up to, and including 2 May. The report made clear that 
any air engagement would be confined to either defensive or immediate ground support 
roles. More importantly it did not sanction any random attacks or missions that simply 
stumbled on to any enemy position.  
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By this stage of the conflict, British forces continued to press hard to bring about an end 
to the conflict. But in doing so clear guidance and communication became ad hoc and 
infrequent. This meant that up-to-date intelligence was not necessarily sourced prior to a 
military encounter. This led to a situation whereby a number of operational squadrons 
were airborne without the latest series of day orders. The impact of pressing hard to the 
Baltic coast meant that some communications went unanswered. Furthermore Second 
TAF HQ believed quite strongly that orders could, and were being intercepted by 
German intelligence systems. In response to this threat, orders were heavily encrypted 
and thus it took longer to decrypt and interpret the information.
426
 As aerial policy 
turned away from land-based targets, this was not simply because of a misguided fear 
that SS troops were fleeing to Norway, but because German ports were seen as a hive of 
activity. Up to, and including 2 May, aerial orders noted that operations were targeting 
anything which challenged the British advance. 
 
On the evening of 2 May, there was an important change of direction in an amendment 
issued that evening by the duty wing commander. This informed squadrons to cease 
attacks on trains and railway trucks.
427
 In attempting to understand the purpose of Allied 
aerial policy in the final week of the war, the strategic move away from land-based 
targets, as well as transportation system’s would suggest that Allied forces were making 
adequate preparations to run the postwar German economy. Once German forces 
surrendered, the big question was how would society still be able to function? The rail 
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infrastructure was paramount to the movement of Allied supplies, food supplies and 
much quicker than relying on road transport. In the course of 2 May and into 3 May day 
orders were amended twice.  
 
Photographic reconnaissance had indicated “large-scale enemy shipping movement 
away from Schleswig-Holstein ports’, though it was less precise as to the nature of this 
shipping”.428 The report set out the intention to “destroy enemy transportation on land 
and sea, and harass the enemy”.429 The initial orders were issued by Duty Wing 
Commander Christmas, but subsequently amended in line with intelligence. In this 
example, evidence suggested that Second TAFs’ ability to process intelligence in an 
efficient time frame was still possible. Furthermore the chain of information and its 
dissemination also remain clear. But by 3 May, this attention to detail and ability to 
distribute relevant information fails.  
 
The photographic aerial survey suggested that “it was apparent that a large-scale 
evacuation was being attempted”,430 Though Coningham noted that “the enemy 
appeared to be silently waiting for the end”.431 This change of tactical decision came not 
from Second TAF but from the Allied Naval Commander of the Expeditionary Force 
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(ANCXF).
432
 Although permission had been obtained for a large-scale attack, the report 
made two things clear. Firstly Red Cross vessels operating in the area were to not to be 
attacked and could be easily identified as the ships would be illuminated.
433
 More 
importantly only ships seen departing away from the ports should be attacked.
434
 Thus, 
this raises further doubt as to why stationary ships in Neustadt Bay were attacked on 3 
May. 
 
Day order 71 had made it clear that only vessels that were seen travelling away from a 
port or harbour should be seen as a potential target.
 435
 This order therefore almost 
guaranteed protection to those ships that were docked in the remaining German ports. 
Furthermore the order stated that clear should also be taken as Red Cross vessels were 
docked close by or in amongst German tonnage. The second day order (order72) 
removed this immunity from air attack for those vessels that were at harbour. The ships 
that were docked in Neustadt, including the Cap Arcona were therefore seen as a viable 
military target. Moreover the speed at which the order had been amended highlighted 
that Allied forces felt that German forces would attempt to flee to Norway. 
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British Attack, 3 May 1945 
 
British air operations reached a climax on 3 May as German forces in the West had all 
but surrendered.
436
 With the surrender of Hamburg, the long term policy of reaching the 
Baltic coast was almost complete. The immediate priority for the Allies was to decipher 
why German forces had gathered a significant number of ships in the Northern ports. 
Lange noted that on 2 May “British aerial reconnaissance in the late afternoon had seen 
two outgoing military convoys with at least six destroyers, some submarines, escort 
boats and large troop transports leaving Neustadt in Holstein”.437 In his analysis Lange 
suggests that the British attack was based on this piece of reconnaissance gathered the 
previous day. However the on-going military situation, combined with a breakdown of 
communication, meant that a judgment call was made based on this single piece of 
intelligence. In reconstructing key elements of the attack, this section will argue that 
instead of an isolated attack, the bombing of the Cap Arcona was part of a much wider, 
systematic attack on German shipping. 
 
In order to understand the subsequent attack on the Cap Arcona, it is necessary to 
reconstruct part of the events on the morning of 3 May. This will demonstrate that the 
processing of valuable intelligence was slow, and that aircrews were all too keen to 
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attack Nazi Germany one last time. As the conflict reached its penultimate climax, 
Coningham notes in this report that,  
during this week wintry weather seriously interfered with air operations. 
Showers of sleet and rain blowing from the North Sea kept No. 84 Group 
grounded for two days. No 83 Group, with its bases further inland, was more 
fortunate but operations were often restricted by poor visibility.
438
 
 
Coningham therefore notes that the weather only hindered a small number of squadron 
locations. The CIU and other squadrons attached to Second TAF were still able to 
operate throughout April and the early May. Furthermore, operations for 83 Group 
maintained a minimal presence in the skies over North-West Germany. But when the 
weather did final break on 3 May, air operations proceeded at a fast pace. The stage was 
set, and air intelligence records indicate that: 
no quarter was given or asked for in the air today – it would indeed have been 
difficult to arrange – and operations proceeded at full blast. Attacks on motor 
transport in the Schleswig area began soon after 0600 hours and continued all 
day, but in mid-morning all aircraft carrying bombs or R.P. were diverted to deal 
solely with the large concentrations of shipping making their way from Lübeck, 
Kiel and Schleswig in the general direction of Norway.
439
  
 
The intelligence summary notes clearly that air operations were to proceed unhindered 
against all sea-based transportation in the Schleswig area. With almost no resistance in 
the air, the skies over Germany provided the opportunity to continually attack ships 
harboured in North Germany. One short-term factor that did impact on air operations in 
May was the sudden down-grading of port surveys. Previously, photographic 
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reconnaissance had been used extensively to document and track ships moving between 
ports, or for the period they had been docked. By early May, this requirement had been 
significantly downgraded, and therefore the threat to shipping dramatically increased as 
intelligence was not as detailed. A reconnaissance brief indicated that, 
By May 2 or 3, 1945, apart from the need to keep track of German naval 
movements, there was very little requirement for information about traffic 
movements in the ports. Indeed, the acquisition of Intelligence about enemy 
merchant shipping was accomplished faster by oral reports from pilots who were 
then shuttling between their bases and the targets in the various harbours.
440
 
 
The impact of downgrading certain types of intelligence had serious implications for the 
vessels in Neustadt. However the use of oral reports via the pilots was not as reliable as 
it might have seemed. While the more experienced pilots such as Johnny Baldwin or 
Derek Stevenson might have had the knowledge to indicate what they believe would be 
the enemy’s intentions, the majority of pilots would report simply what they witnessed.  
 
On 1 May 83 Group undertook around 13 successful reconnaissance operations. The 
group reported that “the general trend of activity was defensive over roads and airfields 
with some attempt at offensive action against the Elbe bridges and bridgehead”.441 
There was no mention of any detailed information regarding the growing situation of 
Axis port movements or attempts by the Germans to flee to Norway. However the 
intelligence summaries provide a different picture: 
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On the water, the opinions of the various ships’ captains seemed divided 
between forcing on, as they did yesterday, on a Northerly course, and seeking 
the shelter provided by neutrality, shore-based batteries, and the limited range of 
the Group’s aircraft. Most of the serviceable shipping had already left Kiel, but 
seven destroyers were sighted at the mouth of the Elbe…and several U-boats in 
the canals that connect Schleswig with the sea.
442
 
 
The record indicates that German shipping was mainly headed on a northerly course. 
One possible destination could have been Norway, although the likelihood of navigating 
the Flensburg Chanel after heavy mining was almost impossible. 
 
The first squadron to begin the assault on shipping in Neustadt bay was No.263 
squadron under the command of Martin Rumbolds. Their instructions were to attack a 
large gathering of shipping in the Bay of Neustadt. Air records indicated that 
the weather is still poor but eight aircraft take off at 1135 hours to attack 
shipping in Lübeck Bay. The operation was abortive due to weather.
443
 
 
Their target was the recently converted hospital ship, the Deutschland. From their base 
in Ahlhorn, Rumbolds had spent part of the morning briefing his men. Schwarberg 
suggested in his account that 263 Squadron had “already received a confidential report 
that the Nazi leaders wanted to set off to Norway”.444 In fact there was no conclusive 
suggestion either way that these ships were or were not intending to flee to Norway and 
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therefore this remained nothing more than a rumour. Although the pilot’s viewpoint was 
rather obscured and limited, there still remains doubt as to why the pilots reported an 
observation that neither vessel had steam up nor therefore the vessels were not in a 
position to move. It later emerged that one pilot, Lawrence Stark 609 wing, reported to 
Command HQ that  
I attacked a small motor vessel sailing out of Lübeck that morning and then 
observed three large ships at anchor in the Bay. They did not have steam up, so 
as the war was ending and there was a shipping shortage, I suggested to 
intelligence that they should be left alone.
445
 
 
As the planes returned to refuel information was passed on to the squadron command. 
Prior to any future attack, pilots needed to be briefed on what could be expected during 
the operation. There appeared on this occasion to be little if any communication which 
had been passed to continually update the pilots who were undertaking operations. 
263 Squadron Take Off Landing 
      
Sqn Ldr M.T.Rumbold 11:35 12:55 
Flight Lieutenant 
E.A.Tennant 11:35 12:55 
F.O. M.S.M Hamilton 11:35 12:55 
      
F.O A Proctor 11:35 12:55 
F.O J.J. Morgan 11:35 12:55 
W.O. L Saunders 11:35 12:55 
W.O L. J. Miller 11:35 12:55 
      
W.O D. Coles 11:35 12:55 
Table Two: List of pilots from No.263 Squadron who underwent the first attack in 
Neustadt Bay 
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The first attack on the Deutschland took place between 1202 and 1208 hours. 
Intelligence considered the Deutschland a viable target and as weather conditions 
permitted operations to proceed, the pilots used rocket projectiles (R.P.) to form the 
basis of their attack.
446
 Owing to crucial ammunition shortages the Typhoons were only 
fitted with four R.P.s. Two out of the four rockets failed to explode and the crew of the 
ship were able to put these overboard, while the remaining two caused some damage 
internally.
447
 
 
A subsequent damage report stated that, 
the superstructure was also damaged by cannon fire. No leaking was caused by 
these four hits. The fires, which were extinguished with water and carbon 
dioxide, were confined to wooden panels, furnishing and other inflammable 
material in the accommodation decks.
448
 
 
As a direct result of the air strike, Captain Steincke began to implement measures to 
ensure the safe evacuation of the Deutschland. The few nurses and naval surgeons who 
were aboard abandoned ship.
449
 Prior to the attack an order had been received by 
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Steincke that his ship was in the process of being converted to a hospital ship.
450
 
Unfortunately shortages of basic equipment meant that there was no paint to illuminate 
the ship in the correct colours with only the funnels painted white and only one of these 
was marked with a Red Cross.
451
 From the cockpit the pilots view of these markings 
would not have been clear enough to prevent the attack. Furthermore the pressure of the 
over-riding military situation placed unnecessary pressure on these pilots. 
 
The second attack on shipping in Neustadt Bay was to be carried out by the fighter ace, 
Group Captain Jonny Baldwin who led 198 Squadron. Prior to take-off, 198 Squadron 
were briefed simply that there was a large gathering of ships in the bay of Neustadt. 
This information had been collated by a reconnaissance wing earlier that day. The lack 
of detail in the intelligence briefed out to the squadrons further suggests that the Allies 
were impeded by this urge to reach the Baltic coast. There is no mention or indication of 
what threat the ships in Neustadt posed to military operations, nor was there any sign 
that these ships had steam up. The squadron took off around 1400 hours, with around 
nine typhoons airborne and armed for the attack. At this time Captain Bertram was in 
his cabin attending to a conference with Gehrig and other officers. At around 1500 
hours the assault on the ships began. Five of the Typhoons began their assault on the 
Cap Arcona while the remaining four planes targeted the motor vessel Thielbek. Flying 
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in low, Baldwin unleashed his 60lb rockets and began fire his cannon into the structure 
of the ship. A prisoner on board the ship recalled that 
the storeroom rocked back and forth. Clearly, something on the ship had 
exploded. I struggled to my feet…hands grabbed at coats and arms. People lost 
their balance or got shoved, and fell back down…There was a second explosion, 
then a third right after it, somewhere above us…Everyone was screaming – 
prayers, curses; - the terror was beyond belief.
452
 
 
In the midst of the attack Bertram took cover in his cabin. Once the first wave of the 
attack had passed he made his way hastily to the top deck. The situation though was 
desperate. A survivor of the Cap Arcona Sam Pivnik recalled that 
people were running in all directions over the deck and thick grey-smoke was 
belching from the area below. Somebody shouted that we were sinking, and I 
spun round to scrabble in the open hatch and grab Peter’s hands. But they 
weren’t there…Peter had gone, carried away in the headlong panic below decks 
as men desperately looked for a way out.
453
 
 
As Bertram and his crew frantically tried to use the remainder of the fire-fighting 
equipment that was left intact, it soon became evident that their attempts were in vain. 
Owing to the damage caused by the rocket projectiles and cannon strafing, the majority 
of the equipment had been engulfed by fire. Bertram himself stated that “I tried to 
extinguish the fire with my crew but it was found that all pipes and hoses for the fire 
extinguishing apparatus were already destroyed, or out or broken”.454 The first rocket 
had struck between the funnels on A-Deck level, which resulted in the superstructure 
being penetrated. The rocket had subsequently burst in the accommodation area and 
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caught fire almost instantly.
455
 Jacobs remembers that “in minutes the entire upper third 
of the Cap Arcona was in flames…smoke spiralled up in a huge, twisted column, soon 
visible for miles”.456 
 
Shortly after 198 squadron had taken off from Plantlünne, No.193 Squadron under the 
command of Squadron Leader D.M. Taylor, left Ahlhorn under the same mission 
objectives. Airborne at 14.45 hours, they began their assault on the already damaged 
Cap Arcona and Thielbek. Pilot David Ince was flying with 193 Squadron during this 
attack. He recalled that 
we carried out dive-bombing attacks on each occasion and with varying success. 
But certainly we left, from the three shipping strikes, a total I think of three ships 
on fire, damaged or listing and obviously of no further use for [these] alleged 
German northbound convoys.
457
 
 
During the second attack Bertram with his crew tried frantically to release the few 
remaining life-boats into the Baltic. As a result of the damage sustained by the attacks, 
fire had spread to the few lifeboats and davits required to lower the boats. From the 
                                                          
455
 See various, TNA AIR 15/474: Survey of damaged shipping in North Germany and 
Denmark; GeNA: Dokumente Über den Untergang der Häftlings-flötte in der Lübecker Bucht 
am 3. Mai 1945 von Rudi Goguel, pp. 3-4. Also see for an opinion on the initial attack CAMN: 
“Rudi Goguel”, Untergang der Häftlings-flötte in der Lübecker Bucht, (Aus Horizont NR.19, 
(1974). He states that “An jenem 3. Mai warteten die Gefangenen stuendlich auf ihre Befreiung, 
als gegen 15 Uhr die Katatrophe über sie hereinbrach. Wer nicht im Bombenhagel der britischen 
Flugzeuge oder in den Flammen der brennenden Schiffe umkam, wurde ein Opfer der 
Bordwaffen”. 
456
 Jacobs and Poole, The 100-year Secret, p. 102. 
457
 IWM 8651/2/1: David Henry Gason Ince Sound recording Interview, p. 12; See also David 
Ince DFC, Brotherhood of the Skies: Wartime experiences of a Gunner Officer and Typhoon 
Pilot (Grub Street: London, 2010).  
224 
 
perspective of the crew and that of the prisoners trapped on board the ship, the situation 
was almost hopeless. Unlike the Deutschland, the Cap Arcona had remained painted her 
war-time naval grey and thus there was nothing to distinguish her as either a prison or 
hospital ship. More importantly the vessel did even resemble its former grand passenger 
ship view. This meant that from a pilots view in the cockpit, the Cap Arcona was a 
legitimate military target. Bertram, along with a few members of his crew, tried 
tirelessly to signal the Allied planes. Survivor reports suggest that the captain sent a 
man to the stern of the ship to hoist a white flag, while Bertram took his own bed sheet 
and hoisted this on the signal mast.
458
 This, however, was a vain attempt to halt the 
attack. 
 
David Ince has suggested that the attacks carried out on 3 May “were not typical of 
Second TAF leadership”.459  Generally Second TAF leadership would only not over-
stretch resources. Many groups were operating at maximum distance at a time when fuel 
was in short supply.
460
 His opinion provides a rather entrenched view of the actions of 
Second TAF. If the attack was not typical, this suggests that normal procedures had 
been side-lined in favour of attacking these ships. With this in mind it highlights clearly 
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the impact of the short-term factors that impacted British aerial policy in the final days 
of the conflict. A number of possible motives for this approach were that these ships 
were fleeing to Norway, or the chronic shortage of correct ammunition. This suggests 
that the Allies were determined to bring Germany into complete submission. This 
decision was made at the cost of many innocent lives. Furthermore Ince suggests that 
even before 3 May, with the war nearly won, Command HQ began to look beyond the 
battlefield to all matters Russian.
461
  
 
Throughout the British attack many prisoners attempted to flee the burning wreckage. 
Jackson noted that, 
most of the people on the Cap Arcona were burned or drowned. I saw the deck 
black with people who did not jump, and I saw also some people swimming. 
There was naturally no question of lowering the boats as the ship was blazing in 
such a way.
462
 
 
Those who managed to break free from the lower decks scrambled through the burning 
decks to reach the top deck, where many took the chance to go over-board. The British 
attack however did not end there. At this juncture, the Cap Arcona was listing after two 
attacks. The Thielbek which was situated around 700 metres away, when it too attacked 
by the Typhoons of 198 Squadron. Thielbek was struck just below the water line by the 
60lb R.Ps attached to the wings of the Typhoons. Unable to save or delay the sinking of 
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the ship, Captain Jacobsen gave the order to abandon ship.
463
 As later established by the 
British, the Thielbek sunk as a result of underwater hull damage, resulting in a complete 
submergence of the ship in around forty-five minutes.
464
  
 
While the view from the cockpit was rather limited, there were a number of occasions 
where pilots noted that neither vessel had steam up or was in a position to move. This 
testimony shows that the pilots were able to make critical observations during their 
attack over Neustadt. But while the information was made available to the intelligence 
section of Command HQ, attacks over Neustadt continued. In the Sunday Telegraph it 
emerged that one pilot, Lawrence Stark, 609 wing, reported to Command HQ that  
I attacked a small motor vessel sailing out of Lübeck that morning and then 
observed three large ships at anchor in the Bay. They did not have steam up, so 
as the war was ending and there was a shipping shortage, I suggested to 
Intelligence that they should be left alone.
465
 
 
As the planes returned to refuel, information was passed on to the squadron command. 
There appeared on this occasion to be little, if any, communication passing between the 
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pilots. During the attack, there remains some debate as to whether the vessels hoisted a 
form of white flag.
466
  
 
The Squadron flew over the bay at around 10,000 feet on a mission to form a second 
wave of attacks on the Deutschland. As the first planes went in for the attack, the 
rockets plunged through the foredeck, resulting in an explosion that punctured the hull 
on the waterline.
467
 Steincke and the remaining crew began using the water pumps in a 
vain attempt to keep the ship afloat but as it was under attack, this was impossible. As 
No.263 squadron concluded their attack, No.197 emerged from the skies and continued 
the bombardment. This time, they were heavily armed with bombs. The summary for 
197 Squadron states: 
Shipping strikes in Lübeck Bay. All the bombs were dropped on a motor vessel 
of 15/20 000 tons at 0.0208. The ship was already burning as a result of attacks 
by 263 Squadron and we scored two direct hits. Now left burning in five place 
and alter seen capsized and burning.
468
 
 
As the strikes continued, the frantic situation in the Baltic waters became a battleground 
for survival. Pivnik recalled: 
as I reached it my frozen hands grabbed someone else’s and another half-dead 
prisoner got there just as I did. We probably both had the same idea, to forget all 
thoughts of humanity and kick the other bastard away. Other men in the water 
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around us were doing just that, fighting and screaming at each other in a 
desperate quest for survival.
469
 
 
Any sort of mutual moral support among the prisoners had vanished. The attacks from 
the planes above continued for some time longer, the main targets were the already 
burning ships. In the water some fishing boats were trying to pick up German guards 
and merchant crew. However these boats refused to take in survivors. In fact “now and 
again there were bursts of pistol and machine-gun fire as those in the boats scattered 
prisoners trying to board them”.470 The brutality of their captors continued even until 
the last. 
 
The final attack took place around 1800 hours by 193 and 197 Squadrons. By this stage 
the Cap Arcona, Thielbek (sunk) and Deutschland were already past saving, many of 
the boats that were in fact launched to rescue German naval and SS personnel were able 
to rescue around 16 surviving members of a crew of around 80 from the Cap Arcona. 
Meanwhile, during the attack British ground forces were advancing steadily on 
Neustadt. No. 6 Commando, along with 11 Armoured Division, had reached the bank of 
the town from which they could clearly see the drama in the bay unfolding. The Naval 
Liaison Officer to 8 Corps, who was accompanying these troops, arrived at the naval 
barracks at Neustadt at 1600 hours and issued an order that no craft of any sort was to 
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leave the harbour.
471
 From the position now held by the tanks, they were able to shoot 
across the naval marine barracks into the port/ harbour of Neustadt. From their vantage 
point, they could see the ship Athen was docked in the naval port. It was believed, quite 
wrongly, that the prisoners themselves may have set fire to the ship. As the marine 
barracks was surrounded by light flak positions, the position of the Athen was at the 
heart of the fighting zone. As British tanks looked to remove any form of defence, 
particularly in the area around the barracks, at some stage the Athen was struck by what 
was believed to be a 17-pounder shell.
472
 During the attack however, the crew and SS 
guards had vanished, leaving their prisoners locked below deck. As a result of the 
attack, the prisoners forced their way through the hatches and clambered for freedom.
473
 
Although there was no evidence of an aerial attack, the superstructure had been 
completely gutted by fire.
474
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Around 1800 hours, long after the attack on the ships had finished, there was a furious 
explosion on the Cap Arcona. The survey report conducted by the dive-team during 
their post-war examination of the vessel claims that “it was believed that the 100 tons of 
fuel oil which was aboard might have exploded and caused her to capsize”.475 The most 
probable cause for the Cap Arcona to capsize appears to have been fuel combustion, 
although the dive-team was unable to state this with absolute certainty. The ship 
subsequently began to keel to her portside, where the ship laid partly submerged and 
burning out. As for those few prisoners still struggling in the icy waters, the British did 
not rescind the command to send vessels out from the barracks until 1800 hours. It was 
during the evening that British investigators state they were first made aware that 
prisoners were on the ships. However, there were numerous examples prior to the attack 
whereby British forces and intelligence agencies had been alerted to the possibility, but 
chose to launch an attack instead.
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While interviews with the pilots who attacked the Cap Arcona are not available,
477
 there 
are others who flew the same mission and attacked the Deutschland who re-call the 
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incidents. For instance Derek Stevenson who flew with 184 squadron later suggested 
that “the following three days were to prove to be the most extraordinary in the history 
of No 184 squadron, no less than 130 sorties being flown in a period of just over 60 
hours”.478 Although 184 squadron were not directly responsible for attacking the Cap 
Arcona they were part of the overall attack on Neustadt Bay. From their operational 
statistics alone it would appear that these ships were still considered a potential military 
threat, although none of the vessels showed signs of movement. As a matter of policy, 
the area of attack and surrounding coastal areas were to be turned into an inferno of 
burning ships, and wreckage of military units. Derek Stevenson wrote some years later 
that he had been aware of a report of some large ships in the Bay of Neustadt.
479
 He 
claimed that the intelligence officer stated that “it’s a bit unusual. We’ve just had a 
report of some large ships in Lübeck bay … they’re supposed to be carrying SS… to 
fight on in Norway”.480 Stevenson further recalled his conversation with the intelligence 
officer of 184, who said: “I’m sorry, chaps. I really don’t have any more information. 
The ships are there, that’s all we know”.481  Similarly flight Lieutenant David Ince who 
flew with 193 squadron, 146 wings later wrote after the war that “the shipping strikes 
went ahead as a result of delays in transmitting the latest intelligence to Air 
headquarters and the Nazis did nothing to discourage them”.482 It is important to look at 
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these two pilots and their memories for one simple reason. They were involved in the 
briefing prior to the take-off and involved in the subsequent attacks on the ships in 
Neustadt Bay. Therefore although they were not directly engaged in attacking the Cap 
Arcona, they were engaged in aerial duties over Neustadt. Their testimonies provide 
another dimension in an attempt to piece together the frantic days of the Second World 
War.  
 
Air records for May demonstrate a clear understanding that shipping was an important 
agenda. Table Three demonstrates that from 2-4 May some 19 ships were completely 
destroyed and 171 were damaged. When this figure is set against the number of sorties 
flown, it is a reasonable strike rate. Barges were also listed in the final report. 
More interestingly though is the figure for the loss of pilots. For 3 May out of 895 
sorties flown, 83 Group intelligence reported that only 7 pilots were lost. This 
demonstrates that the level of resistance within the bay and the surrounding areas was 
almost non-existent. Not only was shipping a target, but in the morning of 3 May, other 
targets such as rail cuts, MET’s and buildings also bore a percentage of the Allied 
attack. While the level of resistance remained low, if non-existent at times, this did not 
prompt Allied forces to put a halt to their plans or operations. Furthermore, what this 
table evidently demonstrates is a firm commitment from 83
 
Group to continually fuel 
and re-load these planes to continue their air attack on a given target. The use of some 
5000 rocket projectiles is an impressive number, as each Typhoon could only amass 
around four RP’s per flight. As David Ince later wrote “The RP-equipped Typhoons 
were reduced from carrying eight rockets to four plus two forty-five gallon drop 
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tanks”.483  This meant that there were in fact no less than 480 flights were made by the 
Hawker Typhoon on 3 May. 
 
Date Sorties Bombs 500lb R.E. 60lb Ships Barges Losses 
        Destroyed Damaged Destroyed Damaged A/C Pilots 
1 576 48 824 
  
    4 4 
2 815 180 1391 1 8     4 4 
3 895 193 1920 12 97 1 4 9 7 
4 546 202 903 6 66 4 2 2 1 
5 50 
 
  
  
        
                    
Total: 2882 623 5038 19 171 5 6 19 16 
Table Three: Abbreviated table of Air targets for the first days of May 1945, 83 Group 
Intelligence. 
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However the statistics provided by Second TAF in Sir Arthur Coningham’s notes give 
an entirely more positive picture. Table four suggests that Second TAF on 3
 
May alone 
destroyed or damaged some 160 cargo ships of various sizes. 
 
Cargo Ships (All 
Sizes) 160 
U-Boats 9 
E/R Boats 4 
Smaller Craft 8 
Table Four: A summary of damaged vessels provided by Second TAF for  
3 May 1945. 
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From the tables it is evident that the number of attacks directed towards shipping rose 
drastically in the first days of May. These suggest that with the remaining occupied 
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territory for German forces rapidly dwindling, the target changed from land, to the 
remaining Baltic ports. 
 
Conclusion 
History remembers the sinking of the Cap Arcona as a tragic event and British mis-
adventure. The incident that took place on 3 May 1945 was the culmination of a series 
of events that reached a crescendo on that afternoon. The interweaving of British and 
German narratives demonstrates the impact of this wider notion of chaos on both 
elements military forces. Although credible intelligence had existed in various forms 
prior to the launch of an attack, the wider military situation led to British forces pressing 
ahead before this information had been processed.  Furthermore the impact of chaos on 
British strategy becomes apparent.  
 
During the build-up to the attack on the Cap Arcona it is clear that the leadership of 
Second TAF felt strongly that an evacuation to Norway by German forces was likely. 
This policy was based upon a rumour that troops would flee to Norway. British forces 
never considered the possibility that German ships were simply trying to return to a 
home port before the final capitulation. This sudden change in targets, from land-based 
to shipping, highlights that the belief of this threat was significant. However, the 
number of reconnaissance missions, coupled with the close monitoring of shipping by 
Allied CIU, clearly documented that there was no intention of an evacuation to Norway. 
What this further highlighted was an inherent breakdown of communication between 
different departments, as well as a failure to disseminate this information in a timely 
manner.  
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German forces were in a desperate and unmanageable situation, while British pilots 
were also hindered by the impact of chaos on communication. Furthermore, British 
forces exploited the lack of resistance and pressed hard towards the Baltic coast. The 
subsequent attack on the Cap Arcona shows a number of failings in British aerial 
intelligence. The continued mis-communication of information to the pilots, coupled 
with ammunition shortages shows clearly that the attack on the 3 May was hindered by 
a breakdown of communication. In addition, a change in ammunition type for the 
Typhoons of Second TAF demonstrates that British aerial strategy was determined to 
destroy shipping at all costs. 
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Conclusion 
The tragic sinking of the Cap Arcona on 3 May was arguably the by-product of a series 
of broader circumstances that culminated in the final days of the Second World War. By 
the end of April 1945 the overall military situation was one of a chaotic environment for 
both German and Allied forces. The expansion of Allied air operations in the district of 
Schleswig-Holstein throughout April increased exponentially as British forces 
continued to press hard to the Baltic coast. The situation was transformed, however, by 
pockets of fierce resistance in the surrounding areas of Hamburg. Thereafter, 
communication between Allied departments began to fail as the broader military policy 
became the overriding objective. This led to a situation whereby many elements of 
Britain’s military forces entered into combat without up-to-date intelligence or clear 
orders. 
 
The theme of chaos remains an important historical tool which we can use to better 
understand the wider implications of the final months of the war that led to the tragedy 
in Neustadt. This concept, whereby the social stability of everyday society breaks down, 
enables us to understand the set of unique circumstances that evolved in 1945. One such 
area was the way Allied forces conducted their military strategy in the final weeks of 
the war. The overarching demand for British forces to reach the Baltic coast led to a 
situation where the normal protocols were side-lined for the broader strategic policy. 
British military policy became heavily guided and influenced by the wider political 
position, namely a growing distrust of Stalin. By February 1945 British military strategy 
was no longer effective. The resurgence of the Soviet advance from the East meant that 
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the West’s strategy of targeting Berlin was no longer viable. But this meant that the 
West had no secondary military objective. The conclusions of Yalta further highlight a 
sudden change of direction. American forces were thus diverted to technological 
installations in the South, while British and Canadian forces pressed north to the Baltic 
coast. This change of strategy was a significant turning point. British forces pressed 
hard throughout March and into April towards Lübeck with the aim of halting the 
Soviet advance into Denmark. As policy was focused on reaching the Baltic coast, 
communication and the processing of intelligence were severely hindered. Although not 
directly chaotic, the broader military strategy had an impact on the breakdown of 
communication. One important aspect was the relationship between Britain and neutral 
Red Cross agencies. As these humanitarian agencies became more active within conflict 
zone in the final weeks of the war, their information and working relationship with the 
advancing Allied forces was paramount to the safety of their operations. As we have 
seen, the British were handed three important opportunities to prevent the attack on the 
Cap Arcona by the SRC and ICRC. Furthermore the lack of importance placed on this 
information by the different bodies within the British armed forces demonstrated clearly 
that the wider military policy outweighed the normal protocols for processing 
intelligence in a timely manner. 
 
As a historical concept ‘chaos’ demonstrates the significant implications of the overall 
military policy on strategic operations in the closing months of the war. Britain was 
arguably side-lined at Yalta, as well as Berlin no longer a viable target. The realisation 
of a Soviet threat became all too apparent. In turn the overriding need to reach the Baltic 
coast and halt a Soviet advance West led to panic within the senior leadership. The 
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emergence of early Cold War tensions and an ‘operational blindness’ that overtook 
many strategic policies, emphasises that the final months of the war were chaotic for 
Allied commanders. While there is evidence that focused on friendly-fire incidents in 
this final period, further research on incidents and figures throughout the war would be 
beneficial to determine the full impact policy had on military operations. This would 
enable us to potentially evaluate not only the impact of this political change on military 
strategy, but also explore issues of communication and its dissemination during 
operations. 
 
The reconstruction of British aerial policy in the final weeks of the Second World War 
provides an insight into the overall mind set of British commanders. In terms of the 
tragic event that happened on 3 May, this broader approach to aerial strategy clearly 
shows that the policies and procedures that had guided air policy became hampered in 
the closing stages. Much of the aerial strategy throughout April 1945 was directed as 
armed reconnaissance, and this in turn gave a level of freedom to the pilots engaged in 
this campaign. This type of roaming mission was not always against a specified target, 
but part of a wider project to attack a host of German military installations and armed 
divisions. However intelligence and its timely dissemination to the frontline squadrons 
were not always present. In turn this led to a rise in the number of friendly-fire 
incidents. This situation was further exacerbated, particularly on 3 May, when rumours 
continued to circulate that the ships in Neustadt were fleeing to Norway. The constant 
changing of operational day orders, combined with a lack of crucial intelligence led to 
the pilots engaging in the attack on the Cap Arcona resulting in the death of some 8,000 
prisoners.  
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In the final months of the conflict the Nazi concentration system evacuated prisoners 
away from the immediate fighting front. The process, until February 1945, was to retain 
a much needed labour reserve in a desperate hope to increase war production. A large 
number of camp prisoners were forcibly marched towards other camps of operation to 
continue work in key industries. But after February 1945 the area available to continue 
this process of evacuation was simply not available. Increased aerial attacks, entwined 
with military defeats on both fronts left the Reich centre with a difficult choice. 
Surrender the prisoners or continue, in a vain hope, to continue their imprisonment. 
From March 1945 as the remaining concentration camps were under threat of being 
liberated, subsequent death marches departed camps in a vain attempt to avoid the 
advancing Allied forces. However, during these marches countless prisoners were killed 
needlessly as local, junior commanders were without contact with their superiors. 
Without regular contact with senior officers, often those supervising the marches took 
matters in their own hands. This scenario became common-place in final months of the 
conflict with the exception of the camp at Neuengamme. 
 
As evacuation orders were passed through the Reich centre, the interpretation of these 
orders for the camp at Neuengamme became the responsibility of Bassewitz-Behr and 
Gauleiter Kaufmann. The planning process to evacuate the camp at Neuengamme was 
markedly different from other similar sized camps in the final evacuation period. As 
local Gauleiter’s and SS officials panicked, many of the remaining camps were 
evacuated during a last-ditched attempt to avoid Allied troops. But this scenario further 
led to chaotic scenes, not least for those forced along the march. Communication was 
paramount, and in the closing stages of the war, camp commandants, as well as junior 
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officials had no clear idea of the destination of each march column. But the camp at 
Neuengamme was markedly different to those remaining camps in April 1945. While 
Bergen-Belsen was liberated with significant numbers of prisoners still within the 
compound on 15 April, the civilian and SS administration ensured, at all costs, the 
prisoners were evacuated in a timely response to Lübeck bay. Furthermore, the 
destination, method and location of the transports was clear and orderly. This marked a 
noticeable contrast to other transports in this period. Neuengamme was therefore 
different for a number of reasons. The first was a series of personal motives. Kaufmann 
had increasing business interests with local industrialists within Hamburg and his 
association with slave labour was arguably his motive for ensuring the camp was 
evacuated. The second was the overriding military situation. As British forces pressed 
towards Hamburg, the territory obtainable to evacuate the prisoners of Neuengamme 
was simply available. Therefore through his civilian administrative positions Kaufmann 
was the driving force behind the evacuation and continued detention of prisoners on the 
Cap Arcona. 
 
The method used to analyse the evacuation process from Neuengamme highlights that 
our current understanding of the final tri-model phase needs review. While the 
consensus amongst historians suggests that in the final months of the war the 
evacuations had no other purpose than the killing of innocent victims, Neuengamme 
was markedly different. To appreciate the intricate and complex breakdown of the Nazi 
camp system, local studies of individual camp closures are required. In analysing in 
greater detail the method used for each camp closure, as well as looking more locally at 
the political bureaucracy of each camp would yield promising and exciting results. 
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The subsequent use and implementation of the Cap Arcona to continue the detention of 
camp prisoners was solely driven by personal motives. Throughout the war the close 
business connection between Neuengamme camp and industrial sites in Hamburg had 
grown in strength. The local Gauleiter of Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann had been pivotal in 
developing Neuengamme, as well as utilising a vast supply of slave labour for local 
industry. As a result this close business connection between the civilian administration 
in Hamburg and local industry had allowed industry to thrive throughout the war. But as 
Allied forces pressed towards Hamburg in March 1945, local business leaders placed 
increasing pressure on Gauleiter Kaufmann to disassociate Hamburg businesses from 
the camp at Neuengamme. As pressure continued to mount on Gauleiter Kaufmann, the 
need to find a workable solution to the evacuation issue was imperative. For local 
businesses, the need to remove any association with slave labour and its use within 
wartime industry was crucial. Many industrialists feared reprisals and lengthy 
questioning should Allied forces find evidence of their use and association with slave 
labour. Thereafter the Cap Arcona and other ships was a logical choice by the Hamburg 
Gauleiter to relieve the pressure he faced.  
 
By the end of April the number of prisoners arriving at Lübeck reached dangerous 
levels. With civilian refugees, as well as Nazi officials and troops arriving in Neustadt 
to avoid the Soviet forces, the Baltic coast was heavily congested. The lack of further 
planning by the civilian administration suggests that once the prisoners had departed 
Neuengamme, they were no longer concerned. The loading and temporary use of the 
Cap Arcona provides us with a number of valid points. With the SS still largely in 
command of the loading of the prisoners, the continuation of the SS-camp hierarchy 
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demonstrates that they wished to retain some form of social control and order. Therefore 
the placement and purpose of the Cap Arcona can be seen as a physical extension of the 
camp structure. Furthermore the use of the Cap Arcona clearly demonstrated that any 
long-term planning by either the SS or the civilian administration in Hamburg was non-
existent. Gauleiter Kaufmann had assisted and guided the evacuation of Neuengamme 
camp largely for a number of personal motives. Close business links coupled with 
increasing pressure to save Hamburg from a repeat of the firestorm raids of February 
1943 drove the Gauleiter to ensure the city was free was any slave labour.  
 
The final months of the war were often frantic and fast-paced. This evolved into a 
situation whereby many military elements were affected by chaos. The term ‘chaos’ has 
been applied throughout to define an over-riding situation whereby the broader political 
strategy for both British and German forces clouded local judgement and policy-
making. The local civilian administration in Hamburg was arguably fearful that 
evidence of their association with slave labour would be found. This drove the 
evacuation process at a time when the feasibility of such a task was almost impossible. 
But what we learn is that while the Reich centre is faltering, the local administration 
appears to find stability within this chaos and organise the evacuation of Neuengamme 
camp. There is still much to understand about the role of Gauleiter Kaufmann and his 
governance of Hamburg. As arguably one of the most powerful Gauleiter’s, our 
knowledge and appreciation of his political strength and loyalty to Hamburg warrant 
further investigation. Although Bajohr suggests the Gauleiter was a ruthless 
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businessman,
486
 he remained a staunch Nazi and many of his business associations and 
political positions could be explored further. 
 
The events that led to the tragic sinking of the Cap Arcona on 3 May and the tragic loss 
of life merits further study. Within Major Till’s closing statement he acknowledged that 
his report into the sinking of the Cap Arcona had been rushed in favour of other alleged 
war crimes.
487
 The lack of investigation and acknowledgement in the immediate 
postwar gave rise to a significant number of conspiracy theories. But the Cap Arcona 
sinking is much more than a singular tragic event. Its sinking demonstrates the 
importance and impact of Britain’s wider military strategy in the closing months of the 
war. In rushing towards the Baltic coast, evidence clearly suggests that the normal 
protocols and procedures for any military engagement were side-lined. On the other 
hand, in viewing the transfer process onto the Cap Arcona in this broader context, our 
understanding of the intricate debate regarding the purpose of utilising the Cap Arcona 
shows the importance of local policy making. Moreover, personal motives between the 
local Gauleiter and business industrialists were arguably the driving force behind 
ensuring the camp at Neuengamme was completely evacuated. The broader theme of 
chaos not only allows us to expand our knowledge on British military strategy, but also 
enhances our knowledge on the debate surrounding the term death marches, and the 
final period of camp evacuations. 
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Previously Published Work 
 
 
Conference paper submitted for publication in the University of Southampton’s 
Postgraduate Journal Emergence. The paper contains idea’s that were subsequently 
developed in Chapter’s Four and Five. 
 
See Daniel Long, “A Controversial History? An Analysis of British Attitudes and 
Responsibility in the Bombing of the Cap Arcona, 3 May 1945”, Emergence vol.7 (2015), pp. 
28-37. 
 
Introduction 
The history of the sinking of the Cap Arcona is a fascinating but relatively unknown 
topic in Third Reich and British history. The relationship between the British pilots and 
the sinking of the Arcona is a subject which has had much speculation, but no real 
academic analysis of existing archival material has successfully undertaken. The 
bombing and subsequent sinking of the Cap Arcona on 3 May 1945 remains a topic 
which has evaded a detailed scholarly analysis of existing archival research.  Laden with 
over five thousand prisoners from Neuengamme Camp - who had been evacuated to the 
coast as no “suitable” alternative, could be found - were subsequently attacked by RAF 
Typhoons. RAF involvement in the sinking of the Cap Arcona is portrayed in a 
distorted light, with some archival sources suggesting that British forces were aware, 
prior to take off, of the situation that had developed in Neustadt Bay. I present a new 
approach in an attempt to better understand the issue of British responsibility in the 
sinking of the Cap Arcona. This article will explore the wider issue of why British 
forces became desperate to reach the Baltic coast and in turn argue that this desperation 
side-lined the normal protocols for examining intelligence. Furthermore, the issue of 
prior intelligence will be explored further in a hope to determine whether British forces 
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knew of the situation in Neustadt prior to an aerial assault on 3 May.
 488
 The British 
actions need to be fully investigated in order to develop a clearer understanding as to the 
overall tragedy.  
 
Decision-Process 
As the war raged on it became apparent to some groups of Germans that by January 
1945 the Nazis had effectively lost the war.
489
 For the British, along with their 
American counterparts a major topic of agenda was how best to manage and divide 
captured territory. In a secret telegram from Winston Churchill to his then Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs Sir Anthony Eden, Churchill wrote “it is thought most 
important that Montgomery should take Lübeck as soon as possible, and he has an 
additional American Army Corps to strengthen his movements if he requires it”.490 
Churchill stressed the importance for the Western Allies to reach the Baltic coast with 
full haste. Reasons for this can be seen in two important stages. Firstly sovereignty of 
Denmark and secondly to attempt to halt the further advance West of Soviet forces. 
Within the telegram, Churchill expressed that “our arrival at Lübeck before our Russian 
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friends from Stettin would save a lot of argument later on”.491 The importance of 
Denmark was clear to the British. As a country to be released from its occupants the 
Danish sovereignty could be restored and an attempt to return the country to its pre-war 
governance could be achieved. Under a Soviet occupation, it was likely the regime 
would inflict greater misery on a country already suffering from wartime occupation. 
Furthermore with the capture of a Baltic port Allied forces would be a step closer to 
organising a sea-routed supply line. Strategically Lübeck provided an encirclement of 
the North West and allowed Allied forces to push on into Hamburg and further East. 
This meant a great deal of thought and resources were given to capture Lübeck. With 
Allied advances causing panic in Nazi movements along the Northern coast, it became 
increasingly difficult to guarantee the safe passage of convoys from Germany to neutral 
countries. Allied forces were deeply concerned of a possible escape route to Norway. 
This myth that SS and Wehrmacht troops were fleeing to Norway seems highly unlikely 
at a time when panic and confusion had outweighed any form of logical strategy. 
492
 For 
instance a British Pilot David Ince later wrote “everything pointed to a final Nazi retreat 
into a Northern Redoubt, fortress Norway, using all the shipping available”.493 However 
it seemed highly unlikely, and as many AIR records in the National Archives suggest, in 
the final months, the German Luftwaffe in particular had abandoned airfields with 
planes intact.
494
 They had been unable to form any such defence largely due to the lack 
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of fuel. Sir Arthur Coningham notes that “the panic and destruction which was caused 
to the enemy turned the retreat into a rout”,495thus arguing that logic and organisation 
was no longer present amongst the German ranks. 
 
Large gatherings of shipping in key German northern ports regularly featured in Air 
reconnaissance news. For instance “during April, Bomber Command attacked Kiel 
several times capsizing the Admiral Scheer and damaging the Emden by near 
misses”.496 Shipping became increasingly an important topic of agenda for chiefs of 
staff. Continuous anti-shipping and anti-submarine patrols were being flown in spite of 
adverse weather.
497
 Logic to utilise an air strike, rather than a sea-borne assault was 
clear. The area, largely across from the Fehmarn Island towards the Danish peninsula 
was heavily mined. This presented a problem for Allied forces and therefore directed 
towards an airborne assault as a quicker and less expensive form of attack. More 
importantly ground forces at present were encountering pockets of fierce resistance, and 
their assault to the coast was proving difficult. As highlighted in a weekly resume few 
mines had been swept and this meant that many shipping supply routes remained 
treacherous and too dangerous to risk valuable destroyers.
498
 A table (figure 1) is a 
review of Bomber Command in 1945. From this table, although a total of 11,140 
tonnages of bombs were used on naval targets in the final five months, this actually only 
represents a mere 6.1 percent of the overall tonnage dropped.  
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Figure One: Review of Bomber Command Targets for 1945.
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In comparison the records for 2 TAF indicate a different depiction of the events in the 
final months. During April 1945 4 ships were destroyed with 61 damaged, along with 
12 barges destroyed and 149 damaged.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Two: 2TAF targets for April 1945.
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499
 See table in Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against 
Germany 1939-1945, vol 3 (Naval & Military Press: Uckfield, 2006), p. 198. 
Category January February March April May Total Percentage 
  
       Cities 11931 21888 30278 2322 63 66482 36.6% 
Troops and Defences 2072 3756 8042 12056 155 26081 14.4% 
Transportation 8459 5505 6229 7909 - 28102 15.4% 
Naval Targets 129 561 3924 6526 - 11140 6.1% 
Oil 9028 14109 18936 5437 - 47510 26.2% 
G.A.F - - 5 596 36 637 0.4% 
Specific Industries  1221 - 11 4 - 1236 0.7% 
Miscellaneous 83 70 212 104 83 552 0.2% 
  
       Totals 32923 45889 67637 34954 337 181740 
 
Type Destroyed Damaged 
Enemy Aircraft in the Air 199 80 
Enemy Aircraft on the Ground 97 210 
Motor Transport vehicles 1618 6387 
Armoured fighting vehicles 22 63 
Locomotives 119 900 
Goods Trucks 657 2934 
Ships 4 61 
Barges 12 149 
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In actual fact, ground installations, rather than naval vessels became the main target. 
When we look at the records for May there is a drastic change of direction. During the 
first few days alone some 160 Cargo ships, 9 U-Boats, 4 E/R Boats and 8 smaller craft 
were either damaged or destroyed.
501
 This dramatic increase suggests that the Western 
Allies did in fact fear an evacuation from the Northern ports, which results in largely 
sporadic shipping strikes. In fact no less than 130 sorties were flown in a period of just 
over 60 hours by 184 squadron alone.
502
 These figures present a solid foundation that 
Allied command were keen to eliminate any possible escape route to the North. The 
need to continually fuel and load planes to continue these shipping strikes highlight a 
firm commitment by RAF HQ. Combined with a fear of retreat across the Baltic and the 
only way to really attack Nazi forces over long ranges, air attack was used in a hope to 
bring the war to a swift and decisive end. There is limited, if any, credible intelligence 
to suggest that the Nazis final plan was to evacuate to Norway, and therefore this means 
that the British and USAAF became careless in planning and co-ordinating their 
strategic attacks. The use of photo reconnaissance had always played a useful role in 
gaining intelligence as to troop and ship movements. But as the theatre of war came to a 
final chaotic end, the evidence suggests that the RAF became increasingly reckless and 
failed to ascertain the proper intelligence required before take-off.  
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Prior Information 
Amongst academics and amateurs alike there has always been a shroud of uncertainty in 
the history of the Cap Arcona of whether the British had any prior information 
regarding the prisoners being present on the ship. Major Till was a civilian solicitor who 
joined Number two war crimes investigation team. He was tasked with investigating the 
disaster at Neustadt bay. Quoted in nearly every detailed account on the Cap Arcona, 
Major Till noted that: 
 
The intelligence officer with 83
rd
 Group RAF has admitted on two occasions – 
first to Lt. H.F. Ansell of this team and on a second occasion to the investigating 
officer when he was accompanied by Lt. H.F. Ansell – that a message was 
received on 2
nd
 May 1945 that these ships were loaded with KZ prisoners but 
that, although there was ample time to warn the pilots of the planes who attacked 
those ships on the following day, by some oversight the message was never 
passed on.
503
  
 
What remains is why this information, as crucial as it was, did not get passed on to the 
pilots concerned. Also why did RAF intelligence not seek confirmation of the situation? 
Besides which why does Major Till fail to name the intelligence officer? While we can 
speculate about the identity of this officer, what is far more intriguing is that Till notes 
that this confession was documented. He suggested that “from the statement 
volunteered by the RAF intelligence officer”,504that at some point this statement existed 
in paper form. I have scoured archives in the UK and abroad and am certain that if it did 
exist it has since been removed from public consultation. Further as a section of indexes 
are listed within his report, no.72 is entitled Reports by RAF, and like the statement, are 
also not present in the archives. This would naturally suggest that there was information 
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contained in these reports which the British HQ did not wish to be made public. There 
have over the years been several FOI requests which have yielded little or no results on 
this aspect. However all is not lost. There are other pieces of evidence which can be 
collated to form an answer. 
 
The Swiss delegate in Lübeck, Paul de Blonay was interviewed shortly after the end of 
the war. In his deposition he claimed that: 
 
In April 1945 I was at the harbour of Lübeck seeing about some shipments of 
Red Cross Parcels and I noticed a ship ss.Thielbeck at the place where I was 
accustomed to unload Red Cross petrol supplies. Whilst I was walking past this 
ship, a box of matches dropped beside me. I could not find who had thrown it. 
This box contained a letter…telling me about the state of some deportees – 
about 7,000 – in the three ships ss. Thielbeck, ss. Athen and ss. Cap Arcona.505 
 
With this information in the hands of a neutral spectator, de Blonay documents that on 
the 2 May he passed this information to the Brigadier who captured Lübeck – Major 
General “Pip” Roberts 11th Armoured division – who is known to have communicated 
this message on. However, we are not aware of who this was directly communicated to 
or which department. What is also of interest is what happens to de Blonay after he 
passed this message on. It seems by all accounts that he merely continued his ICRC 
duties in Lübeck rather than follow through on the information he had been presented. 
 
Derek Stevenson who flew with 184 squadron later suggested that “the following three 
days were to prove to be the most extraordinary in the history of No 184 squadron, no 
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less than 130 sorties being flown in a period of just over 60 hours”.506 Furthermore the 
area of attack and surrounding coastal areas were to be turned into an inferno of burning 
ships, and wreckage of military units. While reports suggest that there was a large 
gathering of ships in the bays, the image remained unclear as to really who or what the 
ships were in fact doing. Stevenson wrote some years later that he had been aware of a 
report of some large ships in the Bay of Neustadt.
507
 He claimed that the intelligence 
officer stated that “it’s a bit unusual. We’ve just had a report of some large ships in 
Lübeck bay … they’re supposed to be carrying SS… to fight on in Norway”.508 
Stevenson further recalled his conversation with the intelligence officer. He was 
informed that “I’m sorry, chaps. I really don’t have any more information. The ships are 
there, that’s all we know”.509This again supports suggestions that the British disregarded 
the normal protocols to gain further reconnaissance before ordering a raid to take place.  
 
Similarly flight Lieutenant David Ince later wrote after the war that “the shipping strikes 
went ahead as a result of delays in transmitting the latest intelligence to Air 
headquarters and the Nazis did nothing to discourage them”.510 Evidence therefore 
suggested that sections of the British authorities were clearly aware of the situation in 
the Bay of Lübeck, but for reasons unknown there was a clear delay in forwarding this 
information to the pilots concerned. What failed also to help the British was the lack of 
attention paid to air reconnaissance. Although the British reconnaissance branch relied 
heavily on good weather prior to any take-off, their intelligence was “supplemented by 
various other sources, including POW interrogation, agents’ report, reports from our 
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attaches in neutral countries, the German press and so on”.511 The biggest problem 
facing the British in the early days of May 1945 was that poor weather meant that many 
necessary reconnaissance flights were grounded. For instance 184 squadron reported 
poor weather till lunchtime hindered reconnaissance flights, while squadron leader 
Rumbolds also felt that the weather was severely hindering operations.
512
 I believe that 
there appeared to be a strong urge to pull the final curtain on the Second World War, 
and that the British forces who were involved in the final days were tired of the constant 
fight. However while poor weather hindered the ability of a squadron to function to its 
full capabilities, it fails to acknowledge whether intelligence was sort from other means 
available.  
 
Further evidence of some prior information can be found in various statements given by 
Dr. Arnoldsson.  He received an anonymous letter regarding the seriousness of the 
situation in Neustadt, and the prisoners aboard the ships.
513
 Dr Arnoldsson negotiated 
with an SS-Hauptsturmführer on the keel side of Lubeck. He had been made aware of 
the situation aboard the Athen, which was being utilised to ferry prisoners to the Cap 
Arcona. At this time the Athen was holding some 2,200 prisoners. Although Dr. 
Arnoldsson was unable to offer all those prisoners sanctuary via the Red Cross ships, he 
did offer to take between 250 and 300 inmates. These prisoners were placed aboard the 
Lillie Matthiessen and Magdalena. Arnoldsson advised the SS-Hauptsturmführer that 
they should wait for the arrival of the British forces and hand the prisoners over without 
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fighting. However on the 2 May he returned to the berth of the Athen only to find it had 
been sent to Neustadt. It was at this late stage he learned from a German officer of the 
presence of Neuengamme prisoners aboard the Cap Arcona. But amongst the confusion 
this could be the message received by 83
rd
 Group RAF intelligence, and subsequently 
mis-interpreted by the RAF.
514
 Whatever the results of these communications, the Cap 
Arcona, the ss. Thielbek and ss.Deutschland were attacked leaving their crew and 
captives struggling for survival in the icy Baltic waters. 
 
Conclusion 
The Cap Arcona tragedy remains a topic in Third Reich & British history which still 
remains a narrative of facts rather than an analysis of facts. British foreign policy was 
designed to stop the advance West of Soviet forces. Unfortunately this led to a strategy 
of desperation which meant that careful planning and analysis of credible intelligence 
were side-lined. Although German forces were in a state of chaos and confusion, neutral 
spectators had successfully gained valuable intelligence as to the situation looming in 
Neustadt. Having made this available to British HQ, the processing of this information 
was slow. As a result this mis-communication assisted in the death of some 5,000 KZ 
inmates aboard the Cap Arcona. Therefore Britain’s responsibility in the Cap Arcona 
tragedy cannot be ignored, nor can all the blame be attributed to the German elite. This 
led to a careless British attack which disregarded important and credible intelligence in 
the face of a swift and decisive end to the Second World War. 
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Appendix One 
 
Email Correspondence between Daniel Long and David Ince DFC 
 
Sat 18/07/2015, 18:49 
Dear Daniel 
What follows is something which I wrote in 1983.  It carries its own explanation as to 
why I wrote it and was eventually published in my first autobiography "Combat and 
Competition" which is now out of print. 
  
In the spring of that year STERN magazine published six articles about the sinking of 
prison ships by RAF fighter bombers during the final days of the war.  The implication 
conveyed to STERN's mass circulation readership was of a cock up, followed by a hush 
up, as if we were totally to blame.  But there was no explanation as to why the wretched 
inmates of Neuengamme concentration camp near Hamburg had been put on board 
the Cap Arcona in the first place - nor, as was alleged, why those who managed to 
escape and get ashore were shot out of hand by the German troops. 
  
The first indication here was a piece in the Daily Telegraph one Saturday which 
described the STERN article and questioned its conclusions. Having been personally 
involved,  I was incensed at what had been published in Germany and determined to try 
and set the record straight.  My friend Derek Wood was, inter alia, Air Correspondent of 
the Sunday Telegraph at the time.  So I gave him a ring and he wrote a pretty forthright 
column about it, which appeared the next day.  
  
The articles, and the reader's letters which followed, must have been 
acutely embarrassing to many a decent German. Of course there had been a mistake by 
the RAF.  For the very understandable reason that everything pointed to a final Nazi 
retreat into a Northern Redoubt, Fortress Norway, using all the shipping available. 
 
The fact that the Cap Arcona and two other prison ships were carrying some 9,400 
prisoners on Himmler's express instructions was part of a vain attempt to destroy the 
evidence of mass murders by the Nazi regime. 
  
Those letters, from eyewitnesses among the few survivors and British forces on the 
ground, told a heart rending story.  The German troops, mostly SS, had carried 
out Himmler's vile policy to the bitter end, butchering as many of the survivor's as 
possible.  Two large barges, quite independent of the prison ships which had been 
attacked by the Typhoons, had arrived from Stutthof concentration camp on the Baltic 
coast near Konigsberg.   They were found beached at Travemunde.  The ladders had 
been removed, and the occupant’s machine gunned at close range.  Many of the children 
had been clubbed to death. 
  
Shortly after seeing these appalling sights, Mills-Roberts the Brigadier commanding 1 
Commando was faced with accepting Field Marshal Erhard Milch's surrender. The latter 
was unwise enough to do so with the words 'Heil Hitler' and proffered his baton which 
the brigadier promptly broke over his head. 
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In the end it was quite clear that the atrocity was German.  The shipping strikes went 
ahead as result of delays in transmitting the latest intelligence to Air Headquarters and 
the Nazis did nothing to discourage them, The question remains as to why STERN saw 
fit to publish the story and there have been suggestions of Israeli involvement 
following  Mrs Thatcher's refusal to accept a former leader of the Irgun terrorist 
organisation as Israeli Ambassador in London. 
  
Daniel, I hope this helps.  Am looking for old press cuttings.   But no joy so far. 
  
Best regards 
  
David     
 
 
Wed 22/07/2015, 15:58  
Dear Daniel 
Something else which may help.    
  
The squadrons of 84 Group 2nd TAF provided the ground attack capability for 2nd 
Canadian Army and those of 83 Group did so for 1st British Army. 
  
It was a very clear division of responsibility.  And a rule which to my knowledge was 
only significantly broken on three occasions.  The first two - at Mortain during the 
battle of Normandy - and in the Ardennes at the end of 1944 -  were clearly in response 
to very dangerous developing operational situations.     
  
The third, comprising the Baltic shipping strikes of 3rd and 4th May 1945 was a 
different matter entirely.  That these required the daily forward positioning of squadrons 
to Hustedt produced an immediate and major short term demand for RAF Servicing 
Commandos.  Despite these moves our operational sorties were right on the limit for 
range - with everyone really tight for fuel. 
  
It was not typical of 2TAF Leadership! 
  
To make sense of such demands on the squadrons, with a war nearly won, we have to 
look beyond the battlefield.   
And we can say this.  From then on, if not before, all matters Russian were handled with 
utter distrust - foreshadowing the cold war to come. 
  
See 'Brotherhood of the Skies' chapter thirteen.  It stands out a mile 
  
Best regards   David 
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Appendix Two 
Appendix “A” to Intelligence Summary No 318 
The Surrender of Hamburg 
The following is an extract from 7
th
 Armoured Division Intelligence summary 
No 201 dated 30 April 1945. 
This morning we sent back the civilian owner of the Phoenix Rubber Works 
with a letter to Generalmajor Wölz in Hamburg. This was said that after a meeting of 
the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, which was attended by the Gauleiter, he was sent 
purely in order to tell us that all the inhabitants of Hamburg desired to surrender. 
Our letter ran as follows;- 
To Major General Wölz, 
  Kommandant Hamburg. 
Herr General; 
1. The Reichsfuhrer SS has already made an offer of unconditional surrender to the 
Western powers. This offer was made through Count Bernadotte in Stockholm. 
2. Before attacking Bremen we demanded the surrender of the city. As this offer 
was refused, we had no alternative but to attack with artillery and air support. 
Bremen fell in 24 hours, but not without much unnecessary bloodshed. 
3. In the name of Humanity, Herr General, we demand the surrender of Hamburg. 
For you as a soldier there can be no dishonour in following the example of 
famous German Generals such as General d Pz Tr Josef Harps, GOC 5 Pz Army, 
Genlt Fritz Bayerlein, GOC LIII Corps and many others who have surrendered 
themselves and their commands. From the political point of view, there can 
surely be no reflection on you if you allow yourself to follow the example of the 
Reichsführer SS. 
4. We therefore ask you, Herr General, to send into our lines an officer empowered 
to negotiate the surrender. Our forward troops have bene warned to expect his 
arrival and not to shoot at him. He will be treated according to the Geneva 
Convention, and returned after the parley to his own lines. 
5. The population of Hamburg will not easily forget its first large-scale raid by 
over 1,000 bombers. We now dispose of a bomber force 5-10 times greater 
numerically, and operating from nearby airfields. After the war, the German 
people must be fed; the more Hamburg’s dock installations are damaged, the 
greater are the chances of famine in Germany. 
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6. If this offer is refused, we shall have no alternative but to attack Hamburg with 
all the forces at our disposal. 
(Source; 30 Corps Int Summary No 619) 
Source: TNA AIR 37/366:  No 83 Group (124 and 129 Wings): Intelligence Summaries, 
April 1945. 
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